Tag Archives: Light Combat Aircraft

HAL’s Light Combat Aircraft project to come under IAF control

Dinakar Peri   NEW DELHI, AUGUST 04, 2018 THE HINDU

 

Slow takeoff: The development of the Tejas-Mk 1A with specific enhancements has been delayed.

To prevent time and cost overruns, the IAF will soon have effective control over India’s indigenous LCA programme
The government is poised to hand over control of the Bengaluru division of State-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to the Indian Air Force (IAF). This is to prevent more time and cost overruns on the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project. This comes at a particularly crucial time as the next phase of the LCA project, development of the MK2 variant, as well as the country’s next fighter aircraft programme, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), begin to take shape.

“The government has given the go ahead to hand over the entire Bengaluru complex of HAL to the IAF. With this, the fixed wing aircraft division will come under the IAF. The modalities are being worked out,” an official source told this reporter of the process that may take a few months.

HAL resists
HAL manufactures and assembles a range of aircraft and helicopters. However, it has faced criticism for its time and cost overruns and lack of professionalism in project execution. HAL has opposed this move for a long time, fearing erosion of its autonomy.

The LCA programme was sanctioned in 1983 and the aircraft made its first flight in 2001. The IAF had signed two contracts with HAL, one for 20 aircraft in the Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) configuration signed on March 31, 2006, to be completed by December 2011, and another for 20 aircraft in the Final Operational Clearance (FOC) standard signed on December 23, 2010, which was to be completed by 2016. It is in the process of ordering 83 jets in the Mk 1A configuration.

The IAF constituted the first LCA squadron with just two aircraft in 2016 and, as of July 2018, has inducted only nine aircraft. Tejas has once again missed the FOC in June and the development of the Tejas-Mk 1A with specific enhancements has been delayed. With this development, HAL’s aircraft division will be headed by a serving three-star officer or an Air Marshal of the IAF, and effectively give the IAF control over the country’s indigenous LCA project.

In addition, three institutions — Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) and Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) — which are under the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) are likely to be brought under the direct control of the Chief of the Air Staff. Thus, the entire development cycle of the LCA will have the IAF’s oversight and will ensure timely execution and prevent blame games over delays, the source observed. Details of the specific contours of the move are awaited.

‘Long overdue’
“The IAF should have taken over the LCA programme two decades back, but [it is] good it’s happening at least now,” said Air Marshal M. Matheswaran (Retd), who oversaw the IAF’s fighter procurement in the past. He felt that to make a real difference, the IAF should get the entire cycle under its control, from design, standardisation, production and supply chain. Otherwise, just having one officer at the helm will not change things much, he added.

“Production for 20 FOC aircraft will be taken up after FOC clearance by the ADA, for which the current target is December 2018,” Minister of State for Defence Subhash Bhamre said in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha last week.

However, a Defence Ministry official said this is likely to be delayed by another six months as several parameters like gun firing, air-to-air refuelling and new data-linked software defined radios, among others, are yet to be validated. The IAF wants new data links as a standard feature on the FOC variant as communications are an essential feature for an aircraft to operate in a network-centric environment.

HAL is setting up a second assembly line to ramp up production from eight to 16 aircraft a year, in addition to outsourcing major modules to private partners.

Design reboot
The LCA is powered by an American GE-404 engine, which the IAF has stated is underpowered. This is to be corrected in the LCA-Mk2 which would be a larger aircraft powered by the GE-414 engine producing 98kN thrust compared to 84kN thrust of the current engine.

“The design change has been launched sometime back. We don’t want just some superficial changes, but a real increase in performance. The target is to meet or exceed the Mirage aircraft in performance,” an IAF official said.

To accommodate the larger and more powerful engine, which also needs more fuel, requires a larger wingspan for the aircraft. This calls for a major design and engineering effort.

“There are concerns and challenges but it is doable,” the officer noted.

The first prototype of the Mk2 is expected to make its debut flight in 2022-23, and complete the IOC and FOC approvals in the next five years. The current target is to have the first squadron ready by 2028.

The IAF intends to have several squadrons of the LCA-Mk2 as it has to replace three Mirage squadrons, three Mig-29 squadrons and six Jaguar squadrons. A squadron typically has about 18 aircraft, 16 fighters and two trainers. However, this can vary, depending on the type of aircraft and the necessity.

