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India-Israel joint venture to manufacture missiles fails to take off

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Jatinder Kaur Tur, TNN Nov 14, 2013, 12.01PM IST

HYDERABAD: The joint venture between India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Israeli Aerospace Industry to manufacture Long Range Surface-to-Air Missile (LR SAM) and Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile (MR-SAM) has turned out to be a non-starter.

The long range missiles were to have been delivered to the Indian Navy by 2012 while the medium range missiles should be in the Indian Air Force weaponry by 2017. However, both the delivery schedules are way behind schedule and show no signs of meeting them even in the near future.DRDO officials are blaming the lack of progress in the joint venture due to lack of transparency and non-transfer of technology by their Israeli counterparts. And the recent trials that were conducted by the Indian defence organization failed to meet the standards of both the IAF and the Indian Navy. The entire cost of Rs 12,500 crore of the joint venture is being funded by India and the inordinate delay and lack of progress in the project has turned into a big cause of worry in the defence ministry.

According to sources, the LR-SAMs project was commissioned in 2006 and the delivery of the missiles to the Indian Navy should have happened by 2012. Similarly, the MR-SAM venture was signed in 2009 and the missiles are to be delivered to the Indian Air Force by 2017. Both both the projects are way behind schedule and show no signs of making progress.

“Frankly speaking, right now, not much is going on in the joint venture due to various issues between the two sides. Expecting Israel to share its technology with India is unfair. But such things should have been clarified before the joint venture was entered into,” said an official.

DRDO is maintaining that it is because of the lack of transfer of technology that the trials conducted so far have ended up as failures. “Industries are merely getting the drawings as to how to produce certain systems and such things are leading to deviations from the laid down specifications because the knowledge to develop the systems is not being imparted,” said sources.

DRDO officials are also attributing the delay to a complicated and long procedure involving shuttling between India and Israel for various stages of development of a system etc. The Hyderabad-based Indian defence organization also reportedly found itself helpless on problems in propulsion system and other related issues while a significant number of parts or systems are yet to be tested following a delay in manufacturing.

However, when quizzed on the issue, DRDO Director General Avinash Chander told the TOI that nothing was amiss. “Everything is going on as per the plan and development trials are on. We shall be able to deliver the MR-SAMs as per schedule. Right now, the contribution from India in the joint venture project is about 20% and would ultimately reach 80% in the final stages.” Regarding the already delayed LR-SAM, DRDO officials declined to come on record.

MR-SAM, one of the major demands of the forces, is to have a range of 70 kms or so, and the IAF is banking on replacing its ageing Soviet-made Pechora SAM missiles with the MR-SAMs. But nobody is sure how long the wait is going to be, and whether the delivery will take place at all.

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Chinks in the Armour – What ail DRDO, India’s Premier Defence Organigation?

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Rediff.com – News-Special Part- V

‘Kalam has been promoting himself, not self-reliance’

George Iype

Avul Pakir Jainulabeen Abdul Kalam, who headed DRDO for years, is credited with drawing up the blueprint for India’s entry into the league of developed nations. He is the protagonist of the government’s grand plans to make indigenisation of defence products a reality.

If he could transform DRDO from a moribund, bureaucratic government organisation to an establishment that fights for self-reliance in defence production, will Kalam’s effort to build aircraft, war machines and missiles on the Indian soil bear fruit?

Many acknowledge that despite technology denials and control regimes enforced by the developed countries, Kalam imbibed a high-end research and development initiative in DRDO laboratories that the government, academic institutions and the industry now look at him in awe.

Thanks to Kalam, DRDO now has a leading role in generating technologies and secure systems in the field of information technology which could change the quality of life in defence forces. Under his stewardship, the organisation created the critical components and devices that will be the backbone of state-of-the-art electronic systems in defence.

Many claim Kalam’s discovery has been a turning point in India’s history and national security. But these days the boat owner’s son from Rameswaram in Tamil Nadu is setting sail on just one massive project — take India to self reliance in defence production at least 70 per cent by 2005.

It is because of Kalam that India can now boast of the ambitious indigenisation Plan 2005. Plan 2005 is not just about making weapons indigenously. It is the symbol of national pride.

Years after it professed the indigenisation mantra, the government sheepishly admitted last year that only 30 per cent of Indian weapons were of domestic origin. The realisation prompted it to turn to Kalam. It then immediately created a Self-Reliance Implementation Council headed by Kalam that will implement Plan 2005.

Is DRDO’s aim to achieve 70 per cent indigenisation in the defence system realistic in the wake of unaccomplished high profile projects like the Light Combat Aircraft, Arjun main battle tank, the missile and nuclear submarine programmes? But can Kalam deliver?

Not many believe that Kalam will accomplish 70 per cent self-reliance by 2005. The task us gigantic. More than one-third of the budget for the missile programme, the Arjun MBT and the LCA has gone into imports of critical components. More imports are to follow as DRDO’s indigenous engine programme, especially for the LCA, is on the verge of collapse.

“Indigenisation is a hoax. Kalam is spreading it boasting that he will attain self-reliance in defence equipment in five years time. Indigenisation should have been the DRDO motto when it was established in the 1950s, not in 2000,” says an army officer.

Many within the army, the air force and the navy, who have been waiting in vain for DRDO-developed defence equipment and electronic warfare systems, claim Kalam has been promoting himself, and not self-reliance.

