Allegations of Conflict of Interest and Abuse of Official Position in Indigenous Defence Procurement.
For nearly 30 Years, concerns have repeatedly been raised regarding alleged conflicts of interest involving certain scientists and officials associated with (DRDO) defence research and development organizations. These concerns warrant an independent, transparent, and time-bound investigation in the larger interest of national security, public accountability, and the integrity of defence procurement.
One such matter relates to Mr. Arvind Kumar Shukla, who served as a scientist at the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), Bengaluru. It has been alleged that a private company, M/s Pendios Pvt. Ltd., was established in the name of his wife Miss. Sandhya Shukla and was involved in the manufacture of indigenous various aerospace products, including:
Cockpit Flood Light
Inverter cum dimmer
Lighting Control Panel
Navigation Light
Lighting Panel
Formation Light
Other aircraft and testing equipment
The central concern is the apparent conflict of interest. It is alleged that, while holding an official position in ADA, Mr. Shukla was associated with planning, technical evaluation, and testing activities relating to products allegedly manufactured by the same private company. Official documents available on DRDO-related platforms are claimed to indicate his involvement in these activities. If verified, such a situation would raise serious questions regarding impartiality, transparency, and compliance with government conduct rules.
It is further alleged that the products subsequently obtained airworthiness certification from CEMILAC by claiming them to be based on indigenous technology. However, it is alleged that the items were, in fact, imported and their actual origin was concealed before being supplied through HAL.
Questions have also been raised as to whether all testing procedures and qualification requirements prescribed by DGAQA were carried out in strict compliance with the applicable standards. Complaints received from concerned parties further allege that certain test parameters were manipulated or altered during the qualification process. It has also been alleged that such irregularities continued even after the retirement of the concerned official.
These allegations are serious and, if substantiated through an independent investigation, could indicate violations of conflict-of-interest principles, misuse of official position, and possible irregularities in defence procurement and certification processes.
Given the strategic importance of defence systems and the need to maintain public confidence in indigenous defence manufacturing, it is imperative that the competent authorities conduct a comprehensive inquiry into all relevant records, approvals, testing procedures, certification processes, and procurement decisions. Any wrongdoing, if established, should be dealt with strictly in accordance with the law, while ensuring that all individuals concerned are afforded due process.
Several complaints relating to this matter are already stated to be under consideration by the competent authorities. Their impartial examination is essential to uphold transparency, accountability, and the credibility of India’s defence research and procurement ecosystem.
Subject: All Around Corruption and Mismanagement of LCA Project by ADA
Respected Sir,
Enclosed letter is received by this website and forwarded to you for kind perusal. ADA is den of corruption; they are just sucking funds out. It’s very unfortunate these officials don’t have even slightest patriotism or commitment to organization.
Top to bottom including those who are working on contract or as a consultant just flowing off money of poor tax payers. Just it is private work centers that are making some primitive aircraft which will never be used by air force.
Now and then, some senior air force officers make positive statements either for some favors from ADA or they may be trying to get some job in ADA or related organizations after their retirement.
Most of the ADA Scientists & finance people using accommodation, TD, DA and taxi massively. This requires complete large scale inquiry from CBI or any competent agency.
Regards
Prabhu Dandriyal,
21-Sunderwala, Raipur
Dehradun-248008
Phone 0135-2787750, Mobile 9411114879
Not only that, IAF would be “constrained” to induct the fighter LCA without availability of a trainer model, thereby “adversely impacting pilot training.”
By PTI | 8 May, 2015, 07.40PM IST – The Economic Times NEW DELHI: India’s Tejas Light Combat Aircraft project, in the works for over three decades, came under severe criticism from CAG today as it pointed out that its Mark-I version has 53 “significant shortfalls” which have reduced its operational capabilities as well as survivability.
Not only that, IAF would be “constrained” to induct the fighter LCA without availability of a trainer model, thereby “adversely impacting pilot training”, the audit body said in a report tabled in Parliament.
The CAG noted that it was due to the delay in the manufacture and supply of LCA that IAF had to go for alternative temporary measures such as upgrading its MIG BIS, MiG-29, Jaguar, and Mirage aircraft at a cost of Rs 20,037 crore and revise the phasing out of MiG-21s.
