Tag Archives: Arjun Tank

Invite white paper on DRDO’s current scenario

To                                                                                                             14th August 2014
Sh. Narendra Modi,
Prime Minister,
Room No – 152, PMO,
South Block, NEW DELHI -110011

Subject: Invite white paper on DRDO’s current scenario.

Honorable Sir,

I have to submit following points for rejuvenate DRDO and give moral boost to real honest scientific work force for fruitful and meaningful system/ arms development for end application in three services.

  1. DRDO since its inception was committed to assist the active services and the defence production agency in modernization of front line technologies.
  2. Until 1980 the organization followed its road map which was evolved by Dr Kothari the then front line technologies to PM. Since then we fought three successive war with our neighbors and requirements of three services increased   many fold as they had to secure our borders from external threats,
  3. The demand on DRDO increased therefore, 52 defence R&D labs scattered across the India were established in phased manner. Primary importance was given to the development of long/short range missiles, tank equaling to world class technology, light combat aircraft, nuclear powered submarine, kilo class of warships.
  4. With foregoing objectives government of India in 1980 when Smt Indira Gandhi returned to power declared DRDO an integral part of defence working under secretary, DR&D, DG, DRDO and Scientific Adviser to Raksha Mantri. (the three combined post to be hold by single person)
  5. Simultaneously the annual budget of DRDO from Rs 64 crores was raised to 1100 crores in particular for establishing modern infrastructures and accelerates indigenous technology development of arms and ammunitions.
  6.  The enhanced fund and absolute power to SA to RM without accountability derailed the road map laid by Dr. Kothari the then adviser to PM. Prior to this the post of SA to RM was honorary post
  7.  Grabbing land in the name of defence and construction of buildings disproportionate to manpower was the prime work of DRDO top bosses after mid 1980’s. Since the omission commission is hefty every DRDO top officials focused upon the infrastructure development without justified the requirements or create fake requirement in the name of ongoing projects and this being continue till date. Annual maintainace and repairs of these unused infrastructures gulps the major chunk of DRDO annual budget.
  8. Presently in DRDO 99% officials are engaged with procurement cases and look for its completion on 31st march every year, however, they have forgotten the development of frontline technologies and some of the projects/ programs under taken in early 70’s which were suppose to completed by not later than 5 years from the date of sanction is still incomplete after 40 years the notable example are Arjun tank, GTX engine, Tejas, Nag, Akash, Trishul missiles etc.
  9. Due to weak government at the center nobody question the authenticity of prolong time taken for development of arms/ ammunitions etc.
  10. While successive SA to RM were able to justify the failures  and where the centre rewarded those with Padama Awards, such erroneous decisions encouraged the incompetency in DRDO and at one time before the Kargil War SA to RM authenticated the conceptual proving of the arms than the development of prototype. The justification was that “ we are 100 crores people nobody can attack on us
  11. Immediately India witnessed the Kargil conflict in 1999 where the General Malik said “casualties in the conflict could have been reduced had the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) not come in the way
  12. With this poor show of DRDO during Kagil war the then PM expressed unhappiness with then SA to RM and said “ अपना घर संभालिये सब कुछ ठीक नहीं चल रहा है
  13. Today the condition is that the DRDO procurement policy 2006 duly approved by finance ministry is violated by top DRDO officials (SA to RM, Directors, Program Directors etc.) by splitting the orders to make them within their sanction power. Compromising the quality, favors to vendor by customizing specifications, managed foreign visits with help of suppliers all this result at the end short closing of the project without deliverable output.
  14. Now annually DRDO consuming not less than Rs 10000 crores but ultimate looser is country with poor tax payers. “DRDO has become social commitment” Former PM Sh VP Singh said in 2nd DRDO Director’s conference at Bangalore.

Honorable Sir,

A white paper may please be sought from DRDO and it should be made public so that 49% FDI in defence sector could be justified.

Following points to be justified

  1. Total asset of DRDO
  2. Annual Budget
  3. Lab wise manpower vis -a -vis Project/Programs (it will give the clear picture of delays in output)
  4. Products developed and its production and deployments in services for each lab (it will prove the worthiness of Lab)
  5.  Awards – vis a vis output of awardees
  6. Incentives given on product development ( this will expose the real talent)
  7. Patents – Granted/ applied
  8. Man power planned and its proportionate buildup accommodation lab wise
  9. Total cost of abandon equipments lab wise
  10. Statistical failure data analyzing and corrective measure for deployed project like LCA/Arjun Tank/Arihant/various Missiles.