“Both DRDO and Kalam have failed to win over the armed forces because many of their projects have become serious stumbling blocks for the forces’ modernisation,” the army officer adds.

The accusations against Kalam are three — that he did not create a good research and development culture in DRDO, that his relationship with the armed forces has been rocky and that he did not embark on any plan to stem the brain drain from DRDO.

Designing and developing defence weapons is perhaps the toughest engineering task. But experts claim DRDO suffers from a poor research and development culture thanks to Kalam.

“DRDO under Kalam has done more on public relations than on proper research and development. That is the reason why many of our projects like LCA are terribly lagging behind in schedules,” says Shankar Sen Chaudhury, an independent technical analyst based in Hyderabad.

“The structural environment in DRDO labs have to change if effective results in indigenisation is to take place,” he adds.

Another problem is the rocky relationship that Kalam has with the armed forces. He and his colleagues argue that the forces do not have any specialists who understand the design and development concepts of DRDO. “Therefore, the armed forces always interfere in our projects halfway through,” a DRDO scientist says.

Many say this messy relationship between DRDO, “the seller” and the three armed forces, “the buyers”, should be blamed on both sides. “Kalam was a marketing man. He wanted to hard-sell his half-baked DRDO products to us, like the Arjun tank,” says an army officer.

But DRDO asks: When the forces induct imported products without any trails, why can’t they rely on indigenous products? DRDO officials say the only reason for this is that the army does not have the experience to induct an indigenous weapon system.

DRDO has been mouthing the politically correct mantra of indigenisation because a number of disgruntled scientists in the organisation charge, “Dr Kalam is a politician.”

His critics say the problem is that India’s defence programmes is a one-man show. “Only Kalam is recognised and acknowledged. It is ridiculous that thousands of us are working there, and only one man is framed in a glass house. That is the precise reason for the high rate of brain drain from DRDO,” a disgruntled DRDO engineer said.

The rate at which scientists and engineers are leaving the laboratories is a cause for grave concern. According to a survey, more than 3 per cent of scientists and engineers leave the organisation every year in search of attractive salaries and perks.

“We have been demanding better salary packages and service conditions. But neither Kalam nor the government has listened,” says the engineer.

A section of DRDO scientists are now happy that the organisation is no longer under Kalam. Ever since the new chief, Dr Vasudev K Aatre, took over in December, things are looking up. One of the his first decisions was to initiate a university interactive programme for DRDO scientists. Now, professors of premier science institutes like the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore will spend time with DRDO scientists on specific research projects.

Dr Aatre is also taking a few radical decisions — he is on the verge of dropping some projects that the organisation has failed to execute in many years.

TOMORROW: ‘DRDO is like the Indian cricket team’
“They have been pampered with money and praise that they cannot just deliver,” remarks Major General (retd) Ashok Mehta.

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Chinks in the Armour – What ail DRDO, India’s Premier Defence Organigation?

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Rediff.com – News-Special Part- I

‘How long should we wait?’

George Iype

DRDO is responsible for indigenising and constantly upgrading the country’s weapons and equipment inventory and related supplies. But the dilemma has always been to determine the correct balance between make or buy.
The Kargil Review Committee Report
Make. Or buy?

That has been a longstanding issue between the DRDO and the Services. The former complains that the armed forces make impossible demands. The Forces say the DRDO has failed to develop the frontiers of defence technology. And that its claim to produce anything and everything has virtually strangulated critical defence exports.

Experts say it was in fact the collapse of the Soviet Union that drove home the urgency to reduce dependence on external suppliers and rely on indigenous defence production. “Thus over the years, the DRDO has been volunteering to produce virtually anything for the Indian forces. The result is that it has now accumulated nearly 1,000 projects. The DRDO does not have the capability to accomplish some of these,” says Rajendra Mohan, an independent defence analyst in Hyderabad.

According to Mohan, the DRDO promises to make anything for the Forces simply to keep many of its laboratories running. “Or else, some of the labs would have already been shut,” he points out.

Experts like Mohan argue that the very method of calculating the indigenisation content of defence development and production is a matter of debate. Over the years, the government has set up 10 committees under the Department of Defence Production to identify the scope of items such as aircraft, electronics warfare systems and armament. Based on their reports, the government had been claiming for more than a decade that the self-reliance and indigenisation content will be brought up to 70 per cent before 2000.

The core point as per this plan is minimising imports and inducting indigenously designed and manufactured systems. The stress was on increased research and development and the DRDO was the agency to implement it.

But last year, the government — after a thorough review of the DRDO — admitted that the indigenisation level still remained at only 30 per cent. It then quickly created a Self Reliance Implementation Council, chaired by then DRDO chief and now scientific advisor to the prime minister, Dr Abdul Kalam. The Council’s aim is to take indigenisation to 70 per cent by 2005. But many believe like all other DRDO targets, this deadline would also slip.

DRDO scientists claim they have made significant achievements on indigenisation and in their efforts to meet the requirements of the armed forces. They include flight simulators for aircraft, 68mm reusable rocket pod, brake parachute for fighter aircraft, mini remotely-piloted vehicle, light field gun, a new family of light weight small arms systems, charge line mine-clearing vehicle for safe passage of vehicles in the battlefield, and illuminated ammunitions for enhancing night fighting capabilities in their list of achievements.

