Tag Archives: TATB

DEFENCE SECRET IN DANGER, DIRECTOR, DRL, DRDO, TEZPUR’s DIRECTOR SECRETARIAT MANAGED BY CONTRACTUAL LABOUR AS PERSONNEL SECRETARY

To                                                                                                             27th April 2015     Hon’ble Shri Manohar Parrikar,                                                                                       Defence Minister,Room No -104,                                                                                     South Block, New Delhi-110011

SUBJECT:  DEFENCE SECRET IN DANGER, DIRECTOR, DRL, DRDO TEZPUR’s DIRECTOR SECRETARIAT MANAGED BY CONTRACTUAL LABOUR AS PERSONNEL SECRETARY

Sir,                                                                                                                                                                Yesterday (26th April 2015) The Sunday Standard first page news was “Defence Secret is in Danger”

In this reference, DRDO having lot of examples, DRDO is only one department where you can find contractual manpower above age of 70 or below 18 years. People may be think that because of their high skill expertise DRDO might been engage such manpower,  but matter of fact this practice adopted DRDO is only for those who are having good number of secrets or having evidences of wrong doings of DRDO bosses.

In ASL you will find people working since last more than 10 years after retirements, scientists, Technical Officers, who are experts in manpower/ logistic manipulations while missile firing, even JCDA retired account officer etc who are expertise in bill clearance from CDA. These specialized contractual having good assets that can be verified by agencies.

One major observation on these contract appointments is the not following the proper police verification.

ACEM, Nasik campus one murder was done by a contract’s man who has criminal records.

HEMRL GOCO contract labor business, the police verification was done on single list basis one stamp of Thana solved the problem and best part of this these hundreds of contract labours handle the high class explosive TATB.

For example in ADE, DRDO. Bangalore more than 170 B.Tech contract employees are working in core area for mare Rs 12000 and same time scientists who are getting hefty salaries Rs 80000 to 1.5 Lakhs are looking stores /admin /horticulture /works / security /Library etc

This Mail received by website www.corruptioninddo.com on Thu, 30 Oct 2014 01:19:10  IP: 49.206.192.222

HELLO SIR
all of us know about DRDL it is a dream job org to every one. but please think about contract employees. My husband is also working in DRDO RCI he is engineering graduate. From past 2 years he is working but he is getting 14k. how we can Liv with family in Hyderabad and this year no increments… we are not dreaming about permanent  job….. my small wish is to get better pay… for the same job a permanent employee getting nearly 4ok but contract employee getting only 12+.but work is same for both. am not asking to give 4o to contract people just i want to say please provide increments at least…this is not only my wish… i hope u can think & talk about this……….

if i made any mistake please excuse me….. Defence Minister Sir, hope you will take this above mail seriously

Following one example case of DRL, DRDO, Tezpur for your sharp analysis of this DRDO’s contract business.

  1. Sh.M.L. Roy is an ex-employee of Defence Research Laboratory (DRL), Tezpur who superannuated on 31 Dec 2008
  2. He was posted at Director Secretariat as Personal Assistant/Personal Secretary to Director, DRL, Tezpur prior to his superannuation from DRL, Tezpur.
  3. Right from his superannuation on 31 Dec 2008, he was start working at DRL, Tezpur as contractual Laborer and posted at Director He is engaged in all sensitive work like computerized compiling of materials in Director’s Office, monitoring and maintenance   of important files of Director Office which has already been mentioned in his contract.
  4. Since last 7 years continuously working in DRL, Tezpur as Personal Secretary (PS) to Director, DRL, and Tezpur by means of several private vendors / supplier/security agencies.
  5. M.L. Roy is presently of 65 +years age and not fit for this job as in this sensitive post any private contractual labour should not be appointed while several young skilled manpower is available in DRL, Tezpur.
  6. DRL, Tezpur having permanent staff Sh S K Sharma as PS ‘C’ but he was not assigned the right job.
  7. Interestingly Sh M L Roy working for Rs 5000 – Rs 6000 only as Jan 2015 Salary was Rs 5764.00
  8. Sh M L Roy working as mole for vendors, each and every file of procurements / recruitments/ transfer postings/temporary duties etc. moves from Director’s office.

