Hon’ble Shri Manohar Parrikar, Defence Minister, Room No -104, South Block, New Delhi-110011
SUBJECT: Regarding 25 questions asked by government for improving DRDO.
Sir,
Government is putting his whole heartedly efforts to improve the DRDO in the interest of defence preparedness and properly utilization of govt. fund as well as the turning DRDO in delivering mode. Government floated 25 questions to understand the DRDO problems that why after spending so huge amount not able to deliver single 100% indigenous system.
Unfortunately, government is seeking answer from those who are the responsible for gutted DRDO in this stage. How can they accept their incompetency, they are not so generous because they were not even take seriously KARGIL WAR failures. The Gen Malik openly told the country “We had one or two incidents particularly on the weapon-locating radar. If the DRDO had not come in the way we would have got them before the Kargil war and that would have definitely reduced our casualties,” he told Karan Thapar on Devil’s Advocate programme on CNN-IBN.
One question out of 25 questiosn is – What DRDO is doing to make quality scientific manpower pool larger than what is available, to make it much more competent and qualitative, and what kind of facilities and infrastructure DRDO provide to scientific community including their pay, facilities and other things? – Action CC R&D (HR)
I don’t know what DRDO submitted against this question but yesterday I have received a good real analytical input from one of DRDO establishment ACEM, Nashik. Which can an eye opener for Ministry of Defence to see the real cause of DRDO failure?
Although the received letter is not having sign but as per sources all information are true and it can be verified by not from GM but from each and every officials/ employees of ACEM.
It is requested that listen the voice of young scientists although they are serving for their livelihood but same time want to contribute to nation with their full knowledge and ability but unfortunately DRDO management is rotten that the young scientists simply wasting their energy and time.
With hope our great IITan Shri Parrikar ji will this issue with honest and eligible scientists and use the scientific potential in right direction.
Regards
Prabhu Dandriyal 21-Sunderwala, Raipur, DehradunPh 0135 2787750, Mobile 9411114879,
The Modi government has done the right thing by jolting an ossified bureaucracy
India’s ossified bureaucracy is being shuffled like never before. The most recent development in this realm has been the rather dramatic sacking of Sujatha Singh from the post of the Foreign Secretary and the appointment of S Jaishankar to that position. The rumours about this development were floating around for quite some time. Still, when the decision actually came to replace Singh about seven months before the end of her tenure, it ended up sending shock waves through the complacent Indian foreign policy establishment.
No one seems to be contesting that Jaishankar is a great choice. Yet the critics of the decision have largely focused on bureaucratic niceties by suggesting Jaishankar’s appointment not only curtailed Singh’s career but also ended up blocking the career prospects of some senior Indian Foreign Service (IFS) officers. The reaction of the Congress Party has been rather strange with former information and broadcasting minister Manish Tewari trying to link the action to the Khobragade episode involving an IFS officer who was jailed in the US two years ago for allegedly mistreating her maid. He tweeted: “Is sacking of Foreign Secretary late retribution for her stand on Devyani Khobragade affair? Removal after a Presidential visit ‘coincidental’?”
Such criticisms of the government’s decision are missing the key point. This decision should be viewed as part of a larger, and much needed, bureaucratic shake-up that the Prime Minister is engendering. Just two weeks ago, the government had also terminated the appointment of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) chief Avinash Chander, 15 months before his contract was to end.
Prime Ministers till now have devoted, at best, occasional interest in nuclear and strategic policy issues, mainly preferring to delegate substantial levels of policy making discretion to organisations like the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The conduct of the DRDO has been largely driven by an effort to protect its direct communicative link to the Prime Minister, secure recurrent generous funding, and maintain a high level of autonomy. Given its significant budgetary resources in the context of a developing nation, DRDO has repeatedly failed in delivering quality output. Major projects of the DRDO including the Light Combat Aircraft Tejas, Nag missile, Long-range Surface-to-Air missile project and the Airborne Early Warning and Control System have either not been completed on time or have resulted in huge cost overruns. It took the agency almost a decade and a half to operationalise the Agni-I.