The DRDO has also developed a cluster weapon system for fighter aircraft, naval mines, next generation bombs for high speed aircraft, low-level tracking radars Indra-I and II for the army and air force, light field artillery radar, battlefield surveillance radar, advanced ship sonar systems and torpedo launchers.

“Our biggest success and pioneering work has been the testing five nuclear devices during May 11-13, 1998 in the Pokhran range,” claims a DRDO scientist.

In collaboration with the Department of Atomic Energy, DRDO in fact designed, tested and produced advanced detonators, ruggedised high volt trigger systems, interface engineering, systems engineering and systems integration to military specifications for the nuclear blast.

“Like the nuclear bomb project, several high-technology projects are in various stages of design and development. Therefore, it is ridiculous to allege that we are a useless bunch of scientists for the armed forces,” the scientist adds.

Indeed, the problem is that for years DRDO has been enmeshed in several high-technology projects that no one really knows when the armed forces will be able to induct.

“DRDO has been acting like a dog in the manger. The agency has considerably torpedoed our efforts to import state of the art equipment because it has been boasting to make every available defence equipment that we demand,” an army officer says angrily.

For instance, he says, though the defence ministry sanctioned competence build-up projects for the multi-barrel rocket launcher Pinaka in the 1980s, DRDO is nowhere near accomplishing the target. The delay has forced the army to continue to depend upon their existing outdated system, whose range is much less compared to that envisaged for Pinaka.

Concerned about terrible delays in some of the vital projects, the army, the air force and the navy are these days asking just one question: “How long should we wait?”

For the Forces, these projects are lifelines. They include India’s indigenously built surface-to-air missiles Trishul and Akash which were to have replaced the Russian-supplied OSA-AK and Kvadrat systems in 1990. Then there is the most ambitious multi-role fighter, the light combat aircraft, the indigenous production of which DRDO has been grappling with in the last 17 years.

The main battle tank Arjun, incorporating state-of-art tank technologies with superior fire power, high mobility and excellent protection has been developed by DRDO. But the army is unhappy with its performance.

There are growing concerns among the Forces, and politicians and defence experts about the terrible delays of the DRDO and its ability to keep promises. For at stake is not just the concept of indigenisation, but a huge investment of more than Rs 150 billion that the government has made for the last two decades on various projects. Would the money be completely wasted?

“Weapon systems face obsolescence very fast. So the DRDO will have to either give up some projects or reorient its functioning,” says Mohan.

Yet, DRDO has been mouthing the political platitude of indigenisation by postponing the deadlines of LCA, Pinaka, Trishul, Akash, nuclear submarines and several types of electronics warfare systems for the army, air force and navy.

The Kargil conflict last year exposed the chinks in DRDO’s armour. None other than Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee echoed the Forces’s worries when he told DRDO directors on August 6, 1999: “Technology needed for mountain warfare is to be given the highest priority.”
But the biggest worry for DRDO is not the bureaucratic delays and sanctions, but the Indian air force. Faced with diminishing number of its ageing fleet, the IAF holds DRDO responsible for promising to deliver the LCA before year 2,000, thereby considerably upsetting many of its aircraft acquisition plans.

Suspecting that DRDO will never deliver the LCA, the IAF has now embarked on an ambitious project to upgrade 100 MiG-21 aircraft.

Despite the heavy odds, DRDO still remains confident that it will roll out the country’s first indigenous aircraft before 2002.

“We will induct 200 LCAs into the Indian Air Force between 2003 and 2010,” Dr Abdul Kalam told a group of aeronautical scientists before he handed over DRDO’s charges to Dr Vasudev K Aatre.

But there aren’t many who believe that promise will be fulfilled.

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Zero for DRDO

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Bharat Karnad | 26th Apr 2013 – Deccan Chronicle

The Indian Air Force has been clever over the years in a petty sort of way. Short-range or medium-range combat aircraft and so on are uniquely IAF nomenclature; no other Air Force has such categories. In the age of aerial tankers, describing warplanes by their radii of action is a distraction.

Forty years ago the IAF invented another category of warplanes — “deep penetration and strike aircraft”, which permitted the purchase of Jaguar. The IAF sees this sort of thing as a harmless ruse to serve its interest.

The multiplicity of combat aircraft thus procured allows, the service belie­ves, in a crisis to at least have some squadrons in its fleet not subject to sanctions or the spares-and-servicing tourniquet, which supplier countries in greater or lesser measure always apply, depending on their foreign policy goals and national interests of the moment, and which tool of manipulation is now legitimated by the recent Arms Trade Treaty.

This policy of buying aircraft from diverse sources was first articulated in a 2006 note from Air Headquarters (AHQ) to the ministry of defence (MoD), which stated that the requirement for a sub-30-ton fully loaded combat aircraft was being deliberately proposed to escape the Russian stranglehold, and avoid going in for more Sukhoi-30 MKIs or the upgraded variant the “Super” Sukhois. Thus, Rafale passed the spurious test, clocking in at 27 tons. Of course, the IAF-invented range-dictated categories serve another purpose. They confuse generalist civil servants in the MoD and convincing clueless politicians that there are big gaps in combat aircraft numbers which need filling.