Sir, it is requested kindly order for extensive survey of to explore the necessity of this contract business in DRDO. Because like Director, DEAL Sh R C Agarwal used these contract labour for kitchen gardening, to clean utensils, to wash his wife’s petticoats etc, when this issue published on website Sh R C Agarwal stopped using these labours. This British legacy are maintaining by DRDO directors and senior officers. I am enclosing two photographs of a contract labour is busy to wash his boss personal car in DRL, Tezpur campus

Jai hind

Prabhu Dandriyal,
21-Sunderwala, Raipur, Dehradun-248008                                                                                 Phone 0135- 2787750, Mobile- 9411114879,                                                                                 e-mail id prabhudoon@gmail.com  website www.corruptionindrdo.com

Enclosed    1.    DRL, Tezpur, contract bills in respect Sh M.L. Roy                                                             2.    Photographs of contract labour washing the personal car of bossDRL ML Roy caseDRL ML Roy case2DRL ML Roy case3

The i20 Personal Car Registration Number of RKR Singh is MN 01W 6847
The i20 Personal Car Registration Number of RKR Singh is MN 01W 6847
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The i20 Personal Car Registration Number of RKR Singh is MN 01W 6847

 

Making Quite A Bomb

http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279925

Making Quite A Bomb

How workers without intel clearance get into an explosives lab

A Defence Lab Breached?

  • The High Energy Materials Research Lab (HEMRL), Pune, has outsourced the production of TATB, an explosive, to a private firm, Viswaat, with which an ex-director of HEMRL is associated
  • The firm does not have a licence to manufacture explosives
  • Worse, the workforce—which does not have intelligence clearance—enters the HEMRL facility to carry out the work
  • Local auditors have questioned payments, attendance records etc
  • Based on anonymous complaints and these audits, the CBI is investigating all work undertaken by Viswaat Chemicals

What Is TATB

  • TATB (or triamino trinitro benzene) is an explosive yellow powder
  • Being extremely stable, it’s called for in high-risk situations
  • One use of TATB is as a primer in nuclear warheads
  • Mixed with fuel oil or other binders, it can be used for bomb-making by terrorists When the CBI begins to investigate a premier defence research institute, the findings can be explosive. Quite literally so, in this case. Imagine the production of a restricted explosive substance being outsourced by a specialised government lab—that too to an unlicensed private firm. It’s just such a flagrant security lapse that was involved when the High Energy Materials Research Laboratory (HEMRL), Pune, run by the venerable Defence Research & Development Organisation, parcelled out a production contract for the explosive triamino trinitro benzene (TATB) to Viswaat Chemicals. The storyline is by now familiar from other scams: a former director of HEMRL, Dr Haridwar Singh, is associated with Viswaat. The CBI probe began on anonymous complaints and local audits citing the conflict of interest. But especially worrisome is the security angle. One, Viswaat allegedly does not yet have a licence for producing explosives; and two, the workforce it provides does not have intelligence clearance.TATB may be a relatively lesser known one in the roster of explosive acronyms, but it packs quite a punch: it weighs in under rdx on the impact scale, but above TNT. Maj Gen G.D. Bakshi (retd), an explosives expert, says, “In the current scenario—take Monday’s terror attack in a high-security zone in Delhi—substances used to make explosives must always be guarded. If anyone manages to smuggle TATB out of the factory, it can be used for any purpose. The purpose of intelligence checks is to prevent free accessibility. Also, untrained personnel may, without knowing the implications, sell the stuff, leading to disastrous consequences.”Viswaat is said to have applied for the relevant manufacturing licence to the Union industries ministry’s chief controller of explosives, headquartered in Nagpur. (It issues licences under laws governing the manufacture, use and transport of explosives, petroleum products and flammable substances.) The non-issuance of a licence may well be attributed to procedural delay. But it’s the fact of the workforce supplied by the firm not having intelligence clearance that experts cite as a serious internal security threat. In such circumstances, uncleared employees—or anyone claiming connections to Viswaat, for that matter—could gain access to the high-security HEMRL facility.Vidya Krishnan, an SP with the Pune branch of CBI, which is in charge of the probe, confirmed the firm and the lab were being investigated but said “revealing anything beyond this wouldn’t be possible at this stage”. However, sources said Viswaat has been working with DRDO since 2000 on what are known as government-owned, company-operated (GOCO) projects, taking on assignments outsourced by the Advanced Centre for Energetic Materials (ACEM), Nasik, and the Advanced Systems Laboratory, Jagdalpur. Those close to the investigation said all contracts obtained by the firm are now under the scanner. The amount isn’t comparable, say, to the DevasAntrix deal—it’s no more than Rs 15 crore—but the security angle, given that explosives are involved, helps it take on immense gravity.Before the CBI took on the case, local-level government auditors had in 2009-10 raised serious objections to the contracts, pointing to discrepancies in allocation of work and the bill claims made for the workforce. One report, for example, says: “Please intimate the costing formula adopted for fixing the price of TATB at Rs 11,000 per kg and whether any concurrence has been obtained from audit authorities”. They had also sought inspection of documentary proof of raw material being brought into HEMRL by the contractor for producing TATB and the roster of employees deployed for production schedules, saying there was no uniform system for maintaining attendance records. That is a security gap even accounts auditors homed in on, though they were looking at it only from the payments angle: records say Viswaat had provided less manpower in Jan-Feb 2010, but payments made to it weren’t calculated accordingly. Similarly, there were no records of the entry and exits of vehicles the contractor was supposed to provide; again, the auditors looked at it from the payments angle, but the security angle looms large.
  • Dr Singh put on a brave face when asked to comment. “I am aware of the CBI inquiry against Viswaat—these days an inquiry can be initiated against anyone,” he said. “But I know I’ll come out clean.” And although investigators believe he heads Viswaat, Dr Singh maintains his role is that of independent director, and hence “very limited”, which is why he doesn’t know much about the contracts obtained by the company. About the explosives licence, he says, “I think the company was not into explosives earlier, and then started working in the field, so it had to apply for one. I’m not involved with the company directly, so I wouldn’t be part of the process. They requested me after retirement to join them, so I did, as an independent director.”