The inattention or inability of the Prime Minister’s office so far to take concrete steps to improve the DRDO’s performance and compel it to cooperate with other defence bureaucratic stakeholders has permitted it a remarkable degree of self-governance in budgetary prioritisation, project design and delivery time-scale planning, and setting operational policy through regular statements outlining the doctrinal meaning of DRDO products. Prime Minister Modi had criticised the DRDO for its chalta hai attitude during an address in Kargil in August last year when he had said, “If a project was conceived in 1992, it should not be the case in 2014 we are still saying it will take some more time.” And in December last year, India’s Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence had censured the DRDO, accusing it of shoddy research, chronic inefficiency, inordinate delays, corruption and its penchant for reverse engineering. The government seems to have taken the bull by the horns and removed Chander to ensure some semblance of accountability in the organisation.
The appointment of Jaishankar as foreign secretary is also along the same lines that merit would be rewarded. The Indian Foreign Service (IFS) needs to recognise that business as usual is no longer enough. At a time when India’s global imprint is expanding rapidly, a risk-averse foreign policy bureaucracy will not be able to meet the aspirations of the nation. The idea that seniority should determine who should be the nation’s top diplomat is an idea whose time has long gone. But bureaucratic resistance has prevented any substantive reforms in the service. There are hardly any incentives to perform and hardly any penalties for underperformance.
As a result, nearly everyone in the diplomatic service manages to rise to the upper echelons. Despite the fact that the best and the brightest are no longer attracted to the IFS, there have been few attempts to cultivate outside expertise, with hardly any opportunities for lateral entry or temporary rotations. In fact, it was Manmohan Singh who had wanted to introduce lateral entry in the Indian bureaucracy in his first term but the idea was quietly killed by the bureaucracy (who else?). Personnel are scarce and demands are growing on the IFS but Indian diplomats have not managed to transform the service and change its character to suit the needs of the time. Is it any wonder then that ad hocism pervades Indian foreign policy thinking?
Bureaucracies, if not competently led and directed, tend to morph into interest groups with a focus on preserving their own institutional privileges. In democracies, effective political control and guidance is absolutely critical if the role of bureaucracies is not to become corrosive on policymaking. It is in the nature of bureaucracies to be risk-averse. Leave them alone and they will muddle along the path of least resistance, trying to increase their power by resisting change. The Modi government is right in shaking things up and making Indian bureaucracies more accountable and effective. But much more remains to be done!
Dalip Singh | Mail Today | New Delhi, June 14, 2011
Suresh Sharma exposed corruption and nepotism in sensitive appointments made by top brass of NTRO.
A senior official in the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) is facing the heat for blowing the whistle on corruption and nepotism in the premier intelligence body.
Director (establishment) Suresh Sharma was moved out of the NTRO’s Delhi headquarters after red-flagging large-scale irregularities in sensitive appointments made by the organisation brass.
The NTRO has been courting bad publicity following an as yet-unreleased report by the comptroller and auditor general (CAG), criticising the organisation for alleged irregularities in the purchase of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles).
The organisation, set up after the Kargil war to spruce up technical intelligence, reports to the National Security Adviser who is answerable directly to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The PMO has sought the NTRO’s response on the CAG report.
In January, about a month before he was moved to Bangalore, Sharma wrote to NSA Shiv Shankar Menon accusing senior adviser P. V. Kumar of aiding irregularities in the appointment of external pilots and scientists, among other posts. Recently, Kumar was elevated as the NTRO head.
The PMO had forwarded Sharma’s complaint for appropriate action to Kumar, then acting chairman of the NTRO. As nothing seemed to have come of it, the PMO sent a reminder on March 30 and asked for an action taken report.
The PMO also constituted a single-member inquiry panel under Kumar to look into the complaints of irregular appointments. Strangely, the complaints were marked to Kumar despite the fact that the supervisory role of the NTRO chairman was not above board.
A detailed questionnaire was faxed to the NTRO chairman more than a week back, seeking his response on the serious charges against him and allegations of corruption in the premier organisation. However, Kumar refused to file a reply despite several reminders.
Sharma had alleged in his letter to the NSA that Kumar had attempted to water down the true findings of his inquiry panel. Sharma could not be reached for comments despite making several calls to Bangalore.