Sir, this is a honest approach to clean DRDO from corruption as you said in Kargil  “Corruption is the worst plague that has ruined the country. Once it is rooted out, we will sail on the path of development smoothly,”

 
Regards
  
Prabhu Dandriyal
21-Sunderwala, Raipur
Dehradun-248008
Phone 0135- 2787750, Mobile- 9411114879,
e-mail id prabhudoon@gmail.com, website 
www.corruptionindrdo.com

Chinks in the Armour – What ail DRDO, India’s Premier Defence Organigation?

Rediff.com – News-Special Part- III

‘DRDO took up Arjun before it learnt to make tanks’

George Iype

Some 20 years ago, the defence ministry entrusted the DRDO with two projects: the development of a battle tank and a multi-barrel rocket launcher system.

The DRDO called the former, assigned to it in 1974, Arjun, and the latter Pinaka.

Two-plus decades later, the Arjun is considered a major failure. And so is the Pinaka. The Indian army found the latter passed only seven of its 29 requirements.

Defence experts allege that DRDO continues to work on Arjun and Pinaka just to keep its laboratories open.

“The Arjun main battle tank is not world class and has failed to meet the required levels of accuracy. But DRDO is keeping it alive because it does not want its factories to close down,” says Major General (retd) Ashok Mehta.

Experts like Major General Mehta feel the Arjun could have been a tank with potential if DRDO had got its act together. But the premier defence research organisation continues to exert pressure on the army to accept a limited series of production for the Arjun.

Army officers say it is politics and not the tank’s potential that is at work in the defence ministry, which last year placed orders with the Avadi Ordinance Factory to manufacture 124 Arjun tanks.

“I am happy to inform you that not only is the army satisfied with the Arjun tank’s performance, but it has placed an order for 124 more such tanks,” Defence Minister George Fernandes had told Parliament. “With this India has achieved the capability for indigenous manufacture of battle tanks.”

Army officials, however, say no other defence agency in the world must have spent 25 years and Rs 3.5 billion on developing a tank that has failed to perform.

“We have wasted money and time in producing a tank that is just not a world class product these days,” an army officer in Hyderabad says.

Insiders say the army was not “satisfied with the Arjun’s performance” as Fernandes claimed, but was coerced to accept it by the DRDO.

N K Mohan Pillai, a retired army officer who witnessed the Arjun trials, says the tank lacked three vital strengths. First, its engine is weak. Second, its suspension needs permanent maintenance. Third, its gun control is not accurate enough to obtain first round kill probability.

“In fact, the main problem was that DRDO took up the Arjun project before learning how to make tanks,” Pillai remarks.

In 1994 when DRDO announced that the Arjun tank was ready for production, then army chief General B C Joshi witnessed the trials. He sent a note to the DRDO and the defence minister saying the tank fails to meet standards and therefore was unacceptable. General Joshi then laid down a dozen imperatives that DRDO should take to improve upon the tank.

General Joshi’s main concerns were that the tank that weighs 57 tonnes lacked armour protection and vital suspension for crew comfort and gunfire accuracy.

But DRDO, which has showcased the Arjun as its finest indigenous product, claims that the problem is not with the tank, but with the army.

“The army is used to handling only T-72 tanks. For the soldiers who have fired T-72 tanks, operating the Arjun is a gigantic task. So we have told the army to train their crew before accusing us of inferior production,” a DRDO engineer says.

Despite DRDO’s claims, many in the army believe that the 124 Arjun tanks will drain the exchequer just like the multi-barrel rocket launching system Pinaka did.

In 1999 the Comptroller and Auditor General severely indicted DRDO for its failure to develop critical components for Pinaka after spending Rs 424.5 million on the project.

The defence ministry had entrusted DRDO with the Pinaka project in 1980. The deadline given was 1994. Twenty years later DRDO is nowhere near finishing. The war heads and all the three vehicles necessary for launching the rockets are yet to be developed by DRDO. Against the requirement of eight types of warheads, only three have been developed. Of this, one is not acceptable to the army and the other is only a dummy.

“The delay in the development of the EWPinaka has compelled the army to depend on our existing 20 kilometre-range system even during Kargil conflict. The DRDO is entirely responsible for this,” charges an army officer.