50% of Rafale deal value will be invested in India: Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar

By MEERA MOHANTY & Manu Pubby, ET Bureau | 11 May, 2015, 07.04AM IST

NEW DELHI: Terrorists, irrespective of wherever they may be operating from, should be neutralised using all types of methods, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar told ET in an exclusive interview. He elaborated that “neutralisation” doesn’t necessarily mean killing terrorists but making them “ineffective.”

Parrikar also criticised ex-BJP minister Arun Shourie, saying the latter “does not have the full brief on what is happening”. Shourie had recently said the Narendra Modi government was faltering on policymaking and delivery.

Responding to a question on how India should deal with terrorists in foreign territory, the defence minister said: “A terrorist has to be neutralised-…Certain issues cannot be discussed but I feel that for any enemy of the country, all types of methods should be used to neutralise them.”

“Neutralising does not mean just killing…it means any method that makes them non-functional – get him to jail or to make him ineffective in any manner,” Parrikar added.

In his wide-ranging interaction with ET covering several key policy areas, Parrikar also set out the exact figure on India’s manufacturing share of the Rafale fighter jet project – France will need to spend 50% of the contract value, almost four billion dollars, as investments in the Indian defence and aerospace sector. The minister said the Rafale jet project will “unleash Make-in- India”.

Parrikar also said that with India buying around 36 Rafale jets for now, government savings on this project is likely to be up Rs 60,000-65,000 crore. This money, Parrikar said, will be used to accelerate defence manufacturing in India, including speeding up the long-ingestation Light Combat Aircraft. The minister said LCA will be inducted in large numbers, up to 200 fighters or 10 squadrons.
Parrikar linked low levels infiltration from Pakistan and fewer incidents of cross-border firing this year to Indian forces’ strong retaliation to “misadventures”.

Acknowledging that defence forces face an issue on resources, the minister said all three wings, army, air force and navy, must prioritise spending. All three wings have been asked to make a list of must-have items, Parrikar said. He said Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) would have a new head by May 24.

DRDO will also have a separate Scientific Advisor, who will be attached to the ministry for independent advice. Parrikar said for important projects he will form consortiums of all stakeholders from the government system, it won’t be just DRDO taking all the critical decisions.​If the army has to operate in the Jammu & Kashmir, it needs AFSPA: Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar

OneIndia Exclusive: DRDO to abandon indigenous fighter jet engine Kaveri project

Written by: Dr Anantha Krishnan M,Wednesday, November 19, 2014,

Bengaluru, Nov 18: The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has decided to wind up the Kaveri engine (GTX-35VS ) programme, signaling an end to a desi dream of equipping its own fighter jet with a home-grown power plant. Sources in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) confirmed to OneIndia on Tuesday that the DRDO has already moved a file recently seeking the closure of the ambitious engine development project undertaken by Bengaluru-based Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE).kaveri engin
The proposal now needs to get the approval of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and finally the clearance from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) – a process expected to take at least a year. The Kaveri project, which began in the mid-80s, was aimed at powering the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas. GTRE has spent so far Rs 2,106 crore on the project so far and could only fly the engine for 73 hours on the IL-76 Flying Test Bed (FTB) in Russia. The delay in the project saw DRDO choosing the GE 404 engine for Tejas Mk-1 and GE 414 for Tejas Mk-II. GTRE gets additional funds Sources said that the DRDO has sanctioned Rs 300 crore for GTRE to take up future projects. “The lab is gearing up to take up some futuristic projects and the sanctions have been already given. Another additional sanction of Rs 700 crore is on its way to help realize these gen-next technologies,” an official said.kaveri engin 1