    As for the DRDO, its public interface director, Ravi Gupta, was circumspect: “The contract related to production of TATB was awarded after following duly laid down procedures. It won’t be appropriate to make any further comments as the matter pertains to sensitive defence projects.” That really seems to be the whole point. Should a sensitive issue like this be handled in such a fancy-free manner?

HEMRL: Audit report raises security doubts

PUNE I JULY 24 I 2011
Newsline  The Sunday Express

HEMRL: Audit report raises security doubts

Pranav KulkarniTags : JCDAHEMRLDRDO labHaridwar Singh Posted: Sun Jul 24 2011, 02:44 hrs Pune
The Local Audit Objection report, a JCDA questions contract to Viswaat Chemicals without seeking explosives handling licence.  An audit report by the Joint Controller of Defence Accounts (JCDA) has raised questions about the security and tender awarding processes at High Energy Material Research Laboratory (HEMRL), a DRDO lab.

copy of which is with The Indian Express, has questioned HEMRL’s logic of awarding explosive handling contract to Viswaat Chemicals Pvt Ltd under Government Owned Company Operated (GOCO) contract, without asking the company to submit the requisite explosive handling licences. The report also pulls up the contractor for not maintaining entry and exit records of 173 contract manpower during the contract period.

Viswaat Chemicals has been producing a sensitive explosive (HEMRL claims India is only the third country in the world to possess it) at the HEMRL facility. According to the Explosives Act, 1884, producing an explosive handling licence is an important part of the tendering process mandatory for manufacturing and handling explosives.

The Local Audit Objection Report submitted by the Joint Controller of Defence Accounts (JCDA) six months ago refers to a letter numbered HEMRL/MMD/3044/SRP 09-10/34 and dated February 2, 2010 under which the contractor was asked to submit the licence for handling explosives and for the operation of propellent facility.

Former director of HEMRL Haridwar Singh is the director of Viswaat Chemicals.

Scientist G, HEMRL, Dr Bikas Bhattacharya said, “The requirement of the licence was mentioned in the tender specifications. They were to handle explosives for various facilities of the same organisation, HEMRL, because of which licence was not asked. There has been a communication gap and they have the necessary documents. Subsequent reply has been sent to JCDA.”

Manager, R& D, Viswaat Chemicals, S A Borkar said, “We have the licence, however, at the time of the audit, it was submitted for renewal because of which it might not have been seen by the auditors.”