Sharma, who was holding the charge of additional controller (administration) in the NTRO, stated in his fivepage complaint that he had tried to apprise Kumar of the appointments violating all government norms and corruption in the organisation.
“A lot of pressure was mounted on me to change my notes but, as a dutiful officer of central government posted in a very sensitive organisation, I did not succumb to any such pressure,” he wrote.
The letter quotes several instances to give a glimpse of what is wrong in the NTRO. A group captain (retired) posted at the Dehradun aviation base was shielded despite complaints of corruption pending against him. As a cover-up exercise, the NTRO ordered an inquiry against him. But its establishment division suggested the probe report not be accepted as it did not follow government regulations. Once the objections were raised on the official file, it was never returned to the establishment division, Sharma alleged.
Two officers were employed on a contract basis in the organisation at the joint secretary-level. The NTRO, overlooking the PMO’s directive putting a cap on employment at 65 years’ age, wanted to extend their services. The NTRO suggested the two could be appointed at ‘job contract basis’, which too was illegal.
The CAG report is also believed to have taken note of the irregularities. But it is suspected the government is not willing to make the report public as it would open up a can of worms which would be difficult for the PMO to defend.
What about SDR after DEAL’s Director Sh RC Agarwal’s second extension , Aditya after second PDC extension, not even static target fire achieved, in last 15 years corruption in DRDO increased 15 fold ?????????
Couldn’t get key radars before Kargil due to DRDO, says Malik
New Delhi, September 6 The Tribune, Chandigarh
Former Army chief VP Malik, who led the army during the 1999 Kargil war, has said casualties in the conflict could have been reduced had DRDO “not come in the way” in the acquisition of weapon-locating radars.
“We had one or two incidents particularly on the weapon-locating radar. If the DRDO had not come in the way we would have got them before the Kargil war and that would have definitely reduced our casualties,” he told Karan Thapar on Devil’s Advocate programme on CNN-IBN.
Asked whether DRDO was “slight boastful” in claims over developing weapons, Malik said, “Well that has been our (armed forces’) experience over the development of weapons and equipment the DRDO has delivered or not delivered.”
On whether APJ Abdul Kalam, during his stint as the Director-General of the DRDO, overestimated the country’s capacity and ability, Malik merely said. “I do not want to go more into that.”
Amid claims by some scientists that Pokhran-II in 1998 was not a complete success, Malik says armed forces were “affected” by doubts over its efficacy and need to be “reassured” by the nuclear establishment on the exact yield of the atomic tests. Malik also said the statement by former president APJ Abdul Kalam, the DRDO chief when India exploded the bombs in 1998, rubbishing the claims of his colleague and defence scientist Dr K Santhanam, was “unconvincing.”
Santhanam said the tests were a fizzle, which were rejected by Kalam, who said Pokhran-II was a complete success. “They (armed forces) need to be reassured about the weapon system they use and about the planning of what kind of the yield they have when they hit the target,” said Malik. He dubbed as shocking the recent comments of Santhanam, questioning the yield of the thermonuclear device tested on May 11, 1998. “Yes, it affects the armed forces. Particularly, because, when they plan the task given to them then they have to know what kind of yield that each nuclear weapon has,” he said, stressing that it was important to remove doubts.
“Let us not forget that Dr Santhanam was part of his (Kalam’s) team. And it came as quite a shock with Dr Santhanam himself mentioning that it was a fizzle. Of course, again he was referring to the thermonuclear weapon. So, Dr Kalam’s statement was not quite convincing,” he said. Malik said the team of scientists led by then chairman of the Atomic Energy commission R Chidambaram should reassure the armed forces on the yield of the weapons. — PTI
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Rest as shown in picture foam cushions, Hinges, Lifting brackets Stickers and carpentry charges etc Cost you can guess?