Sources confirm that a separate proposal of Rs 2,600 crore to develop engines for an ‘ambitious project’ is under consideration now. The lab has been given another Rs 70 crore for a strategic programme. Part of DRDO’s bold decision, confirms DG Refusing to divulge the finer details, Dr K Tamilmani, Director-General (Aero), DRDO, confirmed to OneIndia that the Kaveri project will be scrapped. “Yes. These are part of the bold stand being taken by DRDO. Whereever we have found bottlenecks for long time, with no realistic solutions, it’s better to move on. It is an honest stand we are taking,” Tamilmani said. When asked whether the decision was a fall out of the recent remarks made by Prime Minister Narendra Modi asking DRDO to come out of the delay trap, the senior official refused to make a direct comment. “If you are fit to run only for 50 km, why attempt 100 km? DRDO has realized its mistakes of the past and we have no hesitation in taking some bold steps,” he said. Sources said that the MoF has sought some clarifications from DRDO on the Kaveri project, before the matter could finally reach the CCS.kaveri engin 2

Years of hard work won’t go waste: GTRE Director Dr C P Ramanarayanan, Director, GTRE, said that the DRDO decision might not be final. Leading a team of 900-plus staff at GTRE, Dr Ramanarayanan is now left with the task of inspiring the team to launch future projects. “This is not the end of the road. We have identified some 12 core areas of technologies and various teams are already at it. Years of hard work put in by the team won’t go waste either,” Dr Ramanarayanan, a torpedo specialist, told OneIndia.

kaveri engin 3He said world over not many countries have progressed ahead in making engines. “We have made a good start and despite the delays, proved our capabilities to our best of abilities. The lessons learnt will not go down the drain. India must become self sufficient in making aero engines and our efforts will continue,” he added.

PM scraps DRDO’s ‘retirement benefits’ committee

ABHINANDAN MISHRA New Delhi | 20th Sep 2014 – The Sunday Gaurdian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has decided to scrap the Departmental Peer Review Committee (DPRCs) of the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) in an attempt to revamp the outfit. The main job of this committee of DRDO scientists is to grant extensions to fellow scientists. The committee has come under scrutiny after complaints that all that these scientists do is to park retiring and retired colleagues in important posts year after year. “The PM has ordered the scrapping of the committee that reviews cases to grant extension of service to scientists who are superannuating. Giving repeated extensions to scientists, whose capabilities could be questioned, is one of the major problems with the DRDO,” a DRDO official said.sunday gaurdians clip

Sources said that 15 top scientists in DRDO, including Director General (DG) Avinash Chander, are on extension. After getting two extensions, Chander is now on contract. “What should have been an exception, has become a norm here. Every year, six to eight senior people in DRDO get extensions. This has led to an alarming attrition rate in the organisation,” said a scientist who has been working with DRDO for the last 12 years. In the seven years between 2007 and 2013, at least 687 scientists left the organisation, which comes to a rate of 100 scientists leaving the organisation every year.

The DRDO, best known for missing manufacturing deadlines, is gearing up for a hard time after PM Modi told its scientists and officials that their lackadaisical approach would not be tolerated anymore. Last month, while addressing the annual award function of the organisation in the national capital, the PM expressed his unhappiness over the way things were working in the organisation.

“The Prime Minister is clearly unhappy with the way the DRDO has been functioning, as most of our projects are running years behind schedule, resulting in cost overruns and compromising of national security. During the event, he made sure that that senior officials were made aware of his views on the subject and the fact that such lackadaisical approach would not work anymore. With the government approving 49% FDI in defence, we need to start performing now,” said a senior DRDO official. Modi, while commenting on DRDO said that the organisation “should not say in 2014 that a project conceived in 1992 will take some more time”.

DRDO, founded in 1958, has a network of 54 laboratories, employs close to 35,000 employees including 7,500 scientists. In July this year, the BJP-led NDA government increased DRDO’s budget from Rs 5,985 crore — as provided by the UPA’s interim Budget in February — to Rs 9,298 crore, the largest ever increase in the organisation’s history.

However, despite being treated with extreme care by successive governments, DRDO has still not been able to shake off the negative image associated with it. Most of its projects, ranging from Tejas light combat aircraft and long-range surface-to-air missile systems to NAG missiles are running years behind schedule.

According to officials, at least ten major projects that are being worked on by the DRDO have exceeded their stipulated date. “The major ones among these are the light combat aircraft, naval light combat aircraft, aero engine Kaveri, airborne early warning and control aircraft, long range surface-to-air missile, air-to-air missile Astra, advanced lightweight torpedo, dual colour missile approach warning system for fighter aircraft. If you include the minor ones, like the NAG missile system, then the number of incomplete projects will become even more,” the official stated.