In this game of “fool you, fool me”, where the IAF is being jerked around by supplier countries, the threat to national security stays unaddressed. IAF is principally to blame, of course. But the inability of the Aeronautical Dev­e­lo­p­ment Agency (ADA) and other Defence Res­earch and Development Organisation (DRDO) units tasked with aircraft and on-board systems designs, and the sheer incompetence of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) are equally responsible.

So criminally negligent has HAL been that in all the years it assembled a variety of MiG-21s, MiG-27s, MiG-29s, and the Jaguar, and the power plants for each of these aircraft at its Koraput factory, it failed to maintain a dat­abase. In other words, for all the licence manufacturing it has done over the years, by failing to compile how every component in the aircraft and in the engines does what and how, it has learnt nothing.

Had HAL maintained a database of all the items it has put together, the country by now would have had the built-up capability to manufacture the Tejas Mk-I and Mk-II on the run. But this defence pu­blic sector unit has red­uced its­elf to an adjunct of supplier companies. That top HAL leadership has not been brought to acc­ount on this score and that the Indian taxpayer continues funding such profligacy only reflects the state of things.

DRDO, on its part, has prospered by creating illusion. Other than in certain areas, such as in writing sophisticated software and devising complex algorithms to drive military systems, DRDO projects are mostly scams. Behind every project that’s touted for realising “self-sufficiency” lies imported technology in some guise. In fact, it has been so grossly inept in not insisting on total transfer of technology from its partners that foreign defence firms happily strike deals in which Indian monies fund the development of state-of-the-art technology in other countries but get nothing out of it except finished high-cost products.

It is not the fault of the supplier firms that DRDO has proved so inattentive, gullible, and plain reckless with public monies. Take for example the advanced medium-range and long-range missile systems supposedly being collaboratively developed with Israel. Except in striking a contract for `15,000 crore, DRDO settled for only a work-share arra­ngement and that too to fabricate the low-value backend of these missile systems, with the Israeli company retaining the intell­ectual property rights on all the technology so developed.

A similar deal for a short-range missile system with Dassault Aviation has just been signed and another `30,000 crore is consequently going down the drain. Because in this business suckers are not given an even chance, the foreign companies can hardly be blamed for exploiting DRDO’s unwillingness to leverage India’s financial subsidy to obtain full proprietary and production rights for all technologies generated in such projects. So what is the department of defence finance doing other than sleeping on the job?

If DRDO brass were to be hauled up, it would be like pulling out a foundational stone that could bring the whole fraudulent public sector defence industrial edifice that, notwithstanding its claims, has produced no original technology after the Marut HF-24 in the 1970s, tumbling down. It is the reason why the Naresh Chandra Committee’s recommendation that the offices of scientific adviser to defence minister, head of DRDO, and secretary defence R&D be separated, may never get implemented. There are too many vested interests in the armed services, DRDO, and DPSUs who have it good to want this situation to change.

Coming back to Rafale, had Reliance Aerospace gone about it the right way it could have emulated Larsen & Tubro (L&T), which has indigenously developed the engineering, tooling, and manufacturing capability to locally produce everything from nuclear-powered and conventional submarines of any design to artillery systems. This proactive attitude to build up its all-round capability means it is in a position to benefit from “transfer of technology” portions of deals for high-value weapons platforms India has signed in the past two decades, and very quickly to absorb foreign technologies India pays for but which, owing to the complete inability and incompetence of defence public sector units, has to-date not capitalised on. We are talking cumulatively of waste now reaching the thousand billion dollar-level.

If the L&T business model is too onerous, Reliance Aerospace, instead of turning itself into a mere cog in the Dassault Aviation machine by channelling payoffs to the right quarters in the ruling party to lubricate the Rafale deal, could have tried to buy off large chunks of the Rafale-maker, Dassault Aviation itself, as the Tatas have done by purchasing the South African company Denel’s entire 155mm/52 calibre Howitzer line. That might have been the second-best strategy to become a commercially viable defence production entity in double-quick time and do right by the country as well.

The writer is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

Comments

by Air Cmde Raghub… (not verified) on Fri, 2013-04-26 22:43
Zero sum Game.Only history will tell whether DRDO has been zero or hero. Import of even obsolescent BMD would have cost us fortune which DRDO has been able to save. Calling Names.. If IAF has managed to get its magnificent flying machines from diverse sources instead of all from Russia without love-it has been smart move by them for which they need to be lauded? Jaguars & Mirages have served us well as Canberra’s & Hunters did? HAL & ADA. The two are incomparable and class apart. While HAL has hardly picked up any worthwhile aviation technology during its half a century of assembling MiG’s & missiles in its sprawling MiG complexes- ADA has developed fourth generation plus Tejas. Flight testing & overcoming problems during development takes time but rewarding eventually. Successes as Scams? It is much easier to call a success a scam than calling a spade a spade. If DRDO has made use of some imported technology where is the problem? Most of the defence technologies are copied all over the world sans any qualms or copyright compulsions.155×52 or Desi Bofors will be copy work of some technologies. Russian K-13A air to air missile was true copy of the the US Sidewinder-without being a scam. Missiles. The learned author can rest assured that no short, medium or long range missiles can take India for a ride in any missile deal till Dr VK Saraswat is around. A scientist who has successfully lead us to the ICBM regime must have seen some technology benefit in these collaborations.

by MVP (not verified) on Sat, 2013-04-27 17:57
The so called DRDO Scientists are busy playing Golf in the DRDO Phase-II Township Golf Course, Bangalore. Unlike the soldiers, risking their lives in difficult terrains, a majority of these scientists enjoy their entire life (doing very little official work) in splendid townships, utilising CSD facilities, many festival holidays, discussing (obviously during office hours) and buying /investing in plots of land, flats etc. without concern to build good quality weapons at the shortest possible time. They do research(at tax payers expense) without any urgency to complete the tasks with an end result in mind. They should be made accountable for each and every pie of tax payers money. In case of not meeting the deadline, the scientists should be asked to reimburse back to the Govt. of India 50% of the salary drawn.

