Mail Today -Sunday 27th November 2011
All posts by Prabhu
Scientist ‘F’ to Scientist ‘G’ – Assessment A clear cut Violation of Article 309
15th November 2011
Dear friends
I have received a request from some of my friends from VRDE, Ahemednagar to ask RTI from DRDO regarding the Scientist ‘F to Scientist ‘G’ promotion 2011. The letter come along with a Rs 100, I worked out all the possibilities to fight the unjustice of DRDO in this subject matter. Please challenge the proceeding of promotion of Scientist ‘F to Scientist ‘G’ in which they introduced the second screening without approval of cabinet. It is a clear cut violation of Article 309, where there is no provision to amendment of recruitment /promotion proceedings without any approval from cabinet. Even any statuary or executive order cannot allow change or amend the existing procedure, like vide letter no RAC/01/Assessment/PSG dated 22 March 2011 cannot right to amend the DRDO service rules 1979 the page No -9 para (e)**
“Recommendations for promotions of Scientist ‘F’ who have been declared eligible by internal screening committee, Scientist ‘G’ shall be made by peer review committee taking into consideration merit, achievement, personality, leadership and managerial qualities etc. there shall be no assessment interview.”
The induction in the name of interaction (the 10 minute presentation) is nothing but assessment and it is clear violation of Article 309.
You people quote the following Supreme Court Judgment it get justice from DRDO.
All Scientists of DRDO, if you feel that you deserve promotions and that you have been sidelined by your bosses due to unforeseen reasons, then you all may ask RTI on following points.
RTI request points
To CPIO, DRDO HQrs, RTI Cell DRDO Bhawan, Rajaji Marg New Delhi — 110105Hello,
Kindly provide me with the following informations requested under the purview of the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005.
1. What are the laid down criteria for the promotion of a Scientist ‘F’ to Scientist ‘G’.
2. In respect of the above, provide a copy of the approval obtained from Department of Personal and Training and Ministry of Finance, the Government of India
3. The sanction obtained from DOPT for a second level screening by an Internal Screening Committee (Main).
4. The marks allocated out of 100 to presentation & Interview conducted in the name of interaction with Scientists in the year 2011.
5. Distribution of marks allocated for promotion from Sc. ‘F’ to Sc. ‘G’ on:
I. CPARs I APARs
II. Interview/Discussion
III. Research contribution/Books/Articles/Research Papers published.
IV. Seminar / Conference attended
V. Contribution by Scientist as technical leader in solving the real time problems in the field (during user trial)
VI. Recommendation of superiors (Director/CC R&D)
VII. Constitution of Selection Committee.
Find the application fee for the request attached with this application. If you feel that above requested information does not pertain to your department then please follow the provisions of section 6(3) of the RTI Act, 2005/also as per the provisions of the RTI Act,2005 please provide the details (Name and Designation) of the first appellate authority w.r.t. to your department with the reply to the above request, where I may if required file my first appeal.
I do hereby declare that I am a citizen of India. Kindly provide me with the information at the address mentioned with the application. I request you to ensure that the information is provided before the expiry of the 30 day period after you have received the application.
Enclosed: Rs 10 Postal order No.
Signaure & Address of Apllicant
The Director General, Indian Council for Agricultural Research & Others Vs D. Sundara Raju
J U D G M E N T
Dalveer Bhandari, J.
1. This appeal emanates from the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore delivered in Writ Petition No. 19516 of 2004.
2. Brief facts which are relevant to dispose of this appeal are recapitulated as under:
3. The controversy in this appeal pertains to the promotion to the post of Principal Scientist under the “Career Advancement Scheme” formulated by the Indian Council for Agricultural Research (hereinafter referred to as `ICAR’). There are two streams from which selections are made to the post of Principal Scientist: (i) Direct recruitment; and (ii) Promotion from the post of Senior Scientist on the basis of personal merit.
4. The ICAR had formulated the “Career Advancement Scheme” in consultation with the Department of Personnel & Training and Ministry of Finance, Government of India laying down guidelines for promotion of a Scientist from one grade to another in the Agricultural Research Services (ARS) cadre, which were made effective from 27.7.1998. The promotion of scientist to the next higher grade (Principal Scientist) is independent of the occurrence of vacancies and is based only when the applicant secures the requisite merit.
5. The procedure for promotion to the post of Principal Scientist is contained in Para 2.4 of the Career Advancement Scheme. The relevant rule is set out as under: 2″In addition to the sanctioned posts of Principal Scientists as per cadre strength already fixed, which is to be filled through direct recruitment through All India advertisement, promotions will be made from posts of Senior Scientist to the posts of Principal Scientists after 8 years of service as Senior Scientist. This promotion will be personal to the Scientist who is promoted. A senior Scientist will be promoted to the post of Principal Scientist if he/she:i. has completed 8 years of service; and ii. he/she presents himself/herself before the Selection Committee constituted by ASRB with some of the following:
a. Self appraisal reports (required).
b. Research contribution/books/ articles/ research papers published.
c. Any other academic contributions. The best three written contributions of the Sr. Scientist (as defined by him/her) may be sent in advance to the experts to review before coming for the selection. The candidate should be asked to submit these in 3 sets with the application.
d. Seminars / conferences attended.
e. Contribution to teaching/academic environment/institutional corporate life.
f. Extensions and filed outreach activities.
6. “A Selection Committee was constituted under the Career Advancement Scheme for considering eligibility of applicants for promotion from the post of Senior Scientist to Principal Scientist. The Selection Committee consisted of a Chairman, Agricultural Scientists Recruitment Board (hereinafter referred to as “ASRB”), Director General, ICAR or his nominee, three experts and the Director of the Institute of the applicant. For different disciplines, different Selection Committees were constituted with three experts from the relevant discipline so that the merit of the applicant could be comprehensively and accurately assessed. The said Selection Committee allocated marks for the assessment procedure for promotion as under:- Research Publication/Achievement 30 marks Recommendation of Superiors 20 marks Personal Interview 50 marks
7. The minimum required marks to qualify for promotion to the post of Principal Scientist was 60 marks out of 100 marks. The candidates were accordingly assessed and the recommendation for promotion or otherwise was submitted to 4the Minister of Agriculture for his approval in his capacity as the President of ICAR.
8. The respondent is a Senior Scientist in the service of the ICAR at the National Research Centre for Cashew at Puttur, Karnataka. Upon the respondent submitting information as per the prescribed assessment proforma, the ASRB addressed a letter to the Respondent calling upon him to present himself for assessment and interview for the Career Advancement Scheme. Accordingly, the respondent appeared for an interview before Selection Committee on 3.5.2001. However, the respondent secured only 49 marks out of 100 and was found unfit for promotion to the post of Principal Scientist. The recommendation of the Selection Committee was approved by the competent authority, i.e., the Union Minister for Agriculture. The respondent was accordingly intimated of his non-promotion as a Principal Scientist on 14.8.2001.
9. The respondent made representations to the appellant Institute for review of the decision of not promoting him, but, when the respondent did not get any relief from the appellant 5institute, he filed a case (original application) before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench. The Tribunal clearly held that the ICAR had acted in an arbitrary manner to allocate 50% marks for a personal interview and on this ground alone the non-selection of the applicant ought to be set aside.
10. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench quashed the order of the ICAR and the appellants were directed to consider the case of the respondent for promotion to the higher grade of a Principal Scientist with effect from 27.07.1998. The Tribunal also observed that the respondent would be entitled for notional fixation of pay but would not be entitled for arrears of back wages.
11. The appellants, aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal filed a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court. The High Court observed that it is not in dispute that the respondent was entitled to be considered for promotion to the post of Principal Scientist under the Career Advancement Scheme. It was also not in dispute that he was invited for 6such consideration by the concerned authorities. The only question which, according to the High Court, fell for consideration was whether the claim of the respondent was considered was in consonance with the Scheme? The Selection Committee constituted by the appellant had devised a method of evaluation of the candidates according to which it had allocated 30 marks for research publication/achievement, 20 marks for recommendation of superiors and 50 marks for personal interview out of a total of 100 marks.