The report also pulls up HEMRL for lapses in security saying, “As per clause 12 of MOU, the contractor has to provide 173 workmen. On scrutiny of the documents, it is revealed that no uniform system exists for maintaining the attendance by the lab for the deployed manpower.”

HEMRL security in-charge Colonel Alok Mathur said, “The system to ensure security checks is in place irrespective of whether the person entering is a scientist or a contract worker.” Bhattacharya said, “Besides normal working hours, there are overtimes during processing campaigns. We have replied to the auditors and they are satisfied with our reply.”

As per the contract, the laboratory agreed to purchase the explosive produced by Viswaat Chemicals at Rs 11,000 per kg. Between November 2007 and December 31, 2010, the laboratory purchased 1,500 kg of explosive from Viswaat Chemicals for Rs 1.7631 crore, including VAT and excise duty. The objection report points out why the laboratory paid additional Rs 11.31 lakh to Viswaat as VAT and excise duty when the production activity of TATB has been undertaken inside the HEMRL campus. “In view of this, the amount paid to the tune of Rs 11, 31,328 may be recovered and remitted into the treasury under intimation audit,” the report said. “We have sent the replies and the case will be settle in a month or two,” said Bhattacharya.

Epitome of DRDO’s Dealing with Explosive

To                                                                                            17th July 2011
The Defence Minister
Room No -104, South Block
New Delhi – 110011

Honorable Sir,

The recent serial bomb blast in Mumbai made a big question about the easy availability of such rare explosive RDX & TNT to terrorist outfit.

Please find enclosed document which shows the casual approach of HEMRL, DRDO, Pune the premier and one of the best explosive production facility of India.

While going through the document evidence and audit objection of auditor of JCDA, I found the loose end of HEMRL, DRDO, which may be one easy source for NaxaliteMaoist and Terrorist outfit to learn how to make explosive and also chance to pilferage the explosive may add to pilferage.

After receiving the document I have personally visited the place in the last June and observe the possibility and find out that the working method of HEMRL to make the explosive.

  1.  HERML having practice to hire outside manpower to produce explosive and the companies involved in this business is related to ex- DRDO senior officials. Dr Hardwar Singh, Ex- Director HEMRL & present director M/s Viswaat Chemicals Pvt Ltd since 2006), the sources said that earlier he was sleeping partner (his son Bunty was inducted in the firm as an employee) when he was active Director, HEMRL.
  2. The same company is involved in all the branches of HEMRL like ACEM, Nasik, where recently you visited on 29th June 2011 and as per press release of DRDO Dr Hardwar Singh was also present there. The company is working since 2000 under Government Owned Company Operated (GOCO) projects with Advance Systems Laboratory (ASL), SF Complex, Jagdalpur.
  3. Mr S A Borkar, Manager, M/s Viswaat Chemicals Pvt Ltd, is only person responsible to hire the manpower and he is doing purely in unprofessional manner by asking HEMRL employees to bring any person of their contact. No police verification is needed. He used to submit a list to police station and after depositing Rs 100/- get a receipt and that receipt is deposited in HEMRL security and they do not wait for police verification, that applied receipt note solve the formality. On the basis of this the casual labour gets the biometric entry card from HEMRL security. No proper entry mechanism is available in HEMRL or any other places.
  4. The records are only maintained with Mr SA Borakar’s office which was situated in old building of HEMRL. Why it is not maintained in HEMRL security because the number of persons in daily required or as per order is need never comes in and the payment bill was always placed as per order. This practice is also observed by local auditor and mentioned his audit objection.
  5. 5.    HEMRL having 1200 work force but as per local audit objection  for HYE 09/2009 & 03/2010 para (e)  “ As per clause 10 of tender specification HEMRL had provided expertise to train the contractors personal up to production stage and raw material formulate the production of TATB  (Triaminotrinitrobenzene explosive) to the contractor. In view of the above please intimate that why the production activity was not undertaken by in house HEMRL”
  6. As per para (D) of audit objection “Attendance: As per clause of MOU the contractor has to provide total 173 workmen. On scrutiny of documents it is revealed that no uniform system exists for maintaining the attendance by the Lab in respect of deployed Manpower. As per clause 1.5 of General Terms & Conditions the vendor shall ensure that In and Out records of all personals/workers are maintained at the security gate during the contract period. However the same is not being done.”
  7. As per para B of audit objection” Kindly refer to your letter No HEMRL/MMD/ 3044/SRP 09-10/34 Dt 01-02-10 under which the contractor was asked to submit the License for carrying out explosive and for operation of propellant facility. Please intimate the reasons for asking the requisite license after the commencement of the contract and how the contract was   awarded in absence of the requisite license. Unfortunately, till date the contractor has failed to produce the requisite license as promised in their letter date 01-02-10. The action taken by your Lab may be intimated to audit.”
  8. As per para (d) of audit objection” The documentary proof of raw material being brought inside the HEMRL through security gate by the contractor for the production of TATB  (Triaminotrinitrobenzene explosive) and the nominal roll of the employees deployed entire operation schedule of production activity may be made available to audit for verification”  There is no such records  available in HEMRL.
  9. As per para (d) of audit objection” Please intimate the costing formula adopted for fixing the price of TATB  (Triaminotrinitrobenzene explosive) @ Rs 11,000/- per KG and whether any concurrence have been obtained from Audit authorities.” The contract rates the working methodology is designed and formulated by Dr Hardwar Singh and Dr A Subhanand Rao, DS & CC R&D – DRDO for siphoned the poor tax payer’s money.