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EXCLUSIVE INTELLIGENCE SECURITY BREACHES By The Way, I Dropped It India’s defence data could be an open secret. Ask the NTRO bosses who lost their laptops. SAIKAT DATTA – OUTLOOK INDIA.COM
MAGAZINE | AUG 30, 2010
The Agni missile: India’s nuclear delivery mechanism could well be in enemy knowledge
In 2006, Ravind Sistala was one among a clutch of scientists on deputation from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) in New Delhi. Set up in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil War, NTRO was meant to be a single technical intelligence facility to keep watch on India’s hostile neighbours. It was also supposed to issue warning signals to those manning India’s missile systems and nuclear warheads in real time so that they could retaliate in case of a possible enemy strike. Sistala’s was a crucial job. The fortysomething was the centre director of NTRO’s missile monitoring division, a position that called for high levels of responsibility and secrecy. But very few within India’s security apparatus are aware, even today, that Sistala was involved in one of the biggest security breaches in India’s post-Independence history. He compromised a Rs 1,850-crore intelligence-gathering programme that had key linkages to India’s growing nuclear arsenal and missile systems. Unencrypted ‘Top Secret’ data pertaining to these was stored on Sistala’s Hewlett-Packard laptop (given to him by NTRO) which disappeared mysteriously while he was on his way to the Delhi airport in early 2006. Did the information-packed computer fall into the wrong hands? Was it stolen by an enemy agent? Even today, no one knows where the laptop is. If still in enemy hands, it has the potential to inflict immense damage.
Ideally, such a security leak should have set alarm bells ringing and occasioned a swift and thorough investigation by the IB, RAW and Delhi Police. But rather than give the incident the attention and inquiry it deserved, a small but extremely powerful group of people—comprising a PMO official, DRDO scientists on deputation to NTRO and intelligence officials—helped Sistala escape any indictment by holding just an in house inquiry, which unearthed little. The missing laptop forgotten, Sistala continued as the head of the sensitive missile programme for another two years, and then returned to the DRDO.
Two years after the Sistala episode, another security breach took place in the NTRO. Arun Dixit, the centre director of the organisation’s atomic explosion division (AED), lost his laptop somewhere in Washington DC during an official trip to the US with the NTRO chairman. The laptop was crammed with top secret data on India’s intelligence on the nuclear weapons programmes of several countries, including Pakistan, China and North Korea. But like in Sistala’s case, the powerful lobby of defence scientists once again scuttled a thorough investigation. The leak was buried and kept out of the files. Dixit too escaped any scrutiny and still serves in the NTRO in the very same post.
Lost Laptops And Their ‘X’ Files
Place Delhi
Year 2006
Official Involved Ravind Sistala
Designation Centre Director (missile monitoring division)
Organisation National Technical Research Organisation
Incident Laptop goes missing from his car
Secret Data Lost
Presentations on Indian efforts to monitor missiles of neighboring countries
Details on the capabilities of the nuclear delivery systems of Pakistan and China
Response options available to India’s nuclear forces (Strategic Forces Command)
Deployment of radars to counter incoming missiles
Vulnerable points in India’s air defence network
Action taken None. Laptop not recovered. Official transferred to DRDO in a more sensitive position.
***
Place Washington DC
Year 2008
Official Involved Arun Dixit
Designation Centre Director (atomic devices division)
Organisation NTRO
Secret Data Lost
Defence nuclear programmes of neighbouring countries
Nuclear proliferation in Asia
Dirty bombs being made in neighbouring countries
Action taken None. Laptop not recovered. After probe, errant official retained in the same organisation.
***
Place Delhi
Year 2003
Organisation Defence Research and Development Organisation
Incident 53 computers go missing; later found with hard disks removed
Secret Data Lost
Secret coding of all communication used by the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the defence forces, and the paramilitary forces, including Border Security Force
Logs of intercepted Pakistani communications
Action taken Case still unsolved. None of the hard disks have been recovered. DRDO has practically closed the case.
SistalaandDixitclearly violated OSA,butescaped. They were also liableto 14 years’imprisonment.
The NTRO was set up in the summer of ’03. A year earlier, a Group of Ministers had handpicked RAW special secretary R.S. Bedi to set up the new intelligence outfit. Bedi started the process by setting up an office in room no. 326, Sardar Patel Bhavan, in the heart of Delhi, on March 29, 2003. The organisation was formally notified in July.
Set up to plug gaps in India’s security establishment post the Kargil debacle, the NTRO’s charter eventually went much beyond the mere act of gathering intelligence. It became a key element within the security apparatus, hitting headlines recently when Outlook reported its ability to pluck GSM phone calls off the air. Bedi had served in RAW’s Aviation Research Centre, which monitored the missile and atomic programmes of neighbours. NTRO took on this responsibility after it came into being.