According to a former bureaucrat, who had worked in the Ministry of Defence, the government has been always generous when it came to funding the DRDO. “The DRDO has never suffered from any paucity of funds. The main problem with the organisation is at the top. No accountability is fixed on them. There is no other place where you will find senior officials being given repeated extensions despite doing nothing.”

The former bureaucrat added that he had come across instances where the country’s defence preparedness suffered because the DRDO first made a commitment that it would manufacture the product, but when the deadline arrived, it did not have the product. And in cases where the product was there, the quality was not acceptable. “It is a shame that due to DRDO’s inefficiency the country has to import more than half of its defence requirements,” he said.

Even the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has time and again come down heavily on the DRDO. “Year after year, the CAG has revealed the kind of mismanagement that has been happening in the DRDO. In February this year, CAG audits revealed that the DRDO spent Rs 52 crore to buy a cooling substance, which was to be used in the NAG missile system in 2007. The interesting part is that the NAG was not operational at the time and it is still not operational. Can you expect such kind of mismanagement from any other defence organisation in the world elsewhere?” an official with the DRDO said.

According to him, the onus of revamping the DRDO is with the Defence Minister. “The DRDO officials and the defence ministry bureaucrats will not take the bull by the horn; no one wants to disturb the status quo. It is the Defence Minister who needs to do it. The minister needs to implement the recommendation of the first-ever external review report of the DRDO, which was prepared by an independent committee of experts headed by P. Rama Rao, former secretary, Department of Science & Technology, and former ISRO man Dr Brahm Prakash. It had recommended a massive restructuring of the 50-year-old body to make it more effective,” the official said.

However, Ravi Kumar Gupta, Director, Directorate of Public Interface, DRDO, said that the PM was very appreciative of the work being done by the organisation during his interaction with the officials last month. “He has positive views about the organisation and said that the organisation had a lot of potential and whatever we were doing, we were doing it in a professional way. He also said that just as it holds true for any other organisation, we too should not lose focus and follow the chalta hai attitude,” Gupta said.

Don’t delay Light Combat Aircraft project: Anthony to DRDO

Rajat Pandit, TNN Nov 6, 2013, 08.19PM IST
NEW DELHI: Defence minister A K Antony on Wednesday directed the DRDO to ensure that the operational deadlines for the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft, first sanctioned 30 years to replace the ageing MiG-21s, are not delayed yet again.

Addressing the parliamentary consultative committee on defence, Antony said the under-development indigenous fighter’s initial operational clearance (IOC) planned for next month and the final operational clearance (FOC) in December 2014 should be “completed on schedule”.With DRDO currently handling as many as 532 projects, the minister asked DRDO to “mainly concentrate on high-end research, particularly in critical and strategic areas”. DRDO should invest more time and resources in fundamental research, lay more emphasis on major mission-mode programmes for the armed forces and pool together resources and talent available in academic and other R&D institutions, he said.

The long-running developmental sagas of the Tejas fighter and Arjun main-battle tank have come to symbolize the huge delays and cost-overruns dogging virtually all major projects of DRDO. While the MPs lauded DRDO’s success in the field of missiles, they were “bitterly critical” of the delay in such projects.

As earlier reported by TOI, the single-engine Tejas is unlikely to become fully combat-worthy anytime before end-2015. When the Tejas project was first sanctioned in 1983, the initial project cost was pegged at Rs 560 crore. The overall programme will now cost upwards of Rs 25,000 crore if the naval variant, trainer and the failed Kaveri engine are also taken into account.

It was in January 2011 that Tejas got IOC-I, which was initially heralded as the “full and final IOC” by the combine of DRDO, Aeronautical Development Agency and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd till better sense prevailed. The fighter can be certified as fully airworthy only after it passes the IOC-II stage.

The light-weight Tejas will be ready to go to war only after the FOC, which will include integration of all weapons and other systems to ensure it can fire guns, rockets, laser-guided bombs and BVR (beyond visual range) missiles as well as undergo air-to-air refuelling.