“LCA Mark-I, which achieved Initial Operational Clearance (December, 2013) has significant shortfalls (53 permanent waivers/concessions” in meeting ASR (Air Staff Requirements) as a result of which it will have reduced operational capabilities and reduced survivability, thereby limiting its operational employability when inducted into IAF squadrons,” the report said.
Listing the shortcomings, the CAG said that the LCA Mark- I fails to meet the electronic warfare capabilities sought by IAF as the Self-Protection Jammer could not be fitted on the aircraft due to space constraints.
Also, it said that the Radar Warning Receiver/Counter Measure Dispensing System fitted on the aircraft had raised performance concerns which are yet to be overcome till January this year.
It added that the shortcomings in the Mark-I (increased weight, reduced internal fuel capacity, non-compliance of fuel system protection, pilot protection from front, reduced speed) are expected to be overcome in the Mark-II model.
“LCA Mark-I does not meet the ASR. The deficiencies are now expected to be met in LCA Mark-II by December 2018,” the CAG said.
IAF had proposed in the early 1980s that a new aircraft be developed to replace the MiG-21 fleet, manufactured during 1966 and 1987, after its phasing out in the 1990s.
The project for indigenous design and development of LCA was sanctioned in 1983 at a cost of Rs 560 crore, which was enhanced from time to time up to Rs 10,397.11 crore.
The government in June, 1984, constituted an Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) as a dedicated institution for the management of the LCA project.
IAF had issued Air Staff Requirement (ASR) in October, 1985, envisaging a light-weight multi-mission fighter with contemporary air combat and offensive air support capabilities and excellent manoeuvrability for close air combat at low and medium altitudes.
The projected requirement was for 220 Light Combat Aircraft (200 Fighters, 20 trainers) to be inducted by 1994.
However, LCA could only achieve Initial Operational Clearance in December, 2013, as against the earlier scheduled date of December, 2005.
The Full Operational Clearance (FOC), which was scheduled to be completed by December, 2008, is now slated to be achieved by December this year although experts said even that could be delayed.
The CAG said that ADA’s decision to advance the building of two prototypes from Full-Scale Engineering Development (FSED) Phase-II to FSED Phase-I so as to utilise its savings on the grounds of accelerating the development process of LCA had failed to yield the desired results.
This, the report said, was because preponed prototypes were deficient in terms of critical onboard systems (Multi- Mode Radar, Self-Protection Jammer, Radar Warning Receiver) and led to ADA using the Limited Series Production (LSP) aircraft (meant for IAF use) towards flight testing/evaluation of these critical on board systems.
“This was in contravention of the Cabinet approval (November, 2001) for phased development of the prototypes in FSED Phase-II after Technical Demonstrators had been built and flight tested for 210 hours,” CAG said.
Talking about lack of trainer aircraft, the audit body said that IAF was in the interim using an upgraded Full Mission Simulator (FMS) at ADA for pilot training, pending supply of an FMS by HAL at the LCA operating base.
It said that the long gestation period led to a change of weapon systems on LCA, necessitating the acquisition of new ones.
The audit body also had a word of appreciation for the ADA, saying its work centres on the indigenous development of the LCA, “which is comparable to many contemporary aircraft in the world”.
CAG said that the manufacturing facilities at HAL cater presently to the production of only four aircraft per annum as against the envisaged requirement of eight due to delays in procuring plant and machinery, tools and also construction of production hangars, which would further impact production of LCA and induction into IAF squadrons.
Repair and Overhaul (ROH) facility for LCA, as specified in the ASR, has not been created fully at HAL, the CAG said.
Of the 344 Line Replaceable Units of LCA, 90 LRUs were considered non-repairable, it said. Of the remaining 254 LRUs, while ROH facilities in respect of 185 were available, the same was yet to be established for 69 LRUs as of January this year, the report added.
The CAG stressed on the need for more efficient management of planning and execution of aircraft development programmes, closer interaction and coordinated efforts among all the stakeholders involved.
It recommended that realistic timelines should be set by MoD while seeking approval for such projects from the government and that the same ..
should be adhered to during their execution with coordinated planning and an effective in-built monitoring mechanism.