NTRO’s task thus was to monitor and gather intelligence on all missile programmes in the region and convey the data in real time to the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), a special military organisation that mans India’s nuclear arsenal and would deploy it in the event of a nuclear war. The SFC would also, based on NTRO data, periodically review and upgrade its positioning of nuclear missiles, and coordinate with the defence forces in launching a counter-strike against any nuclear threat.
This called for a credible linkage between a vast and intricate network of ground-based radars, satellites, secret command codes and SFC’s nuclear arsenal. NTRO’s missile monitoring division established these linkages and set up an early warning network for the SFC. Sistala had a key role in creating these linkages and as such had access to the most sensitive data on India’s capabilities, response time and secret codes. Naturally enough, all these details were part of the presentations, notes, documents, files and folders—all marked ‘Top Secret’—he had on the laptop he was given by the NTRO. Standard rules mandate that a laptop given by the organisation cannot be taken home or used to connect to the Internet. But these being early days for NTRO, Sistala was travelling around the country making presentations to security officials, beginning with then NSA M.K. Narayanan to the three service chiefs, the SFC commander, the intelligence chiefs and other top DRDO scientists who were to work on the technological aspects of the project.
This is the time his laptop went missing. Shockingly, NTRO buried the episode in no time. A preliminary inquiry was ordered to be carried out by Brigadier Anil Malhotra, its counter-intelligence official, but it was quickly wound up. By this time, Bedi had retired from NTRO. A powerful lobby of defence scientists, led by R. Chidambaram, the principal scientific advisor to the government, had already determined his successor: DRDO scientist K.V.S.S. Prasad Rao. Rao had no previous experience in intelligence but he had served as the staff officer to Chidambaram for several years. Sistala, also from the DRDO, got a much-needed reprieve from the ongoing inquiry. He continued with the missile monitoring division for two more years before returning to the DRDO to work on air defence radars.
Outlook’s attempts to elicit an official comment from NTRO via a detailed questionnaire sent a week before going to print met with silence. Phone calls and text messages to NTRO chairman Prasad Rao, its advisor P.V. Kumar, Sistala and Dixit evoked no response either. DRDO, in a cryptic response to an Outlook query, said it wasn’t aware of any lapses by Sistala at NTRO.
Such security breaches are nothing new for the clique that still lords it over DRDO and NTRO. In Oct ’03, 53 computers were stolen one night from two DRDO labs—the Systems Analysis Group and the Institute for Systems Analysis and Studies—in Metcalfe House in Delhi. The computer carcasses were found later, but the hard disks had been removed. They contained secret encryption codes and communications of the army, navy, air force and all central police organisations. Till date, no DRDO scientist has been blamed. Many have even been promoted. A police investigation made no headway, while an internal inquiry remains alive on paper even though many of its members have retired.
It’s also ironical that while many other officials have been prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act (OSA) on flimsy and concocted cases (see following story), Sistala and Dixit have escaped, despite being in clear violation of the OSA. In fact, since the leaks were related to India’s nuclear defence as well as secret codes, they could easily have attracted a penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. Instead, the duo has continued in their careers. Should India’s intelligence agencies really be allowed to operate without even a modicum of accountability?
Dear friends,
I am looking this spirit in DRDO young scientists, few contacted and associated for noble cause, but still search is on at least one or two from each Lab come forward. I assure that these corrupt DRDO officials have no backbone basically they are beggars and always ready/ willing to lick the foots of suppliers and their bosses. the whole nation witnessed the KARGIL WAR and the statement of former Army chief V P Malik, who led the army during the 1999 Kargil war, has said “casualties in the conflict could have been reduced had DRDOnot come in the way” in the acquisition of weapon-locating radar. “Delivery delayed is delivery denied,” said Defence Minister A.K. Antony.
‘DRDO took up Arjun before it learnt to make tanks’
George Iype
Some 20 years ago, the defence ministry entrusted the DRDO with two projects: the development of a battle tank and a multi-barrel rocket launcher system.
The DRDO called the former, assigned to it in 1974, Arjun, and the latter Pinaka.