Chinks in the Armour – What ail DRDO, India’s Premier Defence Organigation?

Rediff.com – News-Special Part- II

‘The LCA won’t take off in the near future’

George Iype

The Light Combat Aircraft is perhaps the most ambitious of all DRDO projects. But 17 years and four postponements of its test flight later, the multi-role fighter meant to replace the MiG-21 is still a dream.

What has happened to the LCA, the most technologically complex challenge that DRDO had taken up? Air force officers, DRDO scientists and defence experts say it remains grounded because of “scores of technical problems.”

The delay has hurt the air force badly and dented the DRDO’s image. A country that has not designed a jet fighter in decades had been waiting long for one. India had designed and produced the HF-24 aircraft in the early 1960s, but its engine was British.

Such was the enthusiasm behind the LCA that in 1985 the then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi showcased it as a symbol of the new era of co-operation and friendship between India and the United States. Gandhi even overrode the claims of the French and Germans who had been collaborating with DRDO and the Bangalore-based Hindustan Aeronautical Limited for the LCA production.

The original deadline to fly the aircraft was 1993. The cost, Rs 5.6 billion. The DRDO and HAL did roll out an LCA in the presence of then prime minister P V Narasimha Rao on November 17, 1995. DRDO top brass then announced that the maiden flight would take place in early 1997. The dates were revised to June 1998 and then to February 1999.

Years passed by, but no test flight took place. Today the deadline for the LCA has become a joke in defence circles.

The most scathing criticism of the project came from the Comptroller and Auditor General of India who, in his 1999 report, said: ‘Even at the end of 1998, the LCA had not crossed the development stage. Its production and induction into the air force remains only a distant possibility.’

The CAG report went on to add that the airframe for LCA developed by the DRDO’s Bangalore laboratory, the Aeronautical Development Agency ‘is deficient in vital parameters of aerodynamic configuration, volume and most importantly, the weight.’

The first phase of the project consumed Rs 25 billion, overshooting the estimated Rs 5.6 billion. Worse, due to the delay, the air force was compelled to upgrade its MiG Bis aircraft at a cost of Rs 21.35 billion.

Scientists at DRDO, ADA and HAL concede one thing: the LCA has run into some serious technical problems. LCA is a meticulous fly-by-wire aircraft, which is critically dependent on software to fly.

“But over the years, we have not been successful in fully testing the software. Therefore, we face difficulties in integrating the system,” admits an engineer at HAL.

Since the aircraft depends on computers, no pilot wants to risk a flight test without thoroughly validating the system. Scientists say the trials intended to test the dynamic stability of the airframe and the LCA’s engine-flight control system has been successful. Though the engine and the electronics are in the advanced test mode, the aircraft’s ability to withstand low pressure and temperature at high altitudes is suspect.

“There is reason enough to worry that the LCA will not take off in the near future,” says Bangalore-based aviation expert P N Srivastava.

I feel the delay is primarily due to the fact that it took years for a country like India to get the advanced technology for the project,” he says. “The idea for LCA was born without having any requisite technology on our side,” Srivastava points out.

DRDO officials put forward one reason for the project delay — sanctions from the United States after the Pokhran nuclear blasts. In a bid to force India to put the nuclear genie back into the bottle, the US has pulled out of the project soon after the tests.

Thus, just one week after the explosions in May 1998, many scientists working on different fields linked to the LCA at aerospace giant Lockheed Martin in Binghamton, New York, were asked to pack their bags for India by the United States. The Indian engineers were working to validate a computerised control law software for onboard computers which will ultimately fly the aircraft.

As it imposed sanctions, the US also denied key components like hydraulic actuators — that help manoeuvre the aircraft, gain altitude and determine the trajectory — and the ring-laser gyros to make inertial navigation systems.

“One of the main reasons for the delay is that technological sanctions from the US hit us badly. Had it not been for the nuclear blasts, our deadline to test fly the aircraft would have been successful in December 1998,” says a senior DRDO official.

Lockheed Martin refused to give the DRDO the flight control computer, which was in the US for testing, when sanctions were announced, he added.