“In view of the complexity of the technology involved, while deviating from the approved plan of development, ADA should consult the user (Air HQ) and obtain prior approval of sanctioning authority/ministry for such deviations so as to minimise waivers and concessions at the time of acceptance by the user (IAF),” it said.
The agencies — DRDO, ADA and HAL — should undertake the projects strictly in conformity with the specifications projected by IAF, who should be involved right from the planning stage so as to ensure timely achievement of their requirements.
Indigenisation efforts should be made in coordination with all the agencies involved by having a well-defined indigenisation plan and a clear roadmap for developing a quality product as per the requirement so as to avoid import substitution, it said.
“MoD should award contract to production agency at an appropriate stage of development of a system/equipment in order to avoid the necessity of extending delivery schedule due to a delay in the development of the system, apart from the resultant blocking of funds/inventory and to overcome obsolescence of the components procured by the production agency,” the CAG said.
To 12th April 2015 Hon’ble Shri Manohar Parrikar, Defence Minister,Room No -104, South Block,New Delhi-110011
Subject: Intimation about deliberate illegal acts and omissions done in DRDO.
Sir, Please find following informations about the intentional unlawful acts and omissions made in DRDO, MOD
Shri Krishan Kumar and Shri J B Singh retired joint Directors of AFHQ Cadre of the o/o JS (T) & CAO, MOD have been appointed as consultants in the ADA, Bangalore (an autonomous body under the administrative control of DRDO, MOD.) soon after their retirement on superannuation for the regular official work of ADA Bangalore and they have been illegally posted in the very sensitive establishment of DRDO i.e. RAC, Delhi. these two (02) consultants are used illegally to attend the court cases at CAT Delhi & High Court of Delhi filed by regular employees of the DRDO like court case of retired Scientist ’G’ Shri Virender Kumar of DEAL Dehradun. These consultants even illegally screen the applications of direct recruitments of scientist in DRDO & in such screening no meticulous screening is carried out by these consultants resulting selection of ineligible & relatives of senior scientist of DRDO as a quid –pro-que. Moreover there is imminent danger of favoritism and leakage of confidential and sensitive documents/information of RAC Delhi.
Shri S T Rajan & Shri R Natrajan retired joint Directors of AFHQ Cadre of the o/o JS (T) & CAO, MOD have been appointed as consultants in the program office of DRDO HQ New Delhi in the missiles program for carrying out routine works for which already their relievers in the form of regular employees have been posted in DRDO HQ. these retired GOVT. servants are also appointed against the vacancies of ADA Bangalore and posted in DRDO HQ New Delhi. they don’t belong to scientific or technical cadre. There is imminent danger of the leakage of the sensitive informations at their level.
Shri V K Shrama retired joint Directors of AFHQ Cadre of the o/o JS (T) & CAO, MOD has been appointed as consultants in the o/o DOP, DRDO HQ New Delhi with the approval of the then defence minister of GOI by misrepresentation & distortion of the material facts particularly with regard to the actual need of hiring him as consultant. His services have been utilized for the assignments for which he has not been appointed. There is imminent danger of leakage of the sensitive information.
Dr. A K Singh, present DOP of DRDO HQ New Delhi has played an active role in illegal extension of the periods of consultancy and in new engagements of consultancies of the retired GOVT. servants which he carried out with deliberate misrepresentation and distortion of the material facts submitted to the various senior authorities of DRDO, MOD & to the defence minister.
Shri A K Singh present DOP of DRDO HQ New Delhi did not take any initiative to suspend Shri G Malakondiah, the then CC R&D (HR of DRDO HQ) for his conviction in a contempt of court case of the high court of the judicature of Chennai on 24-sept-2014 although this conviction news came in almost all the important daily newspapers including Hindusthan times New Delhi edition. No convicted person can be retained in GOVT. service even for a single day if the news of his conviction comes to the notice of the concerned public authority through formal or informal channel. The stay granted to Shri Malakondiah on 26-09-2014 by the apex court was restricted to the implementation of the imprisonment and not his conviction. The convicted person was deliberately allowed an opportunity to influence the witnesses and to tamper, mend, amend, destroy, replace & concealment of the concerned documents against the public interest due to lake of devotion to duty and possession of doubtful integrity of the concerned officials of the DRDO HQ New Delhi.
the number of retired officials of DRDO, AFHQ Cadre appointed as consultants, directly violating the rules of consultancy, for the regular work of DRDO has reached to the alarming point where regular employees are considering illegal interference of the consultants in their regular sphere of duties and are also feeling frustrated and de-motivated which is playing havoc on the output of the DRDO as an organization.
