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The Missile that Cannot Fire – Long delays, cost escalation damage DRDO’s reputation

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Amarnath K, Menon and  Gaurav C. Sawant – April 13, 2012 – India Today 

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was set up in 1958 with a vision to “provide our defence services a decisive edge by equipping them with internationally competitive systems and solutions”. The DRDO has clearly failed in its mission.

There is no bigger indictment of India‘s premier organisation for research and development in military hardware than the fact that 54 years after its establishment, India still imports 70 per cent of its equipment requirements. In 1997, India best known defence bureaucrat and the then scientific adviser to defence minister, APJ Abdul Kalam, had said that India should bring the hare of imports in defence equipment purchases down to 30 per cent by 2005. No progress has been made. The percentage is still 70-30 in favour of imports.

DRDO`s list of successes is short-primarily the Agni and Prithvi missiles. Its list of failures is much longer.The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project, which was commissioned in 2001, is running late by four years. The costs have gone up from an original estimate of around Rs 3,300 crore to over Rs 5,780 crore. The Kaveri Engine for LCA is running late by 16 years and the cost has escalated by around 800 per cent.
In 2011, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) put a serious question mark on drdo’s capabilities. “The organisation, which has a history of its projects suffering endemic time and cost overruns, needs to sanction projects and decide on a probable date of completion on the basis of a conservative assessment of technology available and a realistic costing system,” its report stated.

The CAG report also revealed that not all technologies developed by DRDO were suitable for use by the armed forces. The three services have rejected 70 per cent of the products developed at the Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE), Pune, in the last 15 years costing Rs 320 crore because the products did not meet their standard and requirement, The CAG report stated that in order to form a fair and balanced view of the success of the projects undertaken by drdo, 46 completed and nine ongoing projects worth Rs 387.35 crore were scrutinised in February 2011. Of the 46 completed and closed projects, only 13 closed projects, wrapped up at a cost of Rs 68 crore, underwent production. “Without close synergy between the users and the technology development agency, much of the development efforts would go in vain, as the success rate of projects in ARDE amply demonstrates,” the report said.

The army is not impressed by DRDO`s performance either. Says Major-General S.V. Thapliyal, a former deputy director-general for perspective planning at army headquarters in Delhi, “DRDO promises to manufacture. It nixes our plans to acquire from abroad; It does not meet the deadline. Worse, it does not maintain quality either. The soldier, the end user, is the worst sufferer.”

General V.P. Malik, who was chief of army staff during the Kargil War, has an interesting incident to narrate in his book Kargil From Surprise to Victory. In 1997, the army finalized plans to acquire the AN/TPQ-37 Fire finder radars from the US. Prices were negotiated and just before purchase, drdo offered to manufacture them at half the price and within two years. The government shot down the army’s plans to buy these radars. In 1999, during the Kargil War, the radars were desperately needed. Neither had DRDO manufactured them nor could they be procured from the US (post-1998 Pokhran tests there was an arms embargo). Several lives were lost in Pakistani shelling. Wlien Indo-US relations improved, India did buy these radars in 2003, but at almost twice the initial price. “The problem with drdo is that it is big on promise and small on delivery. There is no accountability in the system,” says Malik.

DRDO continues to mislead. On April 4, it claimed it had achieved a major milestone on an “indigenous” programme to develop a sophisticated radar to monitor the Indian airspace. The aircraft on which the radar is mounted—a modified Embraer EMB 1451-is imported from Brazil. drdo had to resort to the Embraer aircraft because its own efforts at producing an indigenous carrier had ended in disaster. Project Guardian Airawat was stalled in 1999 when its HS-748 turboprop aircraft crashed, killing eight crew members-engineers, scientists and Indian Air Force (IAF) officers-on board.
Under a Rs 1,050 crore agreement, Brazil’s Embraer will now act as the pverall systems integrator for the “indigenous” project, supplying the three jets, mounting the radar and electronics onto the plane’s fuselage and ensuring that the altered jets retain acceptable flight performance.