Two-plus decades later, the Arjun is considered a major failure. And so is the Pinaka. The Indian army found the latter passed only seven of its 29 requirements.
Defence experts allege that DRDO continues to work on Arjun and Pinaka just to keep its laboratories open.
“The Arjun main battle tank is not world class and has failed to meet the required levels of accuracy. But DRDO is keeping it alive because it does not want its factories to close down,” says Major General (retd) Ashok Mehta.
Experts like Major General Mehta feel the Arjun could have been a tank with potential if DRDO had got its act together. But the premier defence research organisation continues to exert pressure on the army to accept a limited series of production for the Arjun.
Army officers say it is politics and not the tank’s potential that is at work in the defence ministry, which last year placed orders with the Avadi Ordinance Factory to manufacture 124 Arjun tanks.
“I am happy to inform you that not only is the army satisfied with the Arjun tank’s performance, but it has placed an order for 124 more such tanks,” Defence Minister George Fernandes had told Parliament. “With this India has achieved the capability for indigenous manufacture of battle tanks.”
Army officials, however, say no other defence agency in the world must have spent 25 years and Rs 3.5 billion on developing a tank that has failed to perform.
“We have wasted money and time in producing a tank that is just not a world class product these days,” an army officer in Hyderabad says.
Insiders say the army was not “satisfied with the Arjun’s performance” as Fernandes claimed, but was coerced to accept it by the DRDO.
N K Mohan Pillai, a retired army officer who witnessed the Arjun trials, says the tank lacked three vital strengths. First, its engine is weak. Second, its suspension needs permanent maintenance. Third, its gun control is not accurate enough to obtain first round kill probability.
“In fact, the main problem was that DRDO took up the Arjun project before learning how to make tanks,” Pillai remarks.
In 1994 when DRDO announced that the Arjun tank was ready for production, then army chief General B C Joshi witnessed the trials. He sent a note to the DRDO and the defence minister saying the tank fails to meet standards and therefore was unacceptable. General Joshi then laid down a dozen imperatives that DRDO should take to improve upon the tank.
General Joshi’s main concerns were that the tank that weighs 57 tonnes lacked armour protection and vital suspension for crew comfort and gunfire accuracy.
But DRDO, which has showcased the Arjun as its finest indigenous product, claims that the problem is not with the tank, but with the army.
“The army is used to handling only T-72 tanks. For the soldiers who have fired T-72 tanks, operating the Arjun is a gigantic task. So we have told the army to train their crew before accusing us of inferior production,” a DRDO engineer says.
Despite DRDO’s claims, many in the army believe that the 124 Arjun tanks will drain the exchequer just like the multi-barrel rocket launching system Pinaka did.
In 1999 the Comptroller and Auditor General severely indicted DRDO for its failure to develop critical components for Pinaka after spending Rs 424.5 million on the project.
The defence ministry had entrusted DRDO with the Pinaka project in 1980. The deadline given was 1994. Twenty years later DRDO is nowhere near finishing. The war heads and all the three vehicles necessary for launching the rockets are yet to be developed by DRDO. Against the requirement of eight types of warheads, only three have been developed. Of this, one is not acceptable to the army and the other is only a dummy.
“The delay in the development of the EWPinaka has compelled the army to depend on our existing 20 kilometre-range system even during Kargil conflict. The DRDO is entirely responsible for this,” charges an army officer.
According to experts, the Pinaka system has met just seven of the 29 requirements of the army during trials. The indigenous rocket launcher lacks the promised range, fire power, loading time of the salvo and deployment time.
These, however, are “minor problems” according to DRDO.
After 1942 it become clear that India will become independent and the national leaders started carving various developmental plans and knowing fully well that the day British goes the kitty will be empty.
However, Tata, Birla and many financially sound business tycoons came forward to rebuild India. Tata institute of Sciences, BITS Pilani, Visvesvaraya Technological University, etc. were to execute the task in land.
In 1948, though it was minor war we used equipment/arm ammunitions left out by British and fortunately both the parties across the border used the same equipment and arms ammunitions.
In 1962 we were an infant but had to fight the Chinese war in which we imported some equipment and arms ammunitions.