I hope that some appropriate concrete action would be taken against the concerned guilty officers of DRDO & all Deviations and distortions would be set right in the national interest.
The Light Combat Aircraft is perhaps the most ambitious of all DRDO projects. But 17 years and four postponements of its test flight later, the multi-role fighter meant to replace the MiG-21 is still a dream.
What has happened to the LCA, the most technologically complex challenge that DRDO had taken up? Air force officers, DRDO scientists and defence experts say it remains grounded because of “scores of technical problems.”
The delay has hurt the air force badly and dented the DRDO’s image. A country that has not designed a jet fighter in decades had been waiting long for one. India had designed and produced the HF-24 aircraft in the early 1960s, but its engine was British.
Such was the enthusiasm behind the LCA that in 1985 the then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi showcased it as a symbol of the new era of co-operation and friendship between India and the United States. Gandhi even overrode the claims of the French and Germans who had been collaborating with DRDO and the Bangalore-based Hindustan Aeronautical Limited for the LCA production.
The original deadline to fly the aircraft was 1993. The cost, Rs 5.6 billion. The DRDO and HAL did roll out an LCA in the presence of then prime minister P V Narasimha Rao on November 17, 1995. DRDO top brass then announced that the maiden flight would take place in early 1997. The dates were revised to June 1998 and then to February 1999.
Years passed by, but no test flight took place. Today the deadline for the LCA has become a joke in defence circles.
The most scathing criticism of the project came from the Comptroller and Auditor General of India who, in his 1999 report, said: ‘Even at the end of 1998, the LCA had not crossed the development stage. Its production and induction into the air force remains only a distant possibility.’
The CAG report went on to add that the airframe for LCA developed by the DRDO’s Bangalore laboratory, the Aeronautical Development Agency ‘is deficient in vital parameters of aerodynamic configuration, volume and most importantly, the weight.’
The first phase of the project consumed Rs 25 billion, overshooting the estimated Rs 5.6 billion. Worse, due to the delay, the air force was compelled to upgrade its MiG Bis aircraft at a cost of Rs 21.35 billion.
Scientists at DRDO, ADA and HAL concede one thing: the LCA has run into some serious technical problems. LCA is a meticulous fly-by-wire aircraft, which is critically dependent on software to fly.
“But over the years, we have not been successful in fully testing the software. Therefore, we face difficulties in integrating the system,” admits an engineer at HAL.
Since the aircraft depends on computers, no pilot wants to risk a flight test without thoroughly validating the system. Scientists say the trials intended to test the dynamic stability of the airframe and the LCA’s engine-flight control system has been successful. Though the engine and the electronics are in the advanced test mode, the aircraft’s ability to withstand low pressure and temperature at high altitudes is suspect.
“There is reason enough to worry that the LCA will not take off in the near future,” says Bangalore-based aviation expert P N Srivastava.
“I feel the delay is primarily due to the fact that it took years for a country like India to get the advanced technology for the project,” he says. “The idea for LCA was born without having any requisite technology on our side,” Srivastava points out.
DRDO officials put forward one reason for the project delay — sanctions from the United States after the Pokhran nuclear blasts. In a bid to force India to put the nuclear genie back into the bottle, the US has pulled out of the project soon after the tests.
Thus, just one week after the explosions in May 1998, many scientists working on different fields linked to the LCA at aerospace giant Lockheed Martin in Binghamton, New York, were asked to pack their bags for India by the United States. The Indian engineers were working to validate a computerised control law software for onboard computers which will ultimately fly the aircraft.
As it imposed sanctions, the US also denied key components like hydraulic actuators — that help manoeuvre the aircraft, gain altitude and determine the trajectory — and the ring-laser gyros to make inertial navigation systems.
“One of the main reasons for the delay is that technological sanctions from the US hit us badly. Had it not been for the nuclear blasts, our deadline to test fly the aircraft would have been successful in December 1998,” says a senior DRDO official.