Another major hurdle for DRDO is the LCA’s engine. As per its agreement with the US, India was allowed to purchase frontline 404 engines from General Electric. In fact, DRDO imported 11 such engines and fitted them on to the early versions of the aircraft, pending the development of the indigenous Kaveri engine being developed by Bangalore’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment.

But after the nuclear tests, GE withdrew its technical support personnel from India and DRDO was forced to depend only on Kaveri. Sources now say it will take at least two years to determine whether Kaveri engines can withstand the low pressure and temperature at high altitudes.

No one at DRDO, ADA and HAL believes that the LCA will fly before 2005.

Experts say the delay should be examined in the context of a country that has not designed and produced a jet fighter since the 1960s. Development of every vital component of the LCA — airframe, multimode radar, flight control system, Kaveri engine, digital electronic engine control – are said to be beset with problems.

Scientists at DRDO, for their part, hold the defence ministry partially responsible for the delay. Between 1990 and 1994, all work came to a virtual standstill as the defence ministry refused to release the much-needed foreign exchange because of economic stringency.

But the biggest worry for DRDO is not the bureaucratic delays and sanctions, but the Indian air force. Faced with diminishing number of its ageing fleet, the IAF holds DRDO responsible for promising to deliver the LCA before year 2,000, thereby considerably upsetting many of its aircraft acquisition plans.

Suspecting that DRDO will never deliver the LCA, the IAF has now embarked on an ambitious project to upgrade 100 MiG-21 aircraft.

Despite the heavy odds, DRDO still remains confident that it will roll out the country’s first indigenous aircraft before 2002.

We will induct 200 LCAs into the Indian Air Force between 2003 and 2010,” Dr Abdul Kalam told a group of aeronautical scientists before he handed over DRDO’s charges to Dr Vasudev K Aatre.

But there aren’t many who believe that promise will be fulfilled.

The case to support the indigenous LCA programme

The case to support the indigenous LCA programme

Ashok Parthasarathi and Raman Puri

The facts with regard to perceived cost and time overruns and performance shortfalls in perspective

There have been several articles in the press critical of projects of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in general, and specifically the programme relating to the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), now named Tejas, and the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. Indeed, whenever a significant event that involves indigenous R&D, particularly defence-related, occurs, or a crucial decision is set to be taken, articles originating from within the defence “system,” or from vendors who see their business prospects threatened, appear. The real facts relating to the programme need to be put in context.

Performance shortfalls

The two issues on which the LCA project is criticised are cost and time overruns, and performance shortfalls. As regards the so-called time overruns, when the zero/go date for the project is taken as 1983, the critics fail to mention that what was sanctioned in 1983 was an ad hoc Rs.560 crore, pending full preparation of the Project Definition Document (PDD) — which is a fundamental step even to start the design and development process. The costs were to be finalised based on the PDD. This required the setting up of infrastructure in a hundred academic institutions and R&D laboratories and building up expertise to undertake the fundamental and application-oriented R&D required, and harnessing the design and engineering effort available largely in the public sector units for such a complex, state-of-the-art aircraft. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) discussed with Air Headquarters the Air Staff Requirement (ASR). Air Headquarters had requirements added to what was originally to be a replacement for the MiG-21. As a result, the ASR that was finalised was practically that for a Mirage 2000. But in the public perception the LCA remained as a replacement for MiG 21.

It look seven years, till 1990, to formulate the PDD. Based on this the ADA, in a report to the Ministry of Defence in 1990, gave a time-frame of seven years to develop the LCA and projected a financial requirement of Rs.4,000 crore. This included the building of four prototypes also. There had been a 25-year gap since the only fighter aircraft ever indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, namely the HF-24 Marut, had entered squadron service. So the period of seven years to set up a more advanced R&D infrastructure and build up even the core personnel needed to develop the technologies that the LCA’s ASR and PDD called for, was modest.

“Go-ahead”

After consideration, including by special committees, the Indian Air Force and the government gave the real operational go-ahead only in late-1993. Even that “go-ahead” covered the development of only two Technology Demonstrator Aircraft (TDA) without weaponisation. The funding approved was only of Rs.2,000 crore — half the amount requested for full-scale development. The first TDA flew in 2001, eight years from the real operational ‘go’ date, despite much additional R&D work that had to be undertaken due to the U.S. sanctions imposed in 1998.