12. The High Court held that the Career Advancement Scheme does not however sanction any such procedure. It does not refer to or even remotely indicate that an interview of the candidate can provide a basis for determining his entitlement to promotion. The High Court also observed that the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras was justified in allowing the petition of the respondent. The High Court relied on a judgment of this Court in the case of Ashok alias Somanna Gowda and Another v. State of Karnataka (1992) 1 SCC 28 in which it has been laid down that 50% 7marks in the interview was excessive and rendered the process of selection arbitrary.
13. The High Court has also observed that the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore, correctly came to the conclusion that the Scheme did not envisage holding of any interview.
14. The High Court also relied on para 2.4(ii) of the Scheme and observed that Senior Scientists are eligible to the post of Principal Scientist if they have completed eight years of service and if he/she presents himself/herself before the Selection Committee constituted by ASRB with the documents indicated therein. The fact that the eligible officer appears before the Selection Committee with the relevant documents does not necessarily imply that the process of evaluation of his merit has to be on the basis of an interview nor does it indicate that the weightage to the interview can go to the extent of 50% of the total marks. The High Court upheld the judgment of the Tribunal.
15. The appellants, aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, as upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court, has preferred this appeal on the following grounds before this Court.
a. Whether the Division Bench erred in holding that award of 50% of marks for interview was excessive and rendered the selection process arbitrary?
b. Whether the inclusion of an interview process is a material irregularity that vitiated the selection process?
c. Whether the Division Bench was justified in holding that the Career Advancement Scheme precluded the Selection Committee from adopting an appropriate method of evaluation?
d. Whether a distinguished body of experts constituting the Selection Committee appointed under the Career Advancement Scheme had no power to assess and interview the applicants for promotion?
e. Whether the High Court was justified in not appreciating that appointment to the post of a Principal Scientist was not on the basis of seniority but on the basis of merit alone through a process of assessment by a high powered Selection Committee.
f. Whether, under the Career Advancement Scheme, the promotion to the post of a Principal Senior Scientist is merely upon the completion of 8 years of service or is based exclusively on the individual merit of the applicant?
g. Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore was bound to follow an erroneous Order rendered by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras.
16. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the Division Bench erred in directing the appellants to reconsider the case of the respondent as he had secured only 49 out of 100 in the selection process and was not found fit for promotion to the post of Principal Scientist under the Career Advancement Scheme.
17. The impugned judgment was also challenged on the ground that the Division Bench ought to have appreciated that the Career Advancement Scheme provides for an interview procedure in para 2.4 (ii), where it states that “the applicant shall present himself/herself before the Selection Committee”.
18. The appellants also submitted that the Division Bench has erred in holding that award of 50% of marks for interview was excessive and rendered the entire selection process arbitrary. The appellant further submitted that Division Bench 10erred in holding that the inclusion of an interview process is a material irregularity that vitiated the selection process.
19. The appellants further submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court ought to have appreciated that the post of Principal Scientist is a very senior post which requires many personal and intellectual qualities and attributes which can be evaluated only through a personal interview of the applicant.
20. The impugned judgment was also challenged on the ground that the Division Bench of the High Court ought to have appreciated that the weightage to be given for the interview procedure had been determined by a body of experts constituting the Selection Committee based on the post for which promotions were being considered.
21. Mr. Kush Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the inclusion of an interview could not be treated as material irregularity that vitiated the entire selection process. Mr. Chaturvedi further submitted that the Division Bench seriously erred in holding that award of 1150% of marks for interview was excessive and rendered the selection process arbitrary.
22. Mr. Chaturvedi also submitted that the interview Board consisted of academicians and they were justified in formulating the criteria which should not be disturbed by the court. He submitted that according to the Career Advancement Scheme, the promotion to the post of Principal Scientist is not dependant merely on completion of 8 years of service. He placed reliance on the judgment of this court in K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines and Others (2009) 5 SCC 515 to strengthen his submission. According to him, for the post of Upper Managerial cadre, allocation of 50% marks for interview cannot be termed as arbitrary. In this case, 25% marks were kept for viva voce which were not found to be excessive. This case has no application to the facts of the instant case because in the instant case, 50% marks have been kept for interview. This case does not support the case of the appellants in any manner.
23. Learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on the judgment of this court in Kiran Gupta and Others v. State of U.P. and Others (2000) 7 SCC 719. In this case, this court has taken the view that it is difficult to accept the omnibus contention that selection on the basis of viva voce only was arbitrary and illegal since allocation of 15% marks for the interview was not held to be arbitrary by this court, this case also provides no assistance to the appellants because in the instant case 50% marks have been kept for the interview.
24. Mr. Manu Mridul, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Career Advancement Scheme did not envisage conducting of any interview for the eligible candidates and introduction of interview itself was arbitrary and against the Career Advancement Scheme.
25. He also submitted that the candidates were never informed that 50% marks would be allocated for interview. Therefore, there was no occasion for the respondent to have 13challenged the aspect of allocating marks for interview before his appearing for the interview.
26. He also contended that allocation of 50% marks for interview out of a total of 100 marks was highly excessive, hence arbitrary. He submitted the allocation of 50% marks for interview is clearly contrary to a large number of judgments of this court.
27. Mr. Mridul further contended that the respondent was considered for selection to the post of Principal Scientist on the basis of his work and performance from 1985 to 1998. According to him, the nature, work, duties and responsibilities of a Senior Scientist and Principal Scientist are almost identical in nature, but in order to remove stagnation, the promotion is envisaged under the Career Advancement Scheme. He submitted that the stand of the respondent is fortified, reinforced and strengthened by the Career Advancement Scheme 2004 and 2005 of the appellants. According to the `Information Handbook of Agricultural Scientists’ Recruitment Board under Right to Information Act, 2005, the criteria for promotion is that the Board evaluates the contribution made by the concerned Scientist in academic research. The Board also evaluates the confidential reports for the last eight years while granting benefit of the scheme.
28. According to the procedure of the Career Advancement Scheme of 2004, the allocation of marks for personal interview has been reduced from 50% to 10% because the appellants themselves realized that allocation of 50% marks was highly excessive and in clear contravention to the series of judgments of this court.
29. He also submitted that in 2007, the Career Advancement Scheme has undergone a further change and for personal interview, 20% marks have been allocated. According to him, in any event, allocation of 50% marks was highly excessive and in contravention of the law declared by this court in a series of judgments.
30. Mr. Mridul fairly submitted that in exceptional cases if the nature of job is such then even 50% allocation of marks for 15interview could be justified. But, in the instant case, the promotion to the post of Principal Scientist is primarily dependant on the length of service as Senior Scientist, publication and evaluation of confidential reports. The promotion to this post is granted predominantly to remove stagnation. For the selection to the post of Principal Scientist, by no stretch of imagination, 50% marks can be justified. He placed reliance on the judgment of this court in Dr. S.M. Ilyas and Others v. Indian Council of Agricultural Research and Others (1993) 1 SCC 182. In the Career Advancement Scheme, the seniority is the important criteria apart from the publication and the evaluation of the confidential reports. Therefore, there cannot be any justification in allocating 50% marks for interview.
31. Mr. Mrudil also argued that the appellants in their wisdom reduced the allocation of marks for interview from 50% to 10% to eliminate or reduce the arbitrariness for the subsequent selections for the post of Principal Scientist.
32. Learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Mridul submitted that 50% marks allocated for interview were highly excessive and rendered the selection of the candidates arbitrary. He placed reliance on a judgment of this court in Ashok Kumar Yadav & Others v. State of Haryana & Others (1985) 4 SCC 417, wherein the Court observed as under: “..the object of any process of selection for entry into public service is to secure the best and the most suitable person for the job, avoiding patronage and favouritism. Selection based on merit, tested impartially and objectively, is the essential foundation of any useful and efficient public service. So open competitive examination has come to be accepted almost universally as the gateway to public services. But the question is how should the competitive examination be devised? The competitive examination may be based exclusively on written examination or it may be based exclusively on oral interview or it may be a mixture of both. It is entirely for the Government to decide what kind of competitive examination would be appropriate in a given case. To quote the words of Chinnappa Reddy, J. “In the very nature of things it would not be within the province or even the competence of the Court and the Court would not venture into such exclusive thickets to discover ways out, when the matters are more appropriately left” to the wisdom of the experts. It is not for the Court to lay down whether interview test should be held at all or how many marks should be allowed for the interview test. Of course the marks must be minimal so as to avoid charges of arbitrariness, but not necessarily always. There may be posts and appointments where the only proper method of selection may be by a viva voce test. Even in the case of admission to higher degree courses, it may sometimes be necessary to allow a fairly high percentage of marks for the viva voce test. That is why rigid rules cannot be laid down in these matters by courts. The expert bodies are generally the best judges. The Government aided by experts in the field may appropriately decide to have a written examination followed by a viva voce test.”