Lockheed Martin refused to give the DRDO the flight control computer, which was in the US for testing, when sanctions were announced, he added.
Another major hurdle for DRDO is the LCA’s engine. As per its agreement with the US, India was allowed to purchase frontline 404 engines from General Electric. In fact, DRDO imported 11 such engines and fitted them on to the early versions of the aircraft, pending the development of the indigenous Kaveri engine being developed by Bangalore’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment.
But after the nuclear tests, GE withdrew its technical support personnel from India and DRDO was forced to depend only on Kaveri. Sources now say it will take at least two years to determine whether Kaveri engines can withstand the low pressure and temperature at high altitudes.
No one at DRDO, ADA and HAL believes that the LCA will fly before 2005.
Experts say the delay should be examined in the context of a country that has not designed and produced a jet fighter since the 1960s. Development of every vital component of the LCA — airframe, multimode radar, flight control system, Kaveri engine, digital electronic engine control – are said to be beset with problems.
Scientists at DRDO, for their part, hold the defence ministry partially responsible for the delay. Between 1990 and 1994, all work came to a virtual standstill as the defence ministry refused to release the much-needed foreign exchange because of economic stringency.
But the biggest worry for DRDO is not the bureaucratic delays and sanctions, but the Indian air force. Faced with diminishing number of its ageing fleet, the IAF holds DRDO responsible for promising to deliver the LCA before year 2,000, thereby considerably upsetting many of its aircraft acquisition plans.
Suspecting that DRDO will never deliver the LCA, the IAF has now embarked on an ambitious project to upgrade 100 MiG-21 aircraft.
Despite the heavy odds, DRDO still remains confident that it will roll out the country’s first indigenous aircraft before 2002.
“We will induct 200 LCAs into the Indian Air Force between 2003 and 2010,” Dr Abdul Kalam told a group of aeronautical scientists before he handed over DRDO’s charges to Dr Vasudev K Aatre.
But there aren’t many who believe that promise will be fulfilled.
The facts with regard to perceived cost and time overruns and performance shortfalls in perspective
There have been several articles in the press critical of projects of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in general, and specifically the programme relating to the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), now named Tejas, and the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. Indeed, whenever a significant event that involves indigenous R&D, particularly defence-related, occurs, or a crucial decision is set to be taken, articles originating from within the defence “system,” or from vendors who see their business prospects threatened, appear. The real facts relating to the programme need to be put in context.
Performance shortfalls
The two issues on which the LCA project is criticised are cost and time overruns, and performance shortfalls. As regards the so-called time overruns, when the zero/go date for the project is taken as 1983, the critics fail to mention that what was sanctioned in 1983 was an ad hoc Rs.560 crore, pending full preparation of the Project Definition Document (PDD) — which is a fundamental step even to start the design and development process. The costs were to be finalised based on the PDD. This required the setting up of infrastructure in a hundred academic institutions and R&D laboratories and building up expertise to undertake the fundamental and application-oriented R&D required, and harnessing the design and engineering effort available largely in the public sector units for such a complex, state-of-the-art aircraft. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) discussed with Air Headquarters the Air Staff Requirement (ASR). Air Headquarters had requirements added to what was originally to be a replacement for the MiG-21. As a result, the ASR that was finalised was practically that for a Mirage 2000. But in the public perception the LCA remained as a replacement for MiG 21.
It look seven years, till 1990, to formulate the PDD. Based on this the ADA, in a report to the Ministry of Defence in 1990, gave a time-frame of seven years to develop the LCA and projected a financial requirement of Rs.4,000 crore. This included the building of four prototypes also. There had been a 25-year gap since the only fighter aircraft ever indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, namely the HF-24 Marut, had entered squadron service. So the period of seven years to set up a more advanced R&D infrastructure and build up even the core personnel needed to develop the technologies that the LCA’s ASR and PDD called for, was modest.
“Go-ahead”
After consideration, including by special committees, the Indian Air Force and the government gave the real operational go-ahead only in late-1993. Even that “go-ahead” covered the development of only two Technology Demonstrator Aircraft (TDA) without weaponisation. The funding approved was only of Rs.2,000 crore — half the amount requested for full-scale development. The first TDA flew in 2001, eight years from the real operational ‘go’ date, despite much additional R&D work that had to be undertaken due to the U.S. sanctions imposed in 1998.