According to experts, the Pinaka system has met just seven of the 29 requirements of the army during trials. The indigenous rocket launcher lacks the promised range, fire power, loading time of the salvo and deployment time.

These, however, are “minor problems” according to DRDO.

Arjun under fire, Army wants another MBT — Manu Pubby Posted: Sat Apr 26 2008, 23:54 hrs NEW DELHI, APRIL 25:

The latest round of user trials has made it clear that even after 30 years of development, Arjun Tank comes nowhere near meeting minimum operational requirements of the Army.

However, what is worrying the top brass is that DRDO’s insistence on inducting larger numbers of the indigenous tank will come in the way of a newer, better “Main Battle Tank (MBT) of the future” that is now required by the Army.

While Army HQ is not even thinking about extending its original order of 124 Arjun Tanks for two regiments, given that it is unacceptable for induction in the present form, the top brass is concerned that continued DRDO efforts on the Arjun will delay its requirement of a futuristic MBT.

The Army has now told DRDO that there is no point bickering about the past and the Arjun Tank should be treated as a technology demonstrator and a platform to work on a totally new tank design for the future.

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There is a certain degree of urgency in the Army’s demand as it is aware of an increasing void in the tank armoury and its requirement of 3,500 tanks to replace the ageing T 72 MBT.

“After 30 years, the Arjun has not fructified, and now we need to start with a new design and a new tank. We have always said that a next (generation) tank has to come out in due course of time. We now have a base and expertise to start on the futuristic tank,” Lt Gen KDS Shekhawat, who till February was Director General of Mechanised Forces at Army HQ, said.

The current round of winter trials, where the German-origin power pack of the tank failed four times within a run of 1,000 kms, is the latest in the series of setbacks that have dogged the project since its inception in 1974.

The Army is disappointed that the tank has failed to deliver on every single count that was citied for the prolonged indigenous research project. The engine, tracks, transmissions and gunners sight — that together account for 60 per cent of its cost — are all imported.

“When we placed the order, 60 per cent of the components were imported. It was going to cost us Rs 25 crore at a time when the T 90 was available for below Rs 10 crore. But it was an indigenous effort, so we agreed for 124 tanks. But not much has changed. We still remain dependant on foreign firms, and there is a lot of unhappiness as it has not met operational requirements of the Army,” feels General VP Malik, who was the Army chief during the Kargil conflict.

The Army is not just questioning the technology of the tank but is also worried about Arjun’s reliability factor given that various components of the tank have not been tested in harsh climatic conditions and terrain unique to India.

As demonstrated during the ongoing Accelerated Usage-cum-Reliability Trials (AUCRT) of the Arjun tank (crucial to clear it for bulk production), the German engine failed four times as it had never been extensively tested by the Army in desert conditions in the past.

Besides, the Army also found “unacceptable” the chipping of the gun barrel during firing trials. The old problem in the hydro pneumatic suspension system also resurfaced.

The next litmus test for the Arjun comes on May 5 when DRDO will make a presentation at Army HQ to explain the defects and the steps taken to rectify the engine faults. Ironically, the DRDO, which was supposed to clarify on the trials this month itself, delayed the presentation by close to two weeks, saying it needs more time to prepare a report. After the DRDO presentation, the Army will take a call to either repeat the third round of AUCRT trials or proceed to the fourth “summer round” of the trials.

EXPERTSPEAK

• General VP Malik, former Army Chief “I can see a lot of unhappiness with the quality of the tank. It is primarily because of very long delay. Even at the end of it all, the tank has not come up to the operational satisfaction of the Army. I am all for self-reliance but we have to make the Arjun more indigenous than it is today.

Lt Gen KDS Shekhawat, former DG, Mechanised Forces No point bickering over past. It is gone. Tanks have a certain shelf life, and now we need a new design looking into the future. Ultimately, it is the men who have to use the tank. If they have confidence, they will love the equipment.

• Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies I don’t really see a major future of the Arjun as the MBT of India. Over all, the Arjun tank has not met certain major parameters. However, the Army had expected that the two regiments to be inducted would meet requirements so that extensive trials could be carried out.

• AV Singh, former defence secretary Regardless of the shortcomings, we must encourage it as an indigenous effort. As far as opening development to the Indian private sector is concerned, it will add to the competition, improve quality and will shorten the development time.