Sir, if you just inquire the file you will find n numbers of mechanism to made money like the product is made in house and the firm only providing the manpower but in their bill they are charging 8.24% excise duty and 4 % VAT, a big question because they are working in DRDO. Who can dare to check? The HEMRL not detecting 10% TDS from the firm in the name of providing specialize service.

The entire nation is aggrieved and as loyal citizen it is our responsibility to protect our country and the national interest. In the name of defence establishment even through employees have noticed the modus operandi they are not coming out because of CCS rules.

The Scientific Adviser’s office is become a black hole. Information/ feedbacks are regularly sent by all Labs and establishments but papers are tear off and put in the dustbin.

Yours sincere effort is needed to clean the DRDO.

Thanking you

Regards
Prabhu Dayal Dandriyal
21-Sunderwala, Raipur, Dehradun-248008
Phone – 2787750, Mobile- 9411114879,
E-mail id prabhudoon@gmail.comprabhu@dandriyal.com Website –  www.corruptionindrdo.com

 

Company to be check thoroughly – M/s Viswaat Chemicals Pvt Ltd,

Corporate Office   Viswaat,7,Satsang Complex, Upper Govind Nagar, L S Raheja Marg, Malad (E), Mumbai – 400 097, Ph-022 28740365/2341 Fax 28745321

 www.viswaatchem.com, e mail-  viswaat@vsnl.comviswaat@mtnl.net.in

Registered Office ” Triveni”, Mith Chowki,Malad – Marve Road, Malad (W), Mumbai – 400064

Board of Directors –  B.Vivek Shetty,Vipin Kumar Jain,Arvind Malhotra, Vishes A Shetty,Shashikant R Shetty,  Bhasker M Shetty, Hari Prasanna Shetty, Dr Hardwar Singh(Ex Director HEMRL)  

Copy for Information and needful action please

  1. P.CHIDAMBARAM,HOME MINISTER, R.No -104, North Block, New Delhi-110011
  2.  R.K.Singh, HOME SECRETARY R.No -113, North Block, New Delhi -110011
  3.  Shri. Umesh C Sarangi  Home Department, Additional Chief Secretary, Maharashtra Government
Enclosed: The Supply Order Copy HEMRL/08AT/0135/D10/LP dated 03/10/2007
                     The Supply Order Copy HEMRL/10AT/0136/D10/LP dated 28/12/2009
                    Copy of Audit Objection HYE 09/2009 & 03/2010  
 
GOCO Audit Objection page 1

 

GOCO Audit Objection page 2
GOCO Audit Objection page 3
supply order to Viswaat Chemicals owned by Dr Hardwar Singh Ex -Director HEMRL
supply order to Viswaat Chemicals owned by Dr Hardwar Singh Ex -Director HEMRL
supply order to Viswaat Chemicals owned by Dr Hardwar Singh Ex -Director HEMRL
supply order to Viswaat Chemicals owned by Dr Hardwar Singh Ex -Director HEMRL
supply order to Viswaat Chemicals owned by Dr Hardwar Singh Ex -Director HEMRL
supply order to Viswaat Chemicals owned by Dr Hardwar Singh Ex -Director HEMRL