According to its original 2004 timeline, this project was to be completed by 2011. Now the delivery of the remaining two modified Embraer aircraft is only expected by mid-2013. The project will not be complete until 2014. Even then there are serious flaws in the project. IAF has pointed out that the Embraer EMB 1451 cannot fly above 4 0,000 ft and therefore is only of limited use in surveillance. “DRDO has a history of claiming foreign designs as its own, like the Arjun tank which is a derivative of the German Leopard,” says a source in the agency. ~
The technology development agency is also largely responsible for the fact highlighted by General V.K. Singh that 97 per cent of the army’s air defence is obsolete. The CAG report lists seven requirements of the army for air defence guns and the project status report. CAG notes the end result: “Even though three R&D projects and one staff project were undertaken, the air defence gun system could not be developed by DRDO to satisfy the frequently revised requirement of the user.”

Army air defence sources say DRDO is tinkering with World War II equipment instead of working on cutting-edge technology. “The chief downplayed the state of affairs. It is in dire straits,” says a top-ranking air defence officer.

“The air defence is in a very-sorry condition,” says Air Marshal A.K. Singh, former air officer commanding-in-chief, Western Air Command. “DRDO is not able to service the equipment. Even if systems are acquired from abroad and DRDO or Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is meant to service it, it fails.This leaves critical gaps in national defence,” he says.

The Government had constituted a committee for the first-ever external review of the agency in February 2007. The committee chaired by P. Rama Rao, ex‘secreta1y, Department of Science and Technology and former director, Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory, Hyderabad, suggested that DRDO be restructured to make it a leaner organisation. It also recommended the setting up of a commercial arm of the organisation to make it a profitable entity, besides cutting back on delays in completing projects. “Delivery delayed is delivery denied,” said
Defence Minister A.K. Antony on delays in DRDO projects. But little progress has been made in the last five years on implementing the committee’s suggestions.

DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat is eager to put his house in order. He has called for the setting up of a Defence Technology DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat is eager to put his house in order. He has called for the setting up of a Defence Technology Commission as well as a bigger role for DRDO in picking production partners for products developed by the agency. Instead of the current practice of the Ministry of Defence arbitrarily nominating a defence public sector undertaking or an ordnance factory to build the product, usually when development is almost complete, DRDO would be able to select a capable partner company from the outset, from the private sector if necessary.

The defence organisation, which has an annual budget of over Rs 10,000 crore, now has no choice but to reinvent itself. The agency‘s research has drifted away from its core competence in recent times. It has been accused of “wasting time and precious resources” being engaged in research and development of technique for detection of pesticides in fruits, technology for dengue control, dental implants, foldable stretchers and berry juice.
The moribund agency is also suffering from employee attrition. Over the past five years, while the report of the Rama Rao Committee has languished, around 1,700 of its 7,900 engineers and scientists have left for better opportunities in private companies. The depletion of talent will be the last stage in what cynical insiders say is the process of converting DRDO into a dodo.

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The Lab Optimists

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Open Magazine – feature

BY Madhavankutty Pillai 31st March 2012

From battle tanks to mosquito repellents to dosas in space, the DRDO is a laboratory of sweeping ideas, many of which will take a lifetime to execute.

Last year, the Indian Air Force got a taste of something they didn’t much like. The newspaper DNA reported that IAF officials had been to the Defence Food Research Laboratory (DFRL) in Mysore, where they were shown a tube from which food could be squeezed out. It might sound odd that anyone would eat like that but this was a necessity stemming from the IAF’s induction of long-range aircraft into its fleet—the pilot would have to be fed if he was going to be in air for hours. But the tube-food wasn’t what they expected. It wasn’t a paste or even semi-liquid; it was solid. Negotiating it would not only mess up the cockpit, it would be a minor battle in itself. The IAF rejected it and the DFRL went back to the lab to make it pastier. The same laboratory is also working on something equally unusual—what to feed Indian astronauts when they eventually go up in space. The lab director was quoted as saying that they were exploring all options—from north Indian chapatis to south Indian dosas, albeit in bits and bites.