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India’s secrets are in Guangdong

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Published: Wednesday, Mar 13, 2013, 6:15 IST | Updated: Tuesday, Mar 12, 2013, 23:25 IST
By Saikat Datta | Place: New Delhi | Agency: DNA

A successful Chinese hacking attack has caused what is arguably the biggest security breach in India with systems of hundreds of key DRDO and other security officials being compromised and leading to the leak of sensitive files related to the cabinet committee on security (CCS), the highest decision-making body for security issues of the government of India.

The other stolen files recovered so far belong to the governments of the United States, Russia, and South Korea.

The leak was detected in the first week of March as officials from India’s technical intelligence wing, National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), working with private Indian cyber security experts cracked open a file called “army cyber policy”. The file had been attached to hacked email accounts of senior DRDO officials that quickly spread through the system in a matter of seconds.

As Indian security experts began to track its origin they discovered, for the first time, that all the sensitive files stolen from the infected systems were being uploaded on a server in the Guangdong province of China.

So far, Indian intelligence has never been able to pinpoint a hacking attack with such accuracy.
As they continued to trace the breach, they discovered thousands of top secret CCS files, and other documents related to surface-to-air missile and radar programmes from DRDL, a DRDO laboratory based in Hyderabad, among many other establishments.

Even the e-tickets of the scientists who had travelled to Delhi in the last week of February were found on the server.

The intelligence officials also discovered documents of deals struck between DRDO and Bharat Dynamics Ltd, a defence PSU which manufactures strategic missiles and components. Some other recovered files were related to price negotiations with MBDA, a French missile manufacturing company.

But the shocking part was the extent of the hacking by the Chinese, believed to be officially sponsored.

The officials began to find files related to the Russian military as well as files that belonged to CSRDC (Centre for Security Research & Development Center) which comes under the United States department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology directorate.
Some files from NASA too have been recovered so far. All this was discovered after cyber security

officials of the Information Dominance Group (IDG) and private Indian cyber security officials began to track down the “NetTraveler Trojan and Key logger” that had infected Indian systems. The other files recovered belong to South Korea, Russia, and the United States.

For a server of its size and capacity, believed to be worth almost Rs150 crore in the open market, it hosted just six domains. This is highly unusual because a server of this size usually has over 10,000 domains.

This meant that this was being used for a specific purpose. Initially, it took time to decipher the files since they were all encrypted. But after the key was found, the decryption of the files began and to their horror, Indian intelligence officials discovered this massive breach of security.

Traced to server:
*Systems of hundreds of key DRDO and other security officials compromised

*Sensitive files related to the cabinet committee on security (CCS) leaked

*Thousands of top secret CCS files and documents related to surface-to-air missile and radar programmes from defence research & development lab discovered

*All sensitive files stolen from infected systems uploaded on a server in China’s Guangdong province

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Chinese hackers merrily go through thousands of secret files of DRDO missile systems in Guangdong:report

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India TV webteam [ Updated 13 Mar 2013, 07:21:39 ]

New Delhi, Mach 13: Chinese hackers have breached the systems of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) leading to the leak of thousands of top secret files related to Cabinet Committee on Security, which have been detected to have been uploaded on a server in Guangdong, the Mumbai newspaper DNA reported.

The report says this is the biggest security breach in the Indian defence establishment.

The breach was detected in the first week of this month when officials from India’s technical itelligence wing, NTRO (National Technical Research Organisation), working with private Indian cyber security experts cracked open a file called “army cyber policy”.

The file was found attacked to hacked email accounts of senior DRDO officials that quickly spread through the system in a matter of seconds, says the DNA report.

As Indian security experts began to track its origin, they discovered, for the first time, that all the sensitive files stolen from the infected systems were beingu ploaded on a server in Guangdong province of China.

So far, Indian intelligence had never been able to pinpoint a hacking attack with such accuracy.

Indian cyber security experts discovered thousands of top secret CCS files, and other documents related to surface-to-air missile and radar programmes from DRDL, a DRDO lab based in Hyderabad, among many other establishments.

Even the e-tickets of DRDO scientists who had travelled to Delhi in February were found on the server.

Intelligence officials also discovered documents of deals struck between DRDO and Bharat Dyamics Ltd, a defence PSU which makes strategic missiles and components.

Other recovered files related to price negotiations with MBDA, a French missile manufacturing company.

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Chinese hackers breach DRDO security, steal thousands of secret files

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13 Mar 2013 10:59:10 AM IST

The official website of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) once again came under the cyber attack unleashed by the Chinese hackers.
According to the Mumbai newspaper DNA, Chinese hackers breached the security of DRDO website and accessed thousands of top secret files.

As par the report, the top secret files related to Cabinet Committee on Security have been uploaded on a server based in Guangdong.

The report claims that this is the biggest security breach in the Indian defence establishment.