Successively in 1965 & 1971 once again we depended upon imported Russian equipment and some equipment given to India on goodwill.
In 1999, Kargil we were 52 years old with scientific and technological achievements on papers with lot of rewards awards like Scientist of the year, young scientist, PATH BREAKING RESEARCH AND OUTSTANDING TECHNOLOGY, AGNI AWARD FOR EXCELLENCE IN SELF-RELIANCE, DEFENCE TECHNOLOGY SPIN-OFF AWARD, BEST INNOVATION/FUTURISTIC DEVELOPMENT AWARD, Silicon Trophy, TITANIUM TROPHY and the list is very long.
We fought the war with imported arms & equipment. The statement of former Army chief V P Malik, who led the army during the 1999 Kargil war, has said “casualties in the conflict could have been reduced had DRDO not come in the way” in the acquisition of weapon-locating radar. “Delivery delayed is delivery denied,” said Defence Minister A.K. Antony.
The best part is that in Kargil war both parties imported same communications equipment from same suppliers of same country and history was repeated. Because of the terrain condition across the border same problems were faced by both the armies and suppliers sent engineers to rectify the problem.
Interestingly, the scientific achievement after 52 years of independence was the same.
In the Government of India, almost all the ministries have spent thousands and thousands of crores and achieved frontline technology but compared to defence R&D is far behind.
Why?
When DRDO used to have one CC R&D it delivered some output. After special powers were granted to project directors the incompetency took the fore front with the blessing of the recruiters that “position makes a man.” With this principle incompetent over powered. The bluffers became achievers.
Congrats to Dr. W. Selvamurthy one such achiever of DRDO, for assuming charge as President of Amity University, Noida.
Dr W.Selvamurthy, as CC R&D, visited DEAL, DRDO, Dehradun in a function when all the past directors were invited for felicitation. Dr E Bhagirath Rao, Sh V P Sandlas, Sh Ashok Sen were present in the function. Ex CC R&D Sh V P Sandlas then was Director General at Amity University and Dr W.Selvamurthy in his address said “the so called Director General of Amity University Sh V P sandlas” with his crooked famous smile on his face.
Amity University is same and today same Dr W.Selvamurthy has joined Amity University without obtaining the mandatory NOC from government of India (copy of RTI reply from DRDO enclosed)
But I must congratulate him that so far he has distributed crores and crores of rupees to his beloved south bound private universities via Life science board of DRDO, as per DRDO culture now he will access his past office and be able to manage funds for Amity University.
So almost private institutions are having same practice to oblige those who had helped them to provide funds (poor tax payers’ money) in the name of projects and individuals are getting interests or kickbacks by mutual understanding.
Only GOD knows when the government of India, GOM, Defence Standing Committee will realize this out flow of precious money. Since there is no accountability, these senior scientists and technocrats are fooling the nation and helping and nurturing the incompetency in the field of science and technology. This growing incompetency is a major obstacle of our self-reliance.
To, Hon’ble Defence Minister; Govt.of India, New Delhi,
Sub:– DRDO have no reply – taken shelter from RTI section 24(1) for unaccountability & delay during Kargil war – More Casualities of Indian Army.
Respected Sir,
Former Army Chief V.P.Malik, who led the army during the 1999 Kargil war, has said casualties in the conflict could have been reduced had the DRDO “not come in the way” of acquiring weapon – locating radars. ‘We had one or two incidents particularly on the weapon locating radar. If the DRDO had not come in the way we would have got them before the Kargil war and that would have definitely reduced our casualties’.
My RTI related to know the DRDO scientist / officer accountable and responsible for the delay which caused more casualties of the Indian Army as per the army chief Malik.. But DRDO have no reply – taken shelter from RTI section 24(1) for unaccountability?
I request you to take necessary action against the accountable officer in DRDO responsible for more casualties of Indian Army.
With high regards,
Your, Sincerely.
(Rajiv Chauhan)
COPY TO THE :
1- Hon’ble President of India for kind consideration and necessary action.
2- Hon’ble Prime minister of India for kind consideration and necessary action.
Rajiv Chauhan
FOR DETAIL PL. SEE ENCLOSERS
Kargil RTI
Appeal to clean DRDO of corrupt and anti-national officials