The DFRL is part of what is known as the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), an umbrella for over 50 laboratories that make everything from tube-food to tanks to combat aircraft to mosquito repellents. Even toilets. In his recent Railway Budget speech, former Railway Minister Dinesh Trivedi announced that from next year, 2,500 rail coaches would have what he called green toilets to replace the holes that now exist in train latrines. These ‘bio-toilets’ have been developed by the DRDO. The DRDO’s mandate, however, is not to cater to the Railways or India’s space programme. It is to make India self-reliant in defence systems and equipment. Stated ends and realities do not always meet. The main criticism of the DRDO—and it comes mainly from its primary clients, the armed forces—is that its scientists are a bunch of optimists. This is why we hear announcements from them that seem fantastic. Consider this public statement by DRDO Director General VK Saraswat just a few months ago: “We are working on building soldier robots that can work like a human soldier. Such a robot needs a database and artificial intelligence to carry out its activities and the DRDO is planning to build such a robot.” Is he talking of the Terminator? In the same exchange with reporters, Saraswat also talked about robotic mules, which then leads to the question: why would anyone need robotic mules? If the purpose is to transport cargo, won’t a suitable vehicle do?

All this would not be so suspect if the DRDO did not have a reputation for routinely shooting off its mouth. We asked a former Chief of Army and a former Chief of Navy whether it was true that the DRDO was quick with announcements and slow with execution. Says former Army Chief General VP Malik: “I tend to agree with critics who say that. The track record of the DRDO so far, primarily on account of delayed/non-delivery of weapons and equipment promised to the armed forces, does not inspire confidence.”

And this was former Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Arun Prakash: “That impression is correct. They are very optimistic and don’t live up to their time schedules, cost schedules, etc. They don’t consult the armed forces enough. They spend the budget the way they think best.”

The Navy, ironically, is the institution that has managed to get the maximum benefit (relatively speaking) from the DRDO and that’s because it made a practice of embedding naval officers into DRDO projects. Admiral Prakash said, “Whenever there’s a naval project going on, there are always naval officers associated with it. Even otherwise the Navy makes available some of its bright officers to the DRDO.”

The two projects for which the DRDO has got the most brickbats are connected to the Air Force and Army—the main battle tank Arjun and light combat aircraft (LCA) Tejas. The Arjun project took off in 1972. In 1974, Rs 15 crore was set aside for its development. The project, which finally cost around Rs 350 crore, got delayed by decades and even now many of its components are imported. The DRDO had initially hoped to make 2,000 tanks and, after about 40 years, has 124 operational. The Army is not happy with these and is pinning its hopes on the impending upgrade, the Arjun Mark II. Similar delays have plagued the LCA Tejas. It has been in the making for just under 30 years and is yet to become operational. Its second phase is now scheduled for completion by December 2012. The indigenous engine, Kaveri, for the LCA didn’t live up to standards and an imported engine is being used.

The problem, according to one view, stems from the DRDO wanting to reinvent the wheel. It was a patriotic thing to build everything from scratch, but, as everyone now recognises, it didn’t have the capability in most areas. This can have consequences. General Malik was Chief of Army when the Kargil war happened. In 2009, when he said in a television interview that Kargil casualties could have been lower if the DRDO had delivered on time, it instantly led to a furore. He elaborated on it in an email interview, ‘I was referring specifically to the non-availability of weapons-locating radars, which were required to engage Pakistani artillery and mortars quickly and effectively during the Kargil war. This would have reduced the effectiveness of Pakistani artillery and mortars. In 1997, after long negotiations with a manufacturer, some of these radars were about to be purchased. At the last moment, the DRDO caused this deal to be scuttled, with a promise that it would develop and produce these radars in the next two years; a promise that was never fulfilled. Incidentally