The hacking incident came to the fore in the first week of this month when officials from India’s technical intelligence wing, National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), along with private Indian cyber security experts cracked open a file called “army cyber policy”.

The DNA report claimed that the file was found attacked to hacked email accounts of senior DRDO officials that quickly spread through the system in a matter of seconds.

Later, the NTRO found that all the sensitive files stolen from the infected systems were being uploaded on a server in Guangdong province of China.

For the first time, Indian cyber intelligence team has successfully tracked the hacking location.

Indian cyber security experts discovered thousands of top secret CCS files, and other documents related to surface-to-air missile and radar programmes from DRDL, a DRDO lab based in Hyderabad, among many other establishments.

Even the e-tickets of DRDO scientists who had travelled to Delhi in February were found on the server.

Intelligence officials also discovered documents of deals struck between DRDO and Bharat Dyamics Ltd, a defence PSU which makes strategic missiles and components.

Other recovered files related to price negotiations with MBDA, a French missile manufacturing company.

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Government baffled over DRDO chief’s claim on missile shield

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Manoj Joshi   |   MAIL TODAY  |   New Delhi, July 18, 2012 |  

The government of India has been baffled by DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat’s repeated claims that a ballistic missile shield is ready for deployment, and that two locations, presumably New Delhi and Mumbai, will be the first recipients of the ballistic missile defence (BMD) system. Speaking on a TV programme in early May, Saraswat said that “this system is now ready for induction”. Nearly two weeks later, the claim was repeated in an interview to Press Trust of India where Saraswat was quoted as saying, “The ballistic missile defence shield is now mature… We are ready to put phase I in place.”

Only six tests have been carried out so far and there is no confirmation if they worked.

Well-known defence technology analyst Prasun K. Sengupta is sceptical; he bluntly terms the DRDO’s claims as “sheer unabashed jingoistic kite-flying by DRDO, period”.

Only six tests, that too in highly controlled conditions, have taken place so far and there is no independent confirmation of whether they have been successful. As of now it is not clear which of the three services will even man the system. Former joint director of the Centre for Air Power Studies, Air Vice-Marshal (retd.) Kapil Kak says, “It is indeed surprising why the IAF – as the national instrument vested with the responsibility of India’s air defence – was not closely involved from the proof-of-concept stage itself.”

Mail Today requested the DRDO to respond to a series of questions early last week, but had received no response till Tuesday.

According to the DRDO, six of its seven tests have been successful. But, instead of carrying them out in realistic conditions, they have been done in laboratory conditions so far. The usual test comprises of the launch of a “hostile missile” from the Interim Test Range in Chandipur on the Orissa coast, and the counter-launch of an interceptor missile from Wheeler Island just 70 km away. DRDO scientists say that the target missile that was intercepted in the test of February 2012, for example, mimicked a 2,000-km range missile of the type that Pakistan possesses, yet it was actually launched from 70 km away.

Equally important is the fact that the “target” missile is a liquid fuelled slow-moving Prithvi, and as of now the DRDO has not tested its system against its own solid-propelled missiles like Agni I or Agni II. As Sengupta puts it, “Its (the Prithvi’s) slow speed during both the boost phase and the terminal phase “does not in any way mimic the flight profiles of the solid-fuelled Theatre Ballistic Missiles and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles with both China and Pakistan.”

With nuclear weapons around, only a shield that will guarantee blocking every single missile is the only one worth having. As of now there is no indication that the DRDO, or any other country, can achieve such a goal. None of the DRDO’s claims have been verified by third parties, say, any of our armed forces. In contrast, China’s January 2010 test was authenticated by the Pentagon whose spokesman said, “We detected two geographically separated missile launch events with an exo-atmospheric collision also being observed by space-based sensors.”

The Indian BMD system is something of a puzzle. It was initially mooted by APJ Abdul Kalam in 1997 and taken up in the 2000s, when key technology relating to tracking, fire control and guidance radars became available from Israel, France and Russia. However, none of the three services ever expressed any requirement for such a system. Their need has been for a system to counter shorter ranged, theatre ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Non-proliferation experts are appalled at the lack of any visible political guidance to the BMD. The obvious response of an adversary to a missile shield is to field greater numbers of missiles with nuclear weapons; that seems to be the track Pakistan is following. Kak notes, “For an unstable and fragile state like Pakistan, India’s BMD could indeed be destabilising, as this would substantially reduce the value of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile arsenal, tempting it to increase the same.”

MIT scholar Christopher Clary argues that, “Indian policymakers must be willing to make the calculation that whatever safety comes from missile defences of dubious effectiveness outweighs the risks that come from a Pakistani nuclear arsenal that is larger than it would be without Indian missile defences.”

Of course, there is the other question. In its claims DRDO says that the system will be ready for “two places”, presumably Mumbai and Delhi. But what about Kolkata, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Lucknow and the rest of the country?

The government only has itself to blame for permitting a technology programme with such serious ramifications and not providing it any political guidance.

Drdo

AK Antony seeks probe into allegations against Abhishek Verma in defence deals

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Rohini Singh, ET Bureau May 7, 2012, 12.51AM IST

NEW DELHI: Defence minister AK Antony has asked investigation agencies to probe into charges levelled against Delhi-based businessman Abhishek Verma, by his former partner, accusing him of acting as a middleman in several defence deals and parking over $205 million in accounts in a bank in the US.