33. This Court further observed that the Court does not possess the necessary equipment and it would not be right for the Court to pronounce upon it, unless to use the words of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan and Others (1981) 4 SCC 159 observed that the exaggerated weight has been given with proven or obvious oblique motives.
34. Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the controversy is no longer res integra. According to him, a 4-Judge Bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav & Others (supra) has observed 22.2% marks of the total marks allocated for the viva voice test as infecting the selection process with the vice of arbitrariness.
35. In Ashok Kumar Yadav (supra), the Court relied on earlier judgment of this Court in Ajay Hasia and Others v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Others (1981) 1 SCC 722, wherein the Court took up the view that allocation of as high a percentage as 33.3% of the total marks for the viva voice test was beyond reasonable proportion and rendered the selection of the candidates arbitrary.
36. In Minor A. Peeriakaruppan v. Sobha Joseph (1971) 1 SCC 38, the Court observed that earmarking 75 marks out of 275 marks for interview as interview marks prima facie appears to be excessive. The Court observed that various researches conducted in other countries particularly in USA show that there is possibility of serious errors creeping in interviews made on haphazard basis. C.W. Valentine on “Psychology and its Bearing on Education” refers to the marks given to the same set of persons interviewed by two competent Boards and that is what is stated in his book: “The members of each board awarded a mark to each candidate and then he was discussed and an average mark agreed on. 19 When the orders of merit for the two boards were compared it was found that the man placed first by Board A was put 13th by Board B when the man placed 1st by Board B was 11th with Board A.”
37. In this case, the Court also observed that even when the interviews were conducted by impartial and competent persons on scientific lines very many uncertain factors like the initial nervousness on the part of some candidates, the mood in which the interviewer happens to be and the odd questions that may be put to the persons interviewed may all go to affect the result of the interview.
38. This Court in R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore and Others AIR 1964 SC 1823 observed as under:- “In the field of education there are divergent views as regards the mode of testing the capacity and caliber of students in the matter of admissions to colleges. Orthodox educationists stand by the marks obtained by a student in the annual examination. The modern trend of opinion insists upon other additional tests, such as interview, performance in extracurricular activities, personality test, psychiatric tests, etc. Obviously we are not in a position to judge which method is preferable or which test is the correct one. If there can be manipulation or dishonesty in allotting marks at interviews, there can equally be manipulation in the matter of awarding marks in the written examination. In the ultimate analysis, whatever method is adopted its success depends on the moral standards of the members constituting the selection committee and their sense of objectivity and devotion to duty. This criticism is more a reflection on the examiners than on the system itself. The scheme of selection, however, perfect it may be on paper, may be abused in practice. That it is capable of abuse is not a ground for quashing it. So long as the order lays down relevant objective criteria and entrusts the business of selection to qualified persons, this Court cannot obviously have any say in the matter.”
39. In Minor A. Peeriakaruppan (supra), the Court referred to Ajay Hasia’s case (supra) where the Court found that the allocation of more than 15 per cent of the total marks for the oral interview would be arbitrary and unreasonable and would be liable to be struck down as constitutionally invalid. The Court observed that the viva voce test conducted must be held to be fair, free from the charge of arbitrariness, reasonable and just.
40. In Nishi Maghu & Others v. State of J&K & Others (1980) 4 SCC 95, the Court observed that 50% marks out of total 150 marks allotted for interview were excessive.
41. In Mehmood Alam Tariq v. State of Rajasthan (1988) 3 SCC 241, the question involved was regarding the validity of certain provisions of the Rajasthan State and Subordinate Services (Direct Recruitment by Combined Competitive Examination) Rules, 1962, the Rajasthan Administrative Service Rules, 1954, the Rajasthan Forest Service Rules, 1962 which contained a provision special to the said three services and not applicable to other services, that candidates, other than those belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes should secure a minimum of 33 per cent marks in the viva voce test. The rules further stipulated that the candidates for these services must also secure 50 per cent marks in the written examination, but that was not in the area of controversy. While dealing with the above questions a reference was made to cases Ajay Hasia (supra), Lila Dhar (supra) and A.K. Yadav (supra). It was observed as under: “The much desired transformation from patronage to open competition is a later development, to which, now, all civilised governments profess commitment. However, though there is agreement in principle that there should be a search for the best talent particularly in relation to higher posts, however, as to the methods of assessment of efficiency, promise and aptitude, ideas and policies widely vary, though it has now come to be accepted that selection is an informed professional exercise which is best left to agencies independent of the services to which recruitment is made. The `interview’ is now an accepted aid to selection and is designed to give the selectors some evidence of the personality and character of the candidates. Macaulay had earlier clearly declared that a young man who in competition with his fellowmen of the same age had shown superiority in studies might well be regarded as having shown character also since he could not have prepared himself for the success attained without showing character in eschewing sensual pleasures. But the interview came to be recognised as an essential part of the process of selection on the belief that some qualities necessary and useful to public servants which cannot be found out in a written test would be revealed in a viva voce examination. In justification of the value and utility of the viva voce, the committee on Class I examinations in Britain said: …It is sometimes urged that a candidate, otherwise well qualified, may be prevented by nervousness from doing himself justice in viva voce. We are not sure that such lack of nervous control is not in itself a serious defect, nor that the presence of mind and nervous equipoise which enables a candidate to marshall all of his resources in such conditions is not a valuable quality. Further, there are undoubtedly some candidates who can never do themselves justice in written examinations, just as there are others who under the excitement of written competition do better than on ordinary occasions…. We consider that the viva voce can be made a test of the candidate’s alertness, intelligence and 23 intellectual outlook, and as such is better than any other….
42. As to the promise as well as the limitations of the viva voce, Herman Finer says: If we really care about the efficiency of the civil service as an instrument of government, rather than as a heaven sent opportunity to find careers for our brilliant students, these principles should be adopted. The interview should last at least half an hour on each of the two separate occasions. It should be also entirely devoted to a discussion ranging over the academic interests of the candidate as shown in his examination syllabus, and a short verbal report could be required on the subject, the scope of which would be announced at the interview. As now, the interview should be a supplementary test and not a decisive selective test. The interviewing board should include a business administrator and a university administrator. The interview should come after and not before the written examination, and if this means some inconvenience to candidates and examiners, then they must remember that they are helping to select the government of a great State, and a little inconvenience is not to be weighed against such a public duty….””
43. In Mohinder Sain Garg v. State of Punjab & Others (1991) 1 SCC 662, allocation of 25 per cent of total marks for viva voce test in selection was held arbitrary and excessive.
44. In P. Mohanan Pillai v. State of Kerala & Others (2007) 9 SCC 497, 50% marks were fixed for the interview. The Court observed as under: “16. In this case allocation of marks for interview was in fact misused. It not only contravened the ratio laid down by this Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav and subsequent cases, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is reasonable to draw an inference of favouritism. The power in this case has been used by the appointing authority for unauthorised purpose. When a power is exercised for an unauthorised purpose, the same would amount to malice in law. (See: Govt. Branch Press v. D.B. Belliappa (1979) 1 SCC 477, Punjab SEB Ltd. v. Zora Singh (2005) 6 SCC 776 and K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P (2006) 3 SCC 581).”
45. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully perused the impugned judgment and the orders of the Tribunal.
46. In our considered view, no interference is called for, on account of following reasons:- (A) Promotion to the post of Principal Scientist pertains to the “Career Advancement Scheme”. Norms, Rules and Guidelines which are 25 employed while granting the benefit of Career Advancement Scheme ought to be applied in the instant case.(B) It is amply clear that the quinquennial assessment scheme for the ICAR/ARS Policies and Rules were- a) for providing opportunities for the career advancement, irrespective of the occurrence of vacancies, through a system of assessment should lead to each scientist competing with his or her rather than with colleagues and to the acceptance of the principle the “all the rights accrue from a duty well done”. b) Enable scientists to get the highest salary possible, within the system while remaining rooted to work in their respective discipline/field, 26 thereby eliminating both the undue importance attached in the past to research management policy and the request for such positions purely for the advancement of salary. c) Link rights and responsibilities and instill through the five-year assessment system the conviction that dedicated and efficient discharge of responsibilities alone would be the means of securing professional advancement.
47. The respondent was not disclosed by the appellant either that the interview would be held for evaluating personal or intellectual qualities that attribute a Scientist and that it shall carry 50% of the total marks. This is uncontroverted position. Had the appellants disclosed the method of evaluation the respondent may have challenged the same before participating in the selection process.
48. No fault can be found in the impugned judgment in view of the legal position which emerges after proper scrutiny of following cases of this Court, namely, Ashok Kumar Yadav (supra), Ajay Hasia (supra), Lila Dhar (supra) and Minor A. Peeriakaruppan (supra). 50% marks allocated for the interview were highly excessive for the post of a Principal Scientist and contrary to the settled legal position crystallized from a series of the judgments of this court.
49. The appellants were totally unjustified in allocating 50% marks for the interview particularly when the appellants did not even disclose to the respondent that the interview would also be held to evaluate suitability of the candidate for the said post.
50. The procedure evolved by the Selection Committee for evaluating the respondent was totally arbitrary and contrary to the settled legal position.
51. The appellants themselves have found 50% marks for interview highly excessive, therefore, now the criterion has 28been changed from 50% to 10%. This is indicative of the fact that good sense had ultimately dawned on the appellants.
52. The appeal is totally devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed with costs which are quantified as 50,000/-. The costs to be paid to the respondent within four weeks.
……………………………………….J. (DALVEER BHANDARI)
……………………………………….J. (DEEPAK VERMA)
DRDO – Revenue and Build up
14th November 2011
To
The Defence Minister
Room No -104, South Block
New Delhi – 110011
Honorable Sir,
During UPA-I you assured the nation to fixing accountability on DRDO an organisation which has never been questioned since its inception in 1958.
Sir, until 1980 the cost of projects were few crores but due to the visionary thought of then Prime Minister late Smt. Indira Gandhi the projects/programs were planned for self reliance in south east Asia and in particular in the Indian sub continent. The neighbors Pakistan and China were supporting each other to keep their upper hand but nothing deterred Smt. Gandhi to take decisions which may culminate to self reliance in the defence sector.
Initially the projects were planned collecting inputs from the literature available elsewhere. The proposals worked out where the cost benefit ration never assessed.
The changing technology was constraint and therefore projects/ programs during 90’s were given extensions time repeatedly, in some cases without enhancing the cost, where the cost was enhanced with proper justification were made. The examples are LCA, MBT, SAMYUKTA (EW) etc.
Easy methods were worked out under the guys defence secret to persue the projects beyond sanctioned time, without financial implications. Today in the last ten years the projects/ programs for which PDC extended did not consume more than 7000 crores rupees an amount equal to the annual budget of DRDO.
What is the fall out?
The revenue and buildup money sanctioned for running the projects were diverted to meet the day to day expenses of the projects the projects/ programs, which were running on PDC extensions. The manpower, the infra structure, the electricity bills, the salary, the TA/DA expenses were more than the cost of build up.
This imbalance between revenue and buildup was supposed to be checked by finance ministry.
Without active project and constant engagement of manpower in dead project resulted in to growing incompetency of laboratories.
What to talk about the Scientist ‘G’, Scientist ‘B’ were started giving justifications for the failures and compared the annual expenditure of DRDO as the expenditure meet to counter the natural calamity like earth quake.
Then the top brass of DRDO says 100 crores projects is not a big amount for DRDO. Indian Air Force is losing every alternate day on a MIG-21.
Let SA to RM justify the extensions of services to his beloved/blue eyed boys.
Sir, there are hope of Indian people with you please fix accountability on DRDO.
At least the finance ministry should cross check the equal flow of money in revenue and build up.
Thanking you
Regards Prabhu Dayal Dandriyal 21-Sunderwala, Raipur, Dehradun-248008 Phone – 2787750, Mobile- 9411114879, E-mail id prabhudoon@gmail.com, prabhu@dandriyal.com Website – www.corruptionindrdo.com Copy to 1. Prime Minister, PMO, south Block, New Delhi – 110011 2. Finance Minister, North Block, New Delhi – 110011 3. Smt. Sonia Gandhi, Chairperson, United Progressive Alliance Fax no.23018651Advice from ex-chief: Accountability absolute must
Advice from ex-chief: Accountability absolute must
Amitav Ranjan Posted: Sun Nov 19 2006, 00:00 hrs New Delhi, November 18:DRDO should definitely be held more accountable for its work and it should stop saying it can do everything under the sun.
Coming from Dr Vasudev K Aatre, who headed the organisation between 2000-04, this could be the luxury of hindsight but yet, a painfully candid admission to the need for reform.
Now a professor at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, Aatre has responded to this newspaper’s investigative series on DRDO’s dismal record (for the previous seven parts, visit www.expressindia.com). “I have been honest about our delays, I could not hide our shortcomings. There is a need to break certain cycles as the series in The Indian Express has shown. It is crucial that DRDO is a dictator of its own destiny.”
For that to happen, Aatre prescribes a five-point programme fundamental to which is, what he calls, “the absolute must for accountability.” And, two, the brisk introduction of the private sector into the fold of defence R&D to take away the burden of prototype production.
Calling for the immediate implementation of the incentive list for scientists — from sharing royalty to increased travel allowances — Aatre says the “Damocles’ Sword of imports” should not be allowed to hang over scientists engaged in fundamental research. Finally, and probably most importantly, “DRDO should stop making exaggerated promises.”
The aspect of talent retention is severely underestimated. Even President A P J Abdul Kalam, who headed DRDO through the ‘90s and saw first-hand the initial exodus of scientists to the newly booming IT sector — over 1400 have left in the last decade — said on November 11 in Ahmedabad: “We should work for the creation of a science cadre, with a clear mission and goal, well-defined growth path, and attractive salaries.”
But better remuneration is just one side of an intricate polygon of reform that DRDO admitted in June to be working on. The other crucial aspect is DRDO’s involvement with the services. The Navy, the smallest of the three armed forces, has the best depth of relations with DRDO but the less said about the Army and IAF, the better.
Experience has shown that programmes in which the agenda is set by senior serving officers, as in Navy’s avionics and sonars, have always performed with the greatest prudence — delivering on time, and cutting away losses when viability was severely undermined.
In June, as a start, the Standing Committee on Defence directed the DRDO to draw up a list of unviable projects that could be terminated.
But there is a consensus that synergy with the services is one way out of the present mess. Says Gen Shankar Roy Choudhary, former Army chief and member of the Standing Committee on Defence: “Coordination and interaction need a great deal of improvement. DRDO should make sure that officers from the services are part of design teams, and not looked upon as outsiders. Even today, they are accepted very reluctantly. I tried to do my bit in my time as Chief, but somehow it did not work out. This should be an immediate area of reform.”
Choudhary’s recommendation is an echo of what was officially proposed by the Defence Ministry’s Task Force on the “Reorganization of Higher Defence Planning”: a three-star serving officer should head the steering committee of DRDO programmes and the Armed forces personnel embedded with these programmes be recognised as integral members of the DRDO design team. None of this has been implemented yet.
New Defence Minister A K Antony, who received a three-and-a-half hour presentation on the DRDO on October 29, five days into office, told The Sunday Express, “In the few weeks that I have been here, I have realized the need for big changes. We need comprehensive reforms in this area to keep with changing situations. Over the next few weeks, I will be looking at this aspect in great detail.”
Consider what one of emerging India’s pioneers in industrial R&D, Biocon chairperson Kiran Mazumdar Shaw has to say about DRDO: “Every research establishment in the country needs to be reformed. Defence is one area where we need a high level of innovation. Enough is not being done and the DRDO is no exception to this. There is no modern approach at all,” she told The Sunday Express. “They should be focusing on every emerging technology and the application of new technology. At present, there seems to be only imitative effort. A lot of the research is ineffective. We need reforms in defence research that capitalise on innovation. Good talent needs to be attracted to these organisations.”
In DRDO’s journey from its fetters, it cannot ignore the private sector. The total volume of work undertaken by the private sector since May 2001 amounts to Rs 6,976 crore out of total capital acquisitions worth Rs 95,145.28 crore. Private sector potential in defence R&D is therefore enormous and mostly untapped.
On September 19, members of the Parliamentary Standing Committee received a compilation of the capabilities of just two private companies. Their capabilities officially declared as everything from weapon-launch systems, sea mines, submarines, fire-control systems and special materials to deep water technology, tracking radars, even space applications.
Atul Kirloskar, chairman of the CII’s National Committee on Defence, which played an integral advisory role to the Vijay Kelkar Committee on reforming self-reliance and procurement, told The Sunday Express: “With DRDO, there is a large opportunity to work on technological issues. Raksha Udyog Ratnas, or private sector systems integrators will be certified next year and will be able to make quotes. The new procurement procedure also includes a Make category. There are opportunities waiting.”
In a sense, few would know this better than Lt Gen S S Mehta, formerly Western Army commander and now Director General of CII. He said, “With growing similarities between civilian and military R&D, it is essential that Defence R&D evolve a collaborative structure which adapts to the rapidly changing technology eco-system.”
The journey to a weapons development system like in the US or Europe is still, quite certainly, decades away. But with shifting paradigms, the blurring of technological boundaries and a whole new element to the meaning of self-reliance, the essence of DRDO’s revitalization will be in accepting that the past is just that. The past.
(With Johnson TA in Bangalore)
What lies unread: the recommendations
• Kelkar Committee: streamline linkages with private sector, open up R&D, audit essential
• Task Force on Higher Defence Planning: Get senior service officers to head steering committees, let services personnel be part of design teams
• Create a science cadre with mission, goal, good salaries: President Kalam
• New evaluation technology to avoid time and cost overruns: ex-DRDO chief Aatre
• Cut losses, terminate unviable programmes, use resources for new ones, fashion future programmes with foreign partners: Defence Standing Committee
• Focus on emerging technology, innovate, attract best talent: Kiran Mazumdar Shaw
DRDO gets it right when it works unlike DRDO
Express Investigation: Delayed Research; Delayed Organisation – Part – Seven
DRDO gets it right when it works unlike DRDO
Amitav Ranjan
Posted: Sat Nov 18 2006, 00:00 hrs
NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 17:
For all its defences against non-performance, the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), ironically, has only to look within for ready templates of distinction. Programmes that have met targets are an isolated few but they worked well because their ethic symbolizes a fundamental breakaway from the tedium of the larger organisation’s default approach. Self-reliance, a term battered by DRDO’s track-record on showpiece programmes, shines beneath the hood in the Navy’s sonars, avionics and electronic warfare systems on IAF fighter aircraft and missiles developed under corporate foreign joint ventures.
The first two were developed on time because of the labs linking up with the armed forces right from the initial stages and, significantly, leadership that keeps young scientists on their toes. The latter, because international partnerships mandate a more professional approach to programme completion.
One of the most successful DRDO laboratories is also one of the least known, tucked away silently in the Trikkakara suburb of Kochi, fomenting applied research and technology to give the Navy real self-reliance in critical sensor systems.
The Naval Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory (NPOL), the only DRDO lab to win both the Silicon Trophy and Titanium Trophy for excellence, has, in the last two decades, given the Navy an impressive 87 per cent self-reliance in acoustic sensors for warships and submarines. All Navy warships, including foreign ones, as a result, are fitted with DRDO sonars like the APSOH, HUMVAD and HUMSA, and the Navy does not need to import. Now, it is putting its finishing touches to the USHUS sonar for the Navy’s Kilo-class submarines and the Mihir dunking sonar for HAL’s Advanced Light Helicopter, all well within their projected timeframes.
Vice Admiral Madanjit Singh, formerly the Navy’s Southern Commander at Kochi, said, “The NPOL’s success is from user involvement right from the word go. The steering panel is headed by a serving Naval commander who sets the agenda, efforts between the DRDO and Navy are joint.”
VK Aatre, former NPOL director who went on to become DRDO chief, agrees. “When I was there, we could not distinguish between designers, Navy personnel and production engineers,” he said. “We shared an excellent rapport. The difference here was that the user was part of the design team.”
The lab’s current director V Chander, an IIT-IISc alumnus, has espoused applied research like no other DRDO establishment, working not for idealistic invention, but delivering quality, fool-proof sonar systems to the Navy. How?
First, he’s rechristened the HR cell as People, Academics, Research & Training. He’s made sure young scientists get to spend time with the Navy for extended periods of time rather than labour away only in their laboratories. Third, he’s made sure that the level of involvement with warships and the Navy is so high that projects are either completed or prudently foreclosed before despondence and lassitude can set in.
Vice Admiral Singh, as DG Defence Planning in 2000, recommended to the Task Force on the Reorganization of Higher Defence Planning, that the country’s R&D labs be rationalized on the lines of NPOL. What ensued, another story entirely, was a turf war that saw the idea quietly dissipate. Another area where DRDO has shone despite itself is avionics and electronic warfare systems for IAF fighter aircraft.
The IAF’s most advanced fighter, the Sukhoi-30 MKI, flies with avionics developed by the Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) in Bangalore, and has proved so good that the new British Hawk advanced jet trainers and the license-produced units of the upcoming contract for 126 foreign fighters, will be armed with DARE avionics and electronic warfare systems.
For now, in addition to the Sukhois, these arm IAF Jaguars and MiG-27s which, combined, have over 30 DARE electronic systems, including mission computers, electronic warfare suites, laser rangers and multifunction advanced cockpits.
A testimony to DARE’s work: in 2003, the Royal Malysian Air Force ordered radar computers worth Rs 21.15 crore (75 per cent of DRDO’s officially declared export value of Rs 27.93 crore) from DARE for its Sukhoi-30MM fighter fleet, and is interested in buying more.
Air Marshal JS Gujral, formerly IAF Central Air Commander and Deputy Chief in charge of acquisitions, feels DARE has done an excellent job in a world where such technology is simply too advanced to share. “DARE’s projects have succeeded also because of deep interfacing with the IAF. They have maintained a high mark in defence output and timeframes compared to DRDO’s other not-so-successful ventures. Across the board, the avionics and electronic warfare systems by DARE match up with the best in the world. The IAF has been very happy with what they have provided us,” Gujral said. DARE Director RP Ramalingam said, “DRDO has realized that if there is a WW III, the winner will be the side that can best control the electromagnetic spectrum, and has therefore placed India as a competent force in the world map of avionics.”
Foreign joint ventures, on the other hand, have compelled DRDO to put out more realistic predictions on time and cost. The BrahMos missile project, which began development in 1998 as a corporate joint venture with Russia and resulted in a world-class cruise missile that other countries now want to buy, was completed in just six years at a cost of Rs 667 crore – no time and cost overruns.
Similarly, the new generation Barak-II surface to air missile for the Navy, being developed by DRDO in a JV with Israel, is officially to cost Rs 2, 606.02 crore and be ready by May 2011, a far more realistic predictive frame than any other missile project under the indigenous IGMDP.
The defence sector does not have a policy for foreign direct investment, but DRDO open to joint ventures with foreign partners. No wonder then, that on June 7, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence said, “BrahMos model should be followed in other projects also. Private sector should be given more opportunities in defence production and user participation should be encouraged from R&D stage.”
Why they don’t line up for DRDO job interviews
Express Investigation: Delayed Research; Delayed Organisation – Part – Six
Why they don’t line up for DRDO job interviews
Amitav Ranjan Posted: Fri Nov 17 2006, 00:00 hrs NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 16:While there could be a thousand and one reasons to explain the Defence Research & Development Organisation’s dismal success rate in defence projects, no rocket science is required to explain why it can neither attract — or retain scientific talent.
In latest testimony before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, available with The Indian Express, the DRDO admitted that 1,404 scientists had left for greener pastures in the last 10 years which, incidentally, coincided with the information technology boom in the country. Worse, this exodus has progressively eroded nearly 10 per cent of DRDO’s technical strength during these years. The DRDO confessed to the Committee on June 7: “The problem is not of the numbers and not of the lack of training but of retaining the scientists.”
In the same breath, however, DRDO said that the “reason” for the attrition was that a large chunk of the 1,404 left on “personal/domestic grounds” – an unbridled expression that could encompass anything from fatter pay packets to the exasperation of working on stalled projects within a sarkari structure. A 16-point list of incentives for its scientists, including royalty-sharing schemes, upgrading allowances, providing financial assistance for laptops and conferences, proposed to the ministry by former DRDO chief V K Aatre in July 2001 languishes in the recesses of the South Block.
Five years later, on July 12 this year, DRDO testified to the Committee that nothing has moved. “DRDO is striving to meet the rising expectations of scientists to attract and retain them in the organisation. Proposed incentives have been submitted to RM (Defence Minister) through RRM (Minister of State for Defence).”
The lack of success, quite apart from compensation at DRDO, is also a dampener in attracting talent. (See table). It is no wonder, therefore, that the IITs – some of the few institutions at which DRDO holds campus recruitment programmes – sends almost none of its students to the organization when they graduate.
Says Professor Y P Singh, formerly Head of Electrical Engineering at IIT Kharagpur and now consulting for a DRDO project: “DRDO was never a preferred place for our students. Most development there is reverse engineering and hardly any original work. Somehow, they have got lost. There is no dearth of talent in the country.”
His remedy: If DRDO could get even a handful of talented youngsters and took good care of them in every way, there would would be no limits to what could be achieved. DRDO today is, therefore, attractive for an internship or a short-term stint for a promising young scientist – there is never a shortage of research resources and equipment – but probably the last place he or she would look at for an enduring career in cutting edge research and development.
That all of DRDO’s biggest programmes are led from Southern laboratories, mostly in Hyderabad and Bangalore, from 1996 onward, the organisation has provided easy pickings for the IT and industrial R&D base there. DRDO chief M Natarajan himself testified on June 7, “A number of MNCs are establishing R&D centers in India, many in the cities where DRDO has a cluster of laboratories and establishments.”
What Natarajan wouldn’t say is that DRDO is also afflicted by a bizarre level of stagnation, in which project directors spend a decade or more on projects, undermining both growth at the lower levels, and a freshness of perspective vital to keep programmes on their toes. The problem is well known – what lies beneath is not. So DRDO scientists are no longer just leaving for better salaries. Groups of scientists and engineers from DRDO are coming together now to form high-tech startups with seed funds from venture capitalists. Salaries are low, but what’s driving them – “entrepreneurial aspirations” (See box).
According to an official estimate, in 2005-06, 42 scientists left DRDO to join startups run by their contemporaries. But a glance at the 16 incentives being asked for, now in the hands of Defence Minister AK Antony, is a revelation of what DRDO scientists want:
* Enhance professional update allowance for scientists from Rs 5,000 to Rs 20,000, reimbursements of Rs 1,000 for internet access and telephone for all scientists, in addition to a Rs 80,000 laptop grants for all scientists, air travel and field trial duty allowances of Rs 500 per day and a Rs 1,000 hard station posting allowance.
* Enhance study leave to 36 months and total absence of 48 months for doctoral degrees among its staff, a study leave living allowance of Rs 3,000 per month, financial assistance of Rs 1 lakh for scientists at international conferences (which they should be allowed to attend once every two years), a reward of Rs 10,000 for scientists who get their papers published in international journals, grant of sabbatical leave for a maximum of 24 months in two spells after a minimum 10 years service.
* Royalty sharing scheme on the lines of CSIR, reward schemes for scientists who get their products inducted into the services , authorisation for individual consultancy to the private sector for three days every month and permission to hold an adjunct appointment for a month every year.
Even if these are approved, experts say, the larger problem remains: the lack of original work in DRDO’s labs, as IIT’s Singh underlined; the bureaucratic structure, the lack of accountability at all levels on project delivery. The same reasons as the ones behind its failure to deliver on projects.
Will anyone dare audit the DRDO?
Express Investigation: Delayed Research; Delayed Organisation – Part – Five
Will anyone dare audit the DRDO?
Amitav Ranjan Posted: Thu Nov 16 2006, 00:00 hrs NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 15:For a full 20 months now, the Defence Ministry has been sitting on two crucial recommendations of a committee on reforming defence procurement chaired by former Economic Advisor to the Finance Minister Vijay Kelkar. Not only have these not been made public, there’s been no action on any. It’s not difficult to understand why.
These two recommendations have to do with what is unspeakable at the Defence Research & Development Organisation: the need for an “independent audit” of its abysmal record of delay and waste in virtually all weapons programmes, as reported in the ongoing series in this newspaper.
Numbered 6.19 and 6.20 in the report, accessed by The Indian Express, the Kelkar panel, including scientists, officials of the three service chiefs and industry organisations, said that the Defence R&D Board, the apex review mechanism headed by the DRDO chief, should also include representatives from the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).
This, the Committee noted, was “in order to enable the Defence R&D Board to draw the expertise and experience from institutions falling outside the purview of defence.”
Second, the Kelkar Committee recommended that DRDO be periodically reviewed “for its functioning” by an independent high level committee and the first such review should be initiated in 2005. The reason: “DRDO has expanded considerably and tried to create in-house research facilities for all defence requirements. This, perhaps, is not a very cost-effective move…DRDO, as a research body has also not been reviewed by an external and independent group of experts”, a process the Kelkar Committee said would compel DRDO to “reform wherever necessary”.
Not just Kelkar. In 2004, the Late J N Dixit, then National Security Advisor, had strongly argued for a comprehensive audit of DRDO’s dubiously expensive project record.
However, such advice is blasphemy in the DRDO. So on January 2 this year — nine months after the Kelkar Committee report was submitted — when the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence asked DRDO what it planned to do about new auditing mechanisms, this is how the DRDO replied: “DRDO has enough audit and reviews of the projects at various stages. It is not considered necessary to introduce additional audit and reviews.”
Limited audits of DRDO were conducted by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in 1988-89, 1992-93 and in 1997-2001 but these focused on manpower utilization, procurement of systems, all concluding derelict financial management and inexplicable expenditure. These reports were followed up by Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee reports, the last one in August 2005 recording massive wastages in 15 major DRDO establishments.
But the fact remains, there has been no single comprehensive audit of the DRDO or its functioning. Perhaps this is what prompted Comptroller and Auditor General V N Kaul to say today at a seminar in the capital on defence finance…”Defence R&D is an area where accountability often takes shelter under the policy of self reliance, and indigenization becomes a reason for delay…accountability of domestic R&D organizations needs to be re-emphasized to enable better assessment of return from investment. Sensitizing of the defence services to the role of public audit is essential.” But an investigation by The Indian Express into official records and testimonies shows that it will take more than a CAG speech to sensitise DRDO. Consider these:
• Not only has DRDO testified to the Standing Committee in January that it has more than sufficient auditing mechanisms, it wants less interference from the government, and even less accountability. In fact, in what the armed forces call preposterous, DRDO chief M Natarajan told the Standing Committee: “We intend examining the possibility of a structure similar to Space Commission/ Atomic Energy Commission to bring about greater autonomy in our functioning…This may take some time to evolve conceptually, before we could seek government approval for the same.”
• The highest monitoring body for DRDO, the DRDO Research Council (DRC), is in-house and under the control of the DRDO chief, who personally reviews its progress. DRDO has testified to the Standing Committee that it has “no scientific audit of DRDO projects as such”, and justified this by indicating the existence of feasibility studies for projects, decision aid for technology evaluation (DATE), in-house project peer reviews and post-project reviews.
• All DRDO projects costing more than Rs 2 crore are to be compulsorily “peer reviewed” by an expert committee for their viability. The Peer Review Committee (PRC) is necessarily an in-house mechanism.
• There are three-tier monitoring boards for all projects over Rs 100 crore. All these boards are under the aegis of the DRDO.
• This September, Army vice chief Lt Gen S Pattabhiraman reviewed 40 DRDO staff projects for the Army and found just three of them on track. Later, in the same month, DRDO chief Natarajan recommended to the Standing Committee that time extensions and cost increases be jointly endorsed with the services for government approval. In other words, DRDO would have sole control over projects but would rather not be accountable all alone.
• In its latest testimony, DRDO has said that accountability “cannot be fixed for loss of time in projects” and that slippages are due to “technological problems and not negligence”. Yet, on September 22, it officially asked the government for the freedom to recommend additional project authorizations, and that the Department of Defence Production (DDP) should ensure compliance.
• Given that the three services are the ones most visibly complaining about DRDO delays and results, DRDO has recommended that equipment trials be conducted by an independent test and evaluation agency, preferably with Integrated Defence Staff or DG Acquisition. In other words, DRDO doesn’t trust the armed forces but puts itself above all questioning.
Audit Mechanism
India
C&AG audits defence expenditure and individual performance of DRDO programmes but ministry justifies with scientific reasons for shortcomings and delays. No independent or external audits for project performance.
USA
US Department of Defence Inspector-General audit, followed by independent technical and performance audit of all programmes. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviews financial prudence.
UK
National Audit Office (NAO) reviews financial performance of defence branches, independent performance audit for programmes
23 yrs and first fighter aircraft hasn’t taken off
Express Investigation: Delayed Research; Delayed Organisation – Part – Four
23 yrs and first fighter aircraft hasn’t taken off
Amitav Ranjan , Siv Aroor
Tags :
Posted: Wed Nov 15 2006, 00:00 hrs
New Delhi, November 14:
At its last meeting in December 2005, the General Body of the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the society developing the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, recorded one fact: the Indian Air Force, despite official plans to ultimately buy 220 LCAs, would order only 20 aircraft.
And that the IAF had refused to push the order up until it’s convinced that the new 2010 deadline, the project’s third consecutive time over-run, would be met.
The IAF had more than a reason.
According to latest official figures that will shortly be tabled by the Standing Committee on Defence in a report for Parliament, available with The Indian Express, DRDO’s 23-year-old indigenous fighter aircraft programme, taken as a whole — including the radar, jet engine and Naval variant — would have wiped away a minimum of Rs 9444.5 crore by 2010. Aggregate cost over-run: Rs 4,094 crore. Delay: 12.5 years and counting.
By DRDO’s own testimony in June to the same committee, there are still “certain complexities,” although it claims it will produce the 20 LCAs on order from the IAF by December 2011. But that would still be understandable if the LCA was in any way ready.
Five months after the ADA meeting, Air chief S P Tyagi communicated in no uncertain terms to then Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee that his force could not depend on the programme in the short term. Shortly thereafter, he told The Indian Express: “We have to see if it is a suitably modern aircraft when it is complete. Right now we just cannot take any decisions. We can only wait for initial operational clearance (in 2008).”
The implication: the IAF is not sure if the LCA would have slipped down a few generations by the time it’s inducted. But the Standing Committee only had this to say: “The Committee are constrained to note that, keeping in view the ever-increasing delay in operational clearance of LCA, early induction of the same as IAF squadrons seems to be an unrealistic proposition.”
Just how unrealistic it is is something that has come to characterize the LCA programme ever since its inception in August 1983, and culminating now in a gravely unready fighter aircraft that the IAF could have no choice but to induct in large numbers from 2012.
Consider the following: Despite a battery of nine test pilots who have been embedded with the LCA programme, the IAF has refused to officially certify any technological aspect of the LCA apart from its structural strength, until initial operational clearance (IOC). Air Headquarters said so, in a written reply to this newspaper. The clearance should have been achieved by 2007 but its new schedule is 2008.
After a four-year wait following the rollout of the LCA technology demonstrator in 1997 for a first flight, former Air chief S Krishnaswamy made out an official case in 2003 for a “limited series induction” of the aircraft to give the IAF a chance to familiarize itself. He told The Indian Express, “The LCA is not full in any way, each prototype is different. I was a staunch supporter of indigenisation but am also very critical. How long can you keep on developing a product?”
The eight promised Limited Series Production fighters, envisaged as a part of the Rs 3,301.78 crore second phase of the programme, are nowhere in sight. The LCA, which should have undergone weapons trials by 2003, will now only undergo “dummy” trials in December 2007 according to DRDO chief M Natarajan, putting a big question mark on the possibility of IOC by 2008.
The real problem: the HAL-DRDO multi-mode radar, the very brain that will guide the LCA’s weapons, is not ready. After spending Rs 166.8 crore since 1997, HAL has decided to bring in a foreign technical partner to bail it out. The radar has been tested on an HS-748 Avro, but persistent problems with software and its signal processor have forced HAL and DRDO to admit their failure.
DRDO has justified the delays and their impact on the IAF’s preparedness by pointing to a revision of the development strategy because of a foreign exchange shortage in the 1990s, US sanctions, re-designing composite wings for weapon definition after January 2004 and extensive on-ground and independent evaluation.
After a cost and time overrun of Rs 2,456 crore and 13 years since 1996, DRDO admitted to the Standing Committee in June that it could complete the Kaveri engine only under a foreign joint venture. Problems that have crippled the Kaveri, according to the latest DRDO testimony, include critical glitches in aerodynamic, aero-mechanical, combustion and structural integrity.
Most significantly, DRDO has admitted to the Committee that to improve performance and safety issues, a JV could be attempted. Former DRDO chief V K Aatre said: “When I retired (in August 2004), there were some loose ends in the programme involving the radar and jet engine. But I am surprised they have still not been resolved.”
The DRDO was pulled up in January by the Standing Committee to explain how the LCA’s delays would impact the IAF’s modernization. Their reply: “IAF only can state the possible impact of delay on modernization exclusively due to LCA.”
But at Air HQ, an unofficial and approximate damage analysis of the LCA’s delay, shared with The Indian Express, is to the tune of Rs 11,440 crore in forced upgrades (some variants of the MiG-21 that the LCA was to replace will be forced to serve till 2019-2021 at least) and stop-gap acquisitions.
This does not include the purchase of 126 fighters potentially worth Rs 30,000 crore that the IAF will shortly begin an acquisition process for. In an unusual move, the Naval LCA will use air data systems from Russia’s state-owned Rosobornexport, which will also create a shore-based test facility for the Rs 948.90 crore development. MiG Corporation will conduct a design review and be DRDO’s chief consultant.
Arjun, Main Battle Tanked
Express Investigation: Delayed Research; Delayed Organisation – Part – Three
Arjun, Main Battle Tanked
Amitav Ranjan Posted: Tue Nov 14 2006, 00:00 hrs New Delhi, November 13:
The Arjun tank has no future. It still cannot fire straight. The T-90, a far superior tank, can kill the Arjun. We would not cross any border with these tanks.
Strong words, from Brigadier D K Babbar, the Army’s pointsman for the Main Battle Tank (MBT) Arjun project at the Mechanised Forces directorate until he retired last year from the 94th Armoured Brigade. Babbar, who spoke to The Indian Express, has reason to be disillusioned. So has Army chief General J J Singh who was more diplomatic last month: “We will see where we can use it to get optimum use.”
It’s not going to be easy.
Over 30 years after Project Arjun was sanctioned by Indira Gandhi’s Cabinet to make a home-grown battle tank that would address the armoured deficit identified during the 1971 war, the Army is now faced with a troubling prospect: inducting a lumbering, misfiring, vintage design tank like the Arjun, and that, too, in large numbers.
This, after DRDO over-shot Arjun’s project deadline by 16 years — from 1984 to 1995, finally closing the project only in 2000 — and the cost over-run is almost 20 times the original estimate. This is the highest percentage over-run for any DRDO project.
With five pre-production tanks forced upon the Army’s 43rd Armoured Regiment in 2004 and 23 tanks to be handed over shortly, MBT Arjun is about to be pushed into full-rate production outside Chennai, with the Army bound by its commitment to buy 124 for two regiments, all of which are to be delivered by 2008.
Still having 58 per cent of its content imported – including its engine, the integrated gunner’s main sight and tracks— the Arjun tank was put through confirmatory trials in the Mahajan ranges in July but the Army wasn’t holding its breath.
Consider these: At a mammoth 58.5 tons, Arjun is a full weight class over the Russian T-90 and nowhere near as agile.