Comments appeared in the media in 2001 quoting IAF sources to the effect that what the ADA had achieved was just a flying machine that was yet to be weaponised. Considering the nature and scope of the approval accorded in 1993, what else was to be expected? Using the money sanctioned for two TDAs, the ADA built four. Full-scale development, for which another Rs.2,000-plus crore was finally sanctioned, thus started only in late-2001. Some 1,200 hours of flight testing was to be undertaken to secure Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) from the IAF.
At that point, apart from the weaponisation requirements the project had to undergo extensive redesign to accommodate an air-to-air missile chosen by the IAF, which was considerably heavier and longer than what had been specified till 2000. The IAF had again changed its mind. This necessitated the complete redesign of the wing structure, using only composite materials in order to keep the weight within limits. The period of this redesign was also utilised to upgrade the avionics, to a completely open architecture.
Consequently, in “generational terms” the LCA is a fourth generation-plus aircraft with full networking capabilities. This made it more than comparable to anything the IAF had, and possibly would have, even after it acquires the 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) now on tender, with first deliveries due eight years hence.
On the engine
It is true that the Kaveri engine for the LCA that the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) of the DRDO has been developing for 12 years has not yet met its technical performance targets and requires redevelopment. So far the GE 404 engine from the U.S., which powers the F-16 fighter-bomber, has been used to power the LCA. The problems the GTRE has with the Kaveri are not unusual in a complex fighter aircraft engine project being undertaken for the first time. Moreover, the financial sanction of about Rs.320 crore given for engine development was possibly only to cover the Project Definition Phase and some high-risk technology development effort. We do not know of a first-of-type high-technology fighter aircraft engine being developed anywhere in less than a multi-billion dollar programme and a 20-year-plus development cycle. Even Snecma, the sole fighter aircraft engine manufacturer in France, despite decades of experience in developing and manufacturing engines for Mirage III, V and F-1, took about a decade and $2.2 billion to develop the M-88 engine for the Mirage 2000. The development of the Kaveri is unlikely to cross $1 billion.
The LCA with a GE 404 engine has done 800-plus hours of flight-testing. Even with that engine the performance has been not only vastly superior to that of even the recently upgraded MiG 21 BIS (the IAF is operating almost 400 of the series), but it has shown itself to be comparable in many critical parameters to the Mirage 2000. Modifications to the aircraft structure are under way to reduce weight and improve engine performance. When the GTRE’s joint venture with a leading foreign engine manufacturer for further development is completed in the next four years, the Kaveri will be brought up to a performance level, superior to the GE 404. Fitted with it, the LCA will be truly comparable to the Mirage 2000 and in many respects even superior. And all this in an aircraft much lighter than the Mirage 2000.
Superior
As for network-centric capability, which intrinsically needs indigenous systems for secrecy, security and inter-operability, it is superior in the LCA compared to any aircraft in the IAF’s inventory.
So it is a fallacy to think that we can continue the importing spree and still have such network-centric capability.
As recently as in 2005, the IAF’s requirement for 126 new aircraft was only for an upgraded Mirage 2000. At Rs.120 crore to Rs.140 crore a plane, compared to at least double that amount for any of the aircraft types now bidding for the 126 MRCA, is not the LCA a highly cost-effective fighter for volume induction into the IAF?
As for development costs, the LCA has remained well within the sanctioned $1.2 billion — which is about the lowest anywhere. Time overrun in the strict sense is only by a year or two, despite the sanctions. A first-of-type aircraft of this degree of complexity has not been developed anywhere in the West or in Russia in less than two to three decades.
The F16 series that was inducted into the U.S. Air Force in 1975 is today at Mark 60. That is how aircraft of this level of complexity are improved after induction. That this imperative applies even more to the LCA has to be recognised.
It is for the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister to ensure that this effort is not belittled or scuttled, and that the LCA programme is given all-out support — as successive Prime Ministers have ensured for our atomic energy and space programmes.
(Ashok Parthasarathi was Science Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Vice- Admiral (retired) Raman Puri was Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Committee of Service Chiefs, remaining closely involved with the inter-service weapons acquisition process from October 2003 to February 2006).
Appeal to clean DRDO of corrupt and anti-national officials