“I have asked the CBI and the Enforcement Directorate to investigate the allegations. The defence secretary has also been asked to take necessary action,” Antony said.
These allegations have been made by C Edmond Allen, head of a New York-based company called Ganton Limited, in a series of letters to Antony. His charges cover purported dealings between Ganton, which Allen – a non-practising attorney – said was incorporated in the US state of Delaware on Verma’s instructions, and major equipment suppliers to the Indian armed forces such as Rheinmettal, Augusta Westland, Hellenic Defence Systems and Hawker Beechcraft.

A top CBI official said the investigations were at a preliminary stage. “We are in touch with Allen and have asked him to submit the documents in original,” said the official. He also said the agency is coordinating with the Enforcement Directorate as there were allegations of large scale money laundering.

Verma, the son of former Congress leader Srikant Verma, is an accused in the naval war room leak case where several sensitive defence documents were stolen and allegedly leaked to Thales, the maker of Scorpene submarines.

He has denied all charges levelled against him by Allen, and said documents implicating him have been forged. Verma said he had received a notice from the Enforcement Directorate asking for an explanation for the money in the accounts but was unable to comment since the matter was sub judice.

“As several petitions filed by me against C Edmonds Allen are pending in various Indian and foreign courts and these cases are somehow connected to alleged foreign exchange violations in which trial is going on in India under FERA Act for ten years, it will not be possible for me to comment as matters are sub-judice,” he wrote.

According to Allen, the escrow accounts belong to Verma but he had the right to handle them as a result of agreements signed between the two in April 2000 and February 2004. Allen has alleged that the money in these accounts has been obtained through illegal means and that Verma has acted as a middleman in several defence deals. Verma, in turn, has issued legal notices to Allen to return the money and a case has been filed in a district court in New York, according to documents reviewed by ET.
Verma, the son of former senior Congress leader Srikant Verma and MP Veena Verma has business links with Jagdish Tytler, a Congress Working Committee member and the party’s Odisha in-charge. Tytler’s fashion designer son, Siddharth, is a founder shareholder in a company along with a former director of Ganton, Arjun Arora. Siddharth Tytler had also signed a joint venture agreement with Ganton India.

Confirming this Jagdish Tytler also told ET that he knew Verma as his parents were colleagues of his. He denied any knowledge of defence deals that Verma is alleged to be involved in.
Tytler also confirmed being an arbitrator in a dispute involving Ganton and another company over nearly hundred acre of land in Noida which belongs to the Yamuna Express Industrial Development Authority.

People close to Verma say that the allegations levelled against him were at Tytler’s behest, a charge that has been strongly denied by both Tytler and Allen. Allen, however, told ET in an email that Tytler and Verma were very close but had fallen out recently over the Noida land deal.

Allen has also alleged that Verma has often flaunted his links with several powerful politicians which has supposedly ensured that no enquiry is initiated against him. Allen also claims to posses several sensitive defence documents allegedly emailed to him by Verma which show his ‘easy access within the government’.

Corruption Charges

The letters to Antony paint a picture of labyrinthine corruption in defence deals with Verma allegedly at the centre. Some of the documents linked to the case, were publicly released by India Against Corruption (IAC) in late April, a group linked to activist Anna Hazare, after Allen sent the documents to lawyer Prashant Bhushan. In a blog posting in New York Times dated April 27, Allen was quoted as saying that he had approached it after Indian authorities showed no interest in his allegations.

In a letter to Antony dated March 28, 2012, Allen alleged that German firm, Rheinmetall AG, paid Ganton $530,000 to reverse its blacklisting by India’s defence ministry. The money was supposedly paid through the firm’s UBS account in Switzerland, according to bank statements of Ganton Limited, and an invoice generated by the company.

Emails sent by ET to Rheinmetall officials did not elicit a response.

Drdo

AK Antony and the problem of corruption

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KP Nayar

Wednesday, 11 April 2012 09:47

“Will Minister Antony resign?” More than any other, this is the one question that I have been asked by Americans in recent weeks about the defence minister who has been in the news for the better part of this year. Most of the people asking this question have some connection with the military-industrial complex in the United States of America or the country’s defence and strategic community.

The reality, howsoever unpalatable, is that few defence ministers can survive after incurring the personal displeasure of an American defence secretary, unless they are defence ministers in Russia and China or in countries like Iran or North Korea, which are in various stages of confrontation with the US.

A.K. Antony attracted the wrath of the Obama administration last year by his determined refusal to receive the then defence secretary, Robert Gates, who tried to inject himself into a US delegation that was to travel to India for the second round of the “strategic dialogue” between New Delhi and Washington. Gates wanted to lobby with Antony on behalf of American companies, which were then in the running for 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft being sought by the Indian air force, the biggest military aviation deal hitherto.

Antony made it clear to his cabinet colleagues, who were persuaded by the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, to plead the case of the Pentagon’s civilian head, that if Gates arrived with Clinton he would go to the remotest location in Kerala where even his mobile phone had no signal for the duration of the American’s stay in New Delhi. Kerala was then in the middle of its state assembly election campaign, which gave Antony enough of an excuse to be in his home state.

The defence secretary did not give up. Gates used the ruse that he was demitting office in July and that he wanted to make a farewell call on Antony: at that point, April was being considered for the strategic dialogue, which eventually had to be postponed because of the defence minister’s insistence that he will not meet Gates as long as the aircraft contract was at a sensitive stage in the acquisition process.