Comments appeared in the media in 2001 quoting IAF sources to the effect that what the ADA had achieved was just a flying machine that was yet to be weaponised. Considering the nature and scope of the approval accorded in 1993, what else was to be expected? Using the money sanctioned for two TDAs, the ADA built four. Full-scale development, for which another Rs.2,000-plus crore was finally sanctioned, thus started only in late-2001. Some 1,200 hours of flight testing was to be undertaken to secure Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) from the IAF.

At that point, apart from the weaponisation requirements the project had to undergo extensive redesign to accommodate an air-to-air missile chosen by the IAF, which was considerably heavier and longer than what had been specified till 2000. The IAF had again changed its mind. This necessitated the complete redesign of the wing structure, using only composite materials in order to keep the weight within limits. The period of this redesign was also utilised to upgrade the avionics, to a completely open architecture.

Consequently, in “generational terms” the LCA is a fourth generation-plus aircraft with full networking capabilities. This made it more than comparable to anything the IAF had, and possibly would have, even after it acquires the 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) now on tender, with first deliveries due eight years hence.

On the engine

It is true that the Kaveri engine for the LCA that the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) of the DRDO has been developing for 12 years has not yet met its technical performance targets and requires redevelopment. So far the GE 404 engine from the U.S., which powers the F-16 fighter-bomber, has been used to power the LCA. The problems the GTRE has with the Kaveri are not unusual in a complex fighter aircraft engine project being undertaken for the first time. Moreover, the financial sanction of about Rs.320 crore given for engine development was possibly only to cover the Project Definition Phase and some high-risk technology development effort. We do not know of a first-of-type high-technology fighter aircraft engine being developed anywhere in less than a multi-billion dollar programme and a 20-year-plus development cycle. Even Snecma, the sole fighter aircraft engine manufacturer in France, despite decades of experience in developing and manufacturing engines for Mirage III, V and F-1, took about a decade and $2.2 billion to develop the M-88 engine for the Mirage 2000. The development of the Kaveri is unlikely to cross $1 billion.

The LCA with a GE 404 engine has done 800-plus hours of flight-testing. Even with that engine the performance has been not only vastly superior to that of even the recently upgraded MiG 21 BIS (the IAF is operating almost 400 of the series), but it has shown itself to be comparable in many critical parameters to the Mirage 2000. Modifications to the aircraft structure are under way to reduce weight and improve engine performance. When the GTRE’s joint venture with a leading foreign engine manufacturer for further development is completed in the next four years, the Kaveri will be brought up to a performance level, superior to the GE 404. Fitted with it, the LCA will be truly comparable to the Mirage 2000 and in many respects even superior. And all this in an aircraft much lighter than the Mirage 2000.

Superior

As for network-centric capability, which intrinsically needs indigenous systems for secrecy, security and inter-operability, it is superior in the LCA compared to any aircraft in the IAF’s inventory.

So it is a fallacy to think that we can continue the importing spree and still have such network-centric capability.

As recently as in 2005, the IAF’s requirement for 126 new aircraft was only for an upgraded Mirage 2000. At Rs.120 crore to Rs.140 crore a plane, compared to at least double that amount for any of the aircraft types now bidding for the 126 MRCA, is not the LCA a highly cost-effective fighter for volume induction into the IAF?

As for development costs, the LCA has remained well within the sanctioned $1.2 billion — which is about the lowest anywhere. Time overrun in the strict sense is only by a year or two, despite the sanctions. A first-of-type aircraft of this degree of complexity has not been developed anywhere in the West or in Russia in less than two to three decades.

The F16 series that was inducted into the U.S. Air Force in 1975 is today at Mark 60. That is how aircraft of this level of complexity are improved after induction. That this imperative applies even more to the LCA has to be recognised.

It is for the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister to ensure that this effort is not belittled or scuttled, and that the LCA programme is given all-out support — as successive Prime Ministers have ensured for our atomic energy and space programmes.

(Ashok Parthasarathi was Science Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Vice- Admiral (retired) Raman Puri was Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Committee of Service Chiefs, remaining closely involved with the inter-service weapons acquisition process from October 2003 to February 2006).