• In May, the Defence Ministry publicized the Army chief’s inauguration of a product called Bogie Flat Arjun Tank (BFAT) built by Bharat Earth Movers in Bangalore. What it didn’t say: these were specially built rail wagons wide enough and reinforced to carry the massive 3.85-m-wide Arjun. For, the tank will crack the existing freight wagons.
• According to the Army’s latest trials, the decade-old problem of overheating persists. Two of the tank’s main subsystems, the fire control system (FCS) and integrated gunner’s main sight, which includes a thermal imager and laser range-finder, are rendered erratic and useless by the Arjun’s abnormally high peak internal temperature, which moves well beyond 55 degrees Celsius. This is in testimony to the Parliamentary committee.
• Following failed trials in summer 1997, which were criticized in a 1998 CAG report for a series of malfunctions, transmission failures and overheating, and an exodus of scientists from DRDO the same year, the tank’s production cost shot up steeply. Its unit price in 1997 was Rs 10.8 crore. It’s official unit price now: Rs 16.8 crore.
Former chief Gen Shankar Roy Choudhary had promised his service quick inductions, only to be faced with yet another extension by DRDO. In the same period, the Sino-Pak Al-Khalid tank was productionised and had begun inductions. When contacted, Roy Choudhary said: “I was a strong proponent of the Arjun tank but its performance was disappointing.”
• On October 12, Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh told The Indian Express that it was decided — after the recent trials — that the production-series tanks will be stripped of their indigenous tracks and will have imported ones. So will the first few tanks that roll out of the Heavy Vehicles Factory outside Chennai. In other words, after three decades of research, Main Battle Tank Arjun cannot stand on its own “indigenous” feet.
• The project, according to testimony provided in January by the Defence Ministry to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, has produced virtually nothing. DRDO admitted to the same committee in June that it would be able to develop an indigenous engine, gunner’s main sight and tracks only if the Army places an order beyond 124 tanks. However, the Army has no such plans, making it uneconomical and non-feasible to reduce import content.
“License production of the above items may be feasible with enhanced order quantity for Arjun tanks and may result in reduction in import contents,” admits DRDO. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Army will progressively begin inducting between 800-1000 T-90 Bhishma tanks, which will be built under license from Russia, from 2008, making the letter ‘M’ in Arjun’s prefix not just superfluous but bogus. Why?
“It is important for the Army to maintain combat superiority over its adversaries. There have been delays and slippages in the MBT Arjun project,” Army Headquarters said in written replies to The Indian Express. Five months ago, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence said, “The Committee also desires that accountability for delay in production of the Arjun Tank may be fixed.” But the Arjun, which has cost the exchequer Rs 305.6 crore so far (representing one of the largest ever cost-overruns in percentage terms), has the influential DRDO high command unfalteringly behind it. DRDO chief Manthiram Natarajan, chief architect of the Arjun programme and a 2002 Padma Shri, has been associated with the programme since its birth in 1974 and became Programme Director in 1987. When contacted, he said, “Defence scientists are conscious that there have been time over-runs on some of the projects. But even today, it is much more cost efficient than tanks of same calibre being produced elsewhere.”
But DRDO is undeterred. With the Army’s armour perspective plan drawing out 60 regiments by 2020, DRDO told the Parliamentary panel that it’s now developing what it calls Tank-X, a hybrid consisting of an Arjun gun turret mounted on a T-72 chassis. Two tanks have been prepared, and DRDO has said it will shortly offer them to the Army for an evaluation. No guesses for why the Army isn’t terribly excited.
Armed Forces wait as showpiece missiles are unguided, way off mark
Express Investigation: Delayed Research; Delayed Organisation – Part – Two
Armed Forces wait as showpiece missiles are unguided, way off mark
Amitav Ranjan Posted: Mon Nov 13 2006, 00:00 hrs NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 12:
It is the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s most prestigious undertaking. Yet the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) remains a venture matchless for its repeated and expensive failures.
Of the five missile families that the DRDO announced at the IGMDP launch in July 1983, two ballistic missiles, the tactical Prithvi and long-range Agni, have been inducted into the Services. But investigation by The Indian Express reveals that even these are far from operational readiness. Among the other three missiles, the situation is worse.
DRDO claims its first success, Prithvi-I, is fully operational. However, the missiles were forced upon the Army even before crucial terminal accuracy trials were complete, according to a 2003 report by one of DRDO’s own top scientists. Even now, despite DRDO’s claims, the Army does not rely on the Prithvi as an effective deterrent and cannot do so unless serious technological issues affecting launch preparedness are resolved.
Former deputy director of the Prithvi project and now DRDO’s chief controller of missiles and strategic systems Dr V K Saraswat’s report RCI/PGT/PGM/1 admits: “Accuracy of missiles like Prithvi is acceptable in surface-to-surface theatre role, but precision strike without collateral damage is not possible with this system.”
Agni-I and Agni-II, the only strategic delivery systems in the Army’s arsenal, are considered risky. DRDO has told the Parliamentary panel, in testimonies available to The Indian Express, that the missiles have been successfully tested five times. What it conveniently leaves unsaid is the fact that this is out of at least 10 tests. Either way, the Army feels a handful of tests is not enough to prove a missile’s worth.
The Agni-III, which plunged into the sea after just five minutes of flight in July, will be tested again only towards mid-2007 as the teams at DRDL and the Integrated Test Range in Chandipur try to unravel the disaster.
As for the remaining three, anti-missile system Trishul is a closed chapter proving to be only a technology demonstrator, by former Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s own recent admission, after it was decided that persistent beam guidance glitches could not be put behind the project.
Even though the system’s radar is ready and functional, the Trishul team has never been able to correct the missile’s flawed trajectory — in all tests it has escaped out of its envelope. The project’s manpower has already been distributed among PSU Bharat Dynamics Ltd in Hyderabad, the Indo-Israeli Barak-II next generation missile project, the Project Nag and the submarine-launched missile, designated K-15.
A notional one-year extension granted to the project till December 2007, after hectic lobbying, is being seen as an outrage by the Army and Navy.
The Akash medium range surface-to-air missile, which DRDO publicly claims “is in the process of induction” will, according to the Ministry in testimony to a Parliamentary Standing Committee, only begin Phase-II user trials in December on a T-72 platform, a change that could pile up the massive time overrun further.
An exasperated IAF, which calls Phase-I user trials unsatisfactory, has decided to buy Israeli Spyder missile systems instead.
Realisation of the ramjet propulsion system has crippled the Akash programme, which continues to flounder when the missile is fired at its ceiling range of 25 to 27 km. The IAF, in fact, has certified the missile to a range of just 16-18-km, virtually declaring it a dud at maximum capacity. Officers in the IAF fear the Akash may go the Trishul way, but Natarajan claims: “The Akash missile defence system has been successful.”
The third missile, the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) Nag, which DRDO brags as an “imminent success,” has not been accepted by the Army. After 57 flight trials, it has encountered unforeseen problems with its Imaging Infrared (IIR) seeker, rendering it inaccurate until the seeker is properly miniaturized for use. User trials are slated for June-December 2007. Saraswat’s report calls for integrating Nag’s seeker with Prithvi to make the latter a precision-guided munition (PGM) but that hasn’t worked either, since the Nag’s seeker is far from ready.
The result: After over two decades of research in seeker technology and expenditure of upto an estimated Rs 800 crore, all Indian missiles, even the Indo-Russian BrahMos,fly with foreign seekers. This is especially troubling since the North Korean and Chinese missiles are known to fly with far superior terminal guidance technologies.
The IGMDP should have wrapped up each of the projects by December 1995 using Rs 388.83 crore, but it got a 10-year extension from the then Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao after the then DRDO chief APJ Abdul Kalam managed to convince him that only a two-three year extension was not acceptable. Its revised funding: Rs 1771.43 crore, a budgetary overrun of Rs 1,382.6 crore. The time line has been further extended to December 2007 under the current chief M Natarajan.
“The Akash was to come at a certain time, and it didn’t. I had to change everything to make up for the delay.”
Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi
“It was a troubling scenario. On the one hand, DRDO assured us of Trishul’s success, and on the other our Western fleet was sitting completely vulnerable to a Pak missile attack.”
Admiral Sushil Kumar (retd)