Pentagon officials have told reporters on background that “the defence secretary was informed that it would be suicidal” for Antony to meet Gates and that this message was conveyed by Indian diplomats in Washington, who were negotiating the strategic dialogue arrangements with the Obama administration at that time.

At the end of April 2011, American companies were eliminated from the race for the multi-role combat planes, the US ambassador, Timothy Roemer, resigned the next day, and Gates lost any further interest in making his farewell call on Antony. The strategic dialogue eventually took place in July last year without a top-level defence participation.

After an unstated policy of having no ministerial exchanges in defence for 50 years — except on a solitary occasion, that too botched — US defence secretaries have lately taken exceptional interest in their Indian counterparts and senior Indian ministers in the last decade. The most famous of such exchanges was when Donald Rumsfeld, who was predecessor to Gates, called on the deputy prime minister, L.K. Advani, at his hotel on a Sunday in a well publicized effort to highlight a new chemistry in their ties.

Rumsfeld felt somewhat proprietary about the new defence relationship that the administration of George W. Bush considerably advanced with India, but luckily for New Delhi, he did not stay at the Pentagon long enough to see Washington’s hope of bagging the much-sought-after combat aircraft deal crumble into dust. There is no saying how the mercurial Rumsfeld would have reacted to such a disappointment. Gates, a man of great dignity, took the setback in his stride, at least in public.

The Pentagon is not alone in being disgruntled by Antony’s ways. He has consistently refused to visit Israel, which interchangeably shares the first or second spots with Russia among the sources of arms imports for India.

As if to add injury to insult, last month the defence ministry blacklisted Israel Military Industries for 10 years for allegedly paying bribes to secure contracts in India. IMI is not just another arms-seller. It is owned by the government in Tel Aviv, a leading weapons manufacturer for Israel’s defence forces.

It was not expected that Tel Aviv will take the ban lying down. Additionally, the ban by Antony’s ministry has cast a shadow over plans by the Netanyahu government to privatize IMI. There are now question marks about the timing of the privatization: if the world’s number one arms buyer — India — has found IMI unsuitable to do business with, it could have ramifications for investors seeking to buy into the company.

Those familiar with New Delhi’s lay of the land in such matters were not, therefore, surprised when grumblings of discontent, which began as whispers after Antony rebuffed Gates, grew louder following the rejection of American bids for the multi-role combat aircraft. It was not entirely unexpected that after the decision against the Israelis, Antony would be put in a spot by a steady flow of news stories and purportedly thoughtful op-ed articles.

The Americans and the Israelis are not alone in being at the receiving end of Antony’s efforts in full throttle to do what he can to curb corruption in defence purchases and create a level playing field. Singapore is a country with which India enjoys a relationship that is totally free of trouble. That has not, however, prevented Antony from banning Singapore Technologies Kinetics from future contracts for a decade.

This land systems and specialty vehicles company has launched an all out bid to clear its name, including recourse to the Supreme Court. It has also threatened to seek international arbitration, creating an irritant in bilateral relations.

Russian defence suppliers who have had a free run of New Delhi’s procurement process for many decades have similarly been slapped with punitive sanctions as part of Antony’s anti-graft drive. The defence minister has further angered Swiss, South African and many more arms manufacturers, lining up a formidable array of forces, all of which would be glad to see him move out of his present job.

Typically, nobody is criticizing Antony for cracking down on corruption. Instead, the strategy of those who want him out of the way is to attack Antony for slowing down the modernization of the armed forces by creating bottlenecks in arms purchases, and for creating a trust deficit between the civilian and uniformed segments of the defence establishment. All in all, the effort is to show up the defence minister as a man incapable of running an enterprise as vast and complex as the one for which he is tasked with providing leadership.

The age controversy about General V.K. Singh, the army chief, was the best thing that Antony’s detractors could have hoped for. Unfortunately for the defence minister, both propriety and constitutionality demand that he cannot truthfully tell his side of the story.

For instance, Antony personally believes that the army chief is not lying about his age and that General Singh was born in 1951. Similarly, the General has been a steadfast ally of Antony in what the latter is trying to do about corruption in the defence establishment. It may be a hard idea to sell, especially after a sensational story about troop movements, but the personal warmth and respect for each other between Antony and Singh are nothing short of total. Which is why there has been no move to dismiss the army chief or get him to resign. Even though Antony believes that General Singh made a mistake about his date of birth, an episode from his own past prevents Antony from doing anything about it except to follow the letter of the law. Antony was chief minister of Kerala when a similar controversy dogged the state government.

Raman Srivastava, an Indian Police Service officer of the Kerala cadre who became director-general of the state police and later headed the Border Security Force, was at the centre of this controversy. A mere five months separate him and his brother, Vikram Srivastava, an IPS officer of the Uttar Pradesh cadre, who became director-general of the Central Reserve Police Force: a biological impossibility since both the brothers were born of the same mother.

As chief minister, Antony did not allow the Kerala cadre officer to change his date of birth. There is no way he would have acted any differently with General Singh. What is more, it is Antony’s estimate that there are at least 3,000 such cases of incorrect birthdays in government service records. That is a Pandora’s Box, which is best left shut.

-The Telegraph, Calcutta