Kalyan Ray, New Delhi, May 08,2015, DHNS: The indigenous Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) will experience a major handicap in defeating the enemy due to non-availability and poor performance of three electronic warfare instruments, developed by Indian agencies.
During the trial, the all-important counter measure dispensing system that protects the aircraft against radar and heat-seeking missiles, could not do its job properly, leaving the jet with poor defence. The system was developed by , Hyderabad-based Bharat Dynamics Limited.
It was not the only faltering system on-board the LCA. The self protection jammer that blocks the enemy radar was too big to be fitted into the Mark-I version of the LCA and the radar warning receiver, which alerts the pilots on hostile enemy signals, perform poorly. Both were developed by Bangaluru-based Defence Avionics Research Establishment.
“LCA Mark-I remains deficient in full electronic warfare capabilities as specified in the Air Staff Requirement (ASR),” the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) says in a review report that was tabled in Parliament on Friday.
The aircraft, which achieved initial operational clearances on December 2013, has as many as 53 shortfalls from the specifications drawn in the ASR.
Some of the shortcomings like increased weight, reduced internal fuel capacity, pilot protection from the front and reduced speed are to be addressed in the Mark-II version that was taken up by the Aeronautical Development Agency in 2009 and scheduled for completion in 2018.
Even after 30 years, the LCA could get only the initial operational clearance (IOC) in December 2013. The full operational clearance (FOC) is now targeted in December, 2015.
The cost is also rising all these years. What began as a Rs 560 crore programme in 1983 has now gone up by almost twenty times. The financial package for LCA now stands at Rs 8294 crore.
The auditor also criticised the Defence Ministry for awarding two commercial contracts to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in 2006 and 2010 for delivering 20 fighter planes in each contract in the IOC and FOC configurations respectively to the IAF.
Both were termed premature because in 2006 LCA design was nowhere near finalisation, whereas in 2010 HAL was yet to supply any aircraft to the force as per the previous contract. Even now, the IAF is not in a position to operationalise the LCA squadron in the absence of a trainer aircraft. Moreover, HAL’s production capacity – four aircraft per year – is only half of what the government wants.
DH News Service
Press Trust of India | New Delhi , May 8, 2015 – Business Standard
A probe is on into allegations that a Pune-based DRDO lab had donated to a temple a ‘hi-tech chariot’ made by its scientists, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar informed Parliament today.
Responding to a question in Lok Sabha whether Pune-based DRDO lab, Research and Development Establishment (Engineers) had developed a hi-tech battery-operated chariot and subsequently donated it, the minister said in a written reply that the matter is “under inquiry”.
“Further action would be taken thereafter,” he added.
News reports had it that the lab had developed the chariot for a temple and donated it under its corporate social responsibility.
The battery-operated chariot can reportedly run for about 12 hours and the battery can be fully charged in six hours.
Not only that, IAF would be “constrained” to induct the fighter LCA without availability of a trainer model, thereby “adversely impacting pilot training.”
By PTI | 8 May, 2015, 07.40PM IST – The Economic Times NEW DELHI: India’s Tejas Light Combat Aircraft project, in the works for over three decades, came under severe criticism from CAG today as it pointed out that its Mark-I version has 53 “significant shortfalls” which have reduced its operational capabilities as well as survivability.
Not only that, IAF would be “constrained” to induct the fighter LCA without availability of a trainer model, thereby “adversely impacting pilot training”, the audit body said in a report tabled in Parliament.
The CAG noted that it was due to the delay in the manufacture and supply of LCA that IAF had to go for alternative temporary measures such as upgrading its MIG BIS, MiG-29, Jaguar, and Mirage aircraft at a cost of Rs 20,037 crore and revise the phasing out of MiG-21s.
“LCA Mark-I, which achieved Initial Operational Clearance (December, 2013) has significant shortfalls (53 permanent waivers/concessions” in meeting ASR (Air Staff Requirements) as a result of which it will have reduced operational capabilities and reduced survivability, thereby limiting its operational employability when inducted into IAF squadrons,” the report said.
Listing the shortcomings, the CAG said that the LCA Mark- I fails to meet the electronic warfare capabilities sought by IAF as the Self-Protection Jammer could not be fitted on the aircraft due to space constraints.
Also, it said that the Radar Warning Receiver/Counter Measure Dispensing System fitted on the aircraft had raised performance concerns which are yet to be overcome till January this year.
It added that the shortcomings in the Mark-I (increased weight, reduced internal fuel capacity, non-compliance of fuel system protection, pilot protection from front, reduced speed) are expected to be overcome in the Mark-II model.
“LCA Mark-I does not meet the ASR. The deficiencies are now expected to be met in LCA Mark-II by December 2018,” the CAG said.
IAF had proposed in the early 1980s that a new aircraft be developed to replace the MiG-21 fleet, manufactured during 1966 and 1987, after its phasing out in the 1990s.
The project for indigenous design and development of LCA was sanctioned in 1983 at a cost of Rs 560 crore, which was enhanced from time to time up to Rs 10,397.11 crore.
The government in June, 1984, constituted an Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) as a dedicated institution for the management of the LCA project.
IAF had issued Air Staff Requirement (ASR) in October, 1985, envisaging a light-weight multi-mission fighter with contemporary air combat and offensive air support capabilities and excellent manoeuvrability for close air combat at low and medium altitudes.
The projected requirement was for 220 Light Combat Aircraft (200 Fighters, 20 trainers) to be inducted by 1994.
However, LCA could only achieve Initial Operational Clearance in December, 2013, as against the earlier scheduled date of December, 2005.
The Full Operational Clearance (FOC), which was scheduled to be completed by December, 2008, is now slated to be achieved by December this year although experts said even that could be delayed.
The CAG said that ADA’s decision to advance the building of two prototypes from Full-Scale Engineering Development (FSED) Phase-II to FSED Phase-I so as to utilise its savings on the grounds of accelerating the development process of LCA had failed to yield the desired results.
This, the report said, was because preponed prototypes were deficient in terms of critical onboard systems (Multi- Mode Radar, Self-Protection Jammer, Radar Warning Receiver) and led to ADA using the Limited Series Production (LSP) aircraft (meant for IAF use) towards flight testing/evaluation of these critical on board systems.
“This was in contravention of the Cabinet approval (November, 2001) for phased development of the prototypes in FSED Phase-II after Technical Demonstrators had been built and flight tested for 210 hours,” CAG said.
Talking about lack of trainer aircraft, the audit body said that IAF was in the interim using an upgraded Full Mission Simulator (FMS) at ADA for pilot training, pending supply of an FMS by HAL at the LCA operating base.
It said that the long gestation period led to a change of weapon systems on LCA, necessitating the acquisition of new ones.
The audit body also had a word of appreciation for the ADA, saying its work centres on the indigenous development of the LCA, “which is comparable to many contemporary aircraft in the world”.
CAG said that the manufacturing facilities at HAL cater presently to the production of only four aircraft per annum as against the envisaged requirement of eight due to delays in procuring plant and machinery, tools and also construction of production hangars, which would further impact production of LCA and induction into IAF squadrons.
Repair and Overhaul (ROH) facility for LCA, as specified in the ASR, has not been created fully at HAL, the CAG said.
Of the 344 Line Replaceable Units of LCA, 90 LRUs were considered non-repairable, it said. Of the remaining 254 LRUs, while ROH facilities in respect of 185 were available, the same was yet to be established for 69 LRUs as of January this year, the report added.
The CAG stressed on the need for more efficient management of planning and execution of aircraft development programmes, closer interaction and coordinated efforts among all the stakeholders involved.
It recommended that realistic timelines should be set by MoD while seeking approval for such projects from the government and that the same ..
should be adhered to during their execution with coordinated planning and an effective in-built monitoring mechanism.
“In view of the complexity of the technology involved, while deviating from the approved plan of development, ADA should consult the user (Air HQ) and obtain prior approval of sanctioning authority/ministry for such deviations so as to minimise waivers and concessions at the time of acceptance by the user (IAF),” it said.
The agencies — DRDO, ADA and HAL — should undertake the projects strictly in conformity with the specifications projected by IAF, who should be involved right from the planning stage so as to ensure timely achievement of their requirements.
Indigenisation efforts should be made in coordination with all the agencies involved by having a well-defined indigenisation plan and a clear roadmap for developing a quality product as per the requirement so as to avoid import substitution, it said.
“MoD should award contract to production agency at an appropriate stage of development of a system/equipment in order to avoid the necessity of extending delivery schedule due to a delay in the development of the system, apart from the resultant blocking of funds/inventory and to overcome obsolescence of the components procured by the production agency,” the CAG said.
As everyone aware that lot of complaints was filed against various Lab heads, but somehow DRDO management managing to protect these corrupts.
The case of CEPTAM, Director, Sh Rajesh Goyal’s SMS scheme, Dr A K Saxena , Director, DMSRDE is on the top of corrupt scientists list, So called Prof. Dr M P Kaushik, ex Director, DRDE, regarding procurement of 100 cr ICAD Chempro100i Make: Environics, Dr A K Maini, Ex Director, LASTEC regarding fire scam of Coil Laser facility worth Rs 21 Cr, Dr. Lokendra Singh’s farzi claim of Bio digester, Director, DRDE Dr Vijay Veer minting money in the name of high altitude vegetables, Dr Shashi bala, Director, DIPAS looting in the name of improving the health condition of our jawans in extreme condition, (Super audit report), Dr K Tamilmani companies exposed by CAG on LCA issue, Dr K D Nayak, Burman minting money in the name of customized PC from Tata powers etc. Dr Hardwar Singh legacy still running in the name of GOCO, Dr Shubhananda Rao, Resin Allied, Dr Guru Prasad Silver Rath even not going to save him, Ms Tessy Thomas appointment as Director, ASL and her husband appointment with tailor made recruitment snatched the SA post from Sh Avinash Chander.
There several cases are pending in the name of inquiry is going on ……
Now hope Parrikar sahib will going to take seriously all complaints of
To 18th May 2015 Hon’ble Shri Manohar Parrikar, Defence Minister,Room No -104, South Block, New Delhi-110011
Subject: Bander Bant (बंदर बाँट) of lab level award and financial share from award money from public fund although Dr. Vijay Veer, Director, DRL, Tezpur was himself Approving Authority for Lab Level Award.
Sir,
Kindly refer to DRDO Newsletter (A monthly House Bulletin of DRDO), Vol. 35 No. 1, Jan 2015, page 9 which covered the news “Raising Day Celebration at DRL, Tezpur”. Copy of the same is annexed as Annexure-1.
Also refer to DRDO website drdo.gov.in with link page policies. Copy annexed as Annexure-2, it is clearly stated that LAB LEVEL AWARDS will be distributed with Approval of the Director of the concerned lab is required on their recommendations of the Lab Level Award Committee. These awards include Scientist ofthe Year Awardto Scientist of the Laboratory with cash prize of Rs. 25,000 and Technology Group Award for Group/Team of Scientists/ Engineers/support staff with cash prize of Rs.50,000.
It is common practice in most of the Lab/Estt. of DRDO that Director never be the part of awardee group as he himself is approving authority for approving the lab level award and due to “conflict of interest” , Director should not be one of the member among the awardees.
There was no such kind of dirty practice in DRL, Tezpur till the year 2009. Copy of Awards List for 2009 is annexed as Annexure-3, but since joining of Dr. Lokendra Singh as Director, DRL, Tezpur a new unethical and corrupt practice started at DRL by which Dr. Lokendra Singh took two Technology Group Award for the year 2010 and 2011. Copy annexed as Annexure-4.
Similarly Dr. Vijay Veer took the Technology Group Award for the year 2012, 2013 and 2014. Copy annexed as Annexure-5.
But ethics, morals and integrity was kept on one side by greedy Directors Dr. Lokendra Singh (Bio digester Man of DRDO) Ex -Director, DRL, 2010-28 Feb 2012) and Dr. Vijay Veer (Director , DRL, Tezpur from 01 March 2012 – Till Date) when both these Directors started to take Technology Group Award for himself along with contribution in price money.
In the year 2014, Dr. Vijay Veer, Director, DRL, Tezpur himself approved his name for Technology Group Award and Dr. I. Baruah; Scientist ‘F’ himself recommended his name while he was member of Committee for selection of lab level award for the year 2014. Copy of the letter dated 03rd November 2014 itself discloses the whole story.
Sir, the issue is concerned with misuse of power for financial benefits, greediness, degradation of ethics and violation of DRDO policy for awards by Dr. Vijay Veer, Director, DRL, Tezpur.
Therefore, it is request you to issue orders to withdraw Technology Group Awards for the year 2012, 2013 and 2014 from Dr. Vijay Veer, Director, DRL, Tezpur and Dr. Lokendra Singh Bio digester Man of DRDO, both should be ordered to deposit the public money received in these awards to Government account.
Sir, DRDO scientists are great to do exemplary manipulations and misinterpretation of GOI rules for their personal benefits.
Ajai Shukla | New Delhi May 4, 2015 Last Updated at 00:38 IST – Business Standard
A sense of drift is palpable within the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), which has been without a leader for three months since the ouster of its widely respected chief, Avinash Chander, on January 31.
On that day, Defence Secretary R K Mathur was given additional charge of Chander’s post of Secretary, Defence R&D, for three months. That period expired on Thursday.
Mathur had held charge of only one of the three posts that Chander occupied – that of Secretary Defence R&D. The other two posts – Director General, DRDO, and Scientific Advisor to the Raksha Mantri – have lain vacant for three months.
The defence ministry is not alone in having key positions without incumbents. There has been no Chief Information Commissioner since August 22, and no Chief Vigilance Commissioner since September 28.
Without a chief, there are problems in coordinating between the DRDO’s seven technology clusters, each relating to a specific subject – e.g. aeronautics, missiles or naval systems. While cluster heads. called directors general, can function independently within their clusters, major development projects involve several clusters.
Among the programmes suffering from this lack of leadership is the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project. While the DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Agency oversees the Tejas project, it has no authority over the four technology clusters that feed into the LCA project. That coordination was always facilitated by the DRDO chief, who personally oversaw the LCA programme.
Another problem, say senior DRDO scientists, is professional insecurity caused by Chander’s unceremonious removal. On November 28, the defence ministry had granted him an 18-month service extension to head the DRDO till May 31, 2016. Forty-five days later, that extension was withdrawn.
The insecurity is most obvious among junior scientists, most of whom looked to Chander as an icon of the DRDO’s successful missile programme. “With such an accomplished scientist removed so arbitrarily, what job security do we have?” wonders a young scientist bitterly. Nor is there any clarity about who might succeed Chander. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had said while removing Chander, he wanted someone good from the DRDO who has the urge for development. Parrikar also stated he wanted a younger scientist to head DRDO.With almost all the DRDO’s top scientists already on extension, or nearing the retirement age of 60, 11 of the DRDO’s 12 top scientists might soon retire.
Of these 12 “distinguished scientists”, the DRDO’s top rank, equivalent to a lieutenant general, six have already crossed 60 years and are serving on extensions. Another five are 59 years of age, knocking on the doors of retirement.
The only candidate who fits Parrikar’s twin conditions – being from the DRDO, and also young – is Satheesh Reddy, the highly regarded chief of Research Centre Imarat, a missile technology laboratory outside Hyderabad. Reddy is just 52 years old.
Even so, MoD sources do not rule out bringing in an outsider, possibly from the Atomic Energy Agency, to head the DRDO.
There is also speculation that the three hats the DRDO chief traditionally wore might be split into two or more posts. Opinion on this is divided. The Rama Rao Committee, which proposed reorganising the DRDO, recommended the three posts remain vested in a single person. The subsequent Naresh Chandra Committee recommended separation, though not trifurcation.
The departments of space and atomic energy, which are often held up as models the DRDO could emulate, centralise powers in a single chief. The chairman of the Space Commission also heads the Indian Space Research Organisation, while simultaneously advising the prime minister on space matters.
By Rajendra B Aklekar, Mumbai Mirror | May 5, 2015, 12.05 AM IST
Bio-toilets that were fitted in train coaches amid much fanfare are already stinking, with some passengers complaining that the stench is so foul that it is unbearable for those sitting near the toilets.
According to Central Railway’s (CR) official data, of the 4,000 coaches of the long-distance CR trains, 450 were fitted with bio-toilets. The project had gathered momentum after Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and urged authorities to maintain cleanliness in trains and on tracks. A few coaches in the Rajdhani Express trains of Western Railway (WR) were also provided with bio-toilets.
Unlike traditional train toilets that discharge waste on the tracks, the new system treats the waste inside a tank with the help of bacteria and converts it into harmless gas and water. The Railways had signed MoU with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for the project, and the anaerobic bacteria were procured from Antarctica.
Commuters, however, are far from impressed. Nitin Parmar, secretary of Karjat Railway Passenger Association, said, “In most trains with bio-toilets, the stench is unbearable — not only near the toilet but also within the coaches. This is not a one-off thing. I have been observing this often. Biotoilets have been fitted in random coaches, and they all have this foul smell. Passengers sitting near the door have to keep their noses covered all the time. The activist travels between Mumbai and Pune regularly and has done a survey of trains with bio-toilets.
In fact, a maintenance worker to whom Mumbai Mirror spoke, also complained about the unbearable stench. “The technology is good but it is not being maintained the way it should be. There are a lot of processes to maintain but train coaches cannot be practically detained for such a long time as they are always scheduled for runs. If clean toilets are giving out foul smell, there must be something wrong,” he added, on the condition of anonymity.
Another staffer said, “If any foul smell is detected after the removal of waste and cleaning of the toilet, the tank has to be topped up with nearly 15 litres of bacteria. A check is conducted after a week and samples are the n sent for lab testing.”
A former member of the national railway passenger committee, Shailesh Goyal, said, “Bio-toilets are not a practical idea for trains. At many WR stations, the train is back on track within two hours. There is no time to clean the toilets. Also, bio-toilets require hi-end mechanism and a dedicated staff to keep them clean.”
Subhash Gupta, a member of the divisional railway users consultative committee, said he will raise the issue at the official railway forum next week.
While railway officials refused to speak on record, a senior official said, “Not only are all new coaches to be fitted with bio-toilets but the workshops are being instructed to fit in bio-toilets in old trains, taken up for maintenance, as well.” Another staffer said the biggest problem were the commuters themselves. “Many bio-toilets have become choked because passengers dump anything from water bottles to gutkha pouches and polythene in them. The bio-digester bins have turned into garbage bins. We will intensify awareness campaigns to avoid this,” said an official.
The system would be able to tackle incoming ballistic missiles of range up to 2,000 km Written by Sushant Singh | New Delhi | Updated: May 4, 2015 3:20 am
A Ballistic Missile Defence system is based on an interceptor missile shooting down an enemy missile mid-air. It needs ground radars, command-and-control systems and data links. India’s BMD does not yet have geo-stationary satellites.
The proposed Ballistic Missile Defence system is supposed to blow enemy n-missiles out of the sky as they fly towards Delhi. But last month’s test failed, and many questions remain unanswered.
DRDO’s promises and seven tests notwithstanding, the plan to put a nuclear missile defence shield over Delhi remains a work in progress.
The unsuccessful test of an interceptor missile last month swung the spotlight back on the proposed Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. Think of Rajinikanth firing a bullet to destroy the bullet fired by the villain in mid-air. That’s what a BMD system does: it provides a city with a protective shield where an incoming enemy ballistic missile is shot down by interceptor missiles. Besides the interceptors, a BMD consists of radars — satellite-, ground-, and sea-based — to detect and track a missile and its warhead, data communication links to pass on the information, and a command and control system.
DRDO first spoke of a BMD system in December 2007. All building blocks for Phase 1 of a two-layered, fully integrated system were to be in place by 2010. In March 2010, Dr V K Saraswat of DRDO promised initial systems deployment by 2013.
On May 7, 2012, DRDO declared it had developed a Missile Defence Shield that could be put in place at short notice at two selected locations in the country, presumably Delhi and Mumbai. The system would be able to tackle incoming ballistic missiles of range up to 2,000 km. DRDO also said that long-range tracking radars, real-time data-link and mission control systems needed for the perationalisation of the BMD had been “realised”.
The fact is the BMD system is at the moment not even close to being put into operation. Last month’s unsuccessful test at the Chandipur range was the seventh time the BMD interceptor missile has been tested. It was its second failed test, although the first failure was not of an interceptor, but due to a faulty target missile.
Washington-based emerging and space technologies expert Dr Bharath Gopalaswamy said, “Interceptor technologies are test-intensive and never foolproof. We have to wait until DRDO releases the data for these tests — which I suspect they never will — but for the moment, I would contextualise this as part of a routine test phase.”
A senior DRDO official told The Indian Express that they hoped to conduct another test within a couple of months. “It is part of the development process. This was the first time we launched the interceptor missile from a canister. The target was also a more difficult one than the simulated Prithvi missiles used earlier,” the DRDO official said.
According to Gopalaswamy, this is something to be expected with hit-to-kill technologies. “Dr Saraswat (former DRDO chief) declared missile defence capabilities as operational but the failure in such tests exposes the vulnerabilities in the system,” he said.
MILES TO GO
According to Air Marshal (retd) M Matheswaran, “a development trial by DRDO will not result in an operational system so soon. We can only expect to get a technology demonstrator at the end of the ongoing tests. Even the US took three decades to produce a BMD system. A fully mature BMD system is at least a decade away. The political leadership must be made aware of this reality”.
The BMD system was proposed to India’s political leadership by Dr APJ Abdul Kalam in the mid-1990s, a former cabinet secretary told The Indian Express. It was triggered by Pakistan’s acquisition of M-11 missiles from China. The proposal was to provide cover for Delhi, Mumbai and two other strategically important sites. DRDO is believed to have started work on the programme in 1999.
The armed forces were brought into the loop only a decade later, a senior Indian Air Force officer told The Indian Express. A BMD system cannot be operated in isolation; it has to be networked with existing IAF sensors for better situational awareness to avoid friendly fire, or shooting down of own aircraft or missiles. IAF already has a fully integrated air defence system, and the complexities of deployment will have to be resolved as and when the BMD is put into operation.
“There is no direct involvement of the armed forces in its development even now. The IAF, which is the end user, must be closely involved,” Matheswaran said.
DO WE NEED IT?
Many experts argue that the BMD can take on only a limited number of incoming missiles, and will invite saturation salvos from the enemy. Western non-proliferation activists have said India’s BMD will encourage Pakistan to expand its nuclear arsenal to fire multiple missiles. Bharat Karnad of the Centre for Policy Research said BMD was a “hit-and-miss” system whose reliability has been questioned by various US studies.
Last year, the US General Accountability Office questioned the reliability and efficacy of the Pentagon’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) programme, a system similar to India’s BMD. The Pentagon accepted that the GMD system provides “a limited capability against a simple threat”. Senator Tom Coburn’s report last year estimated the GMD system’s success rate at 30 per cent. DRDO has, on the other hand, promised 99.8 per cent reliability for its BMD system.
Unlike the GMD, BMD does not have early warning radars or satellite tracking of an enemy missile. The delayed detection capability reduces the time available for interception of, say, a Pakistani missile to around five minutes. Also, the BMD system can only intercept missiles launched from 900-1,000 km away; the Chinese Dong Feng-21 ballistic missile with a range of 1,700-2,000 km cannot be intercepted.
The BMD is expensive. Ballpark estimates for defending one Indian city vary from Rs 1 lakh crore to Rs 2.5 lakh crore. At the higher range, it is more than India’s annual defence budget. The US continental system is estimated to have cost more than $ 100 billion so far, the GMD system $ 41 billion.
“A system that doesn’t work, costs a lot, and can’t handle multiple attacks will breed a false sense of security and compound our problems. All this talk of deployability of a BMD is premature. What we need at best is a technology demonstrator,” Karnad said.
“We have no expert committee like the US JASON to validate projects like the BMD. India has scarce resources. To use them judiciously, a high-level technical committee should validate all strategic projects proposed by DRDO or the armed forces,” he said.
Whatever the case, India’s ‘Rajinikanth’ gun can’t fire yet. As the Americans like to say, “The real problem with ballistic missile defence is that it is rocket science.”
An order by the DoPT said Mathur would now hold the additional charge as secretary of DRDO till May 24. By: Express News Service | Published on:May 6, 2015 12:46 am
Buying itself more time to choose a full-time head for the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the government Tuesday extended the tenure of defence secretary R K Mathur’s additional charge as DRDO head. An order by the DoPT said Mathur would now hold the additional charge as secretary of DRDO till May 24.
“The appointments committee of the Cabinet has approved the extension of additional charge of the post of secretary, Department of Defence Research and Development assigned to Shri Radha Krishna Mathur, IAS, Defence Secretary for a period up to 24.05.2015 or till the appointment of a regular incumbent or till further orders, whichever is the earliest,” the order said. Mathur has been holding the additional responsibility since January 31.
Appeal to clean DRDO of corrupt and anti-national officials
The indigenous Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) will experience a major handicap in defeating the enemy due to non-availability and poor performance of three electronic warfare instruments, developed by Indian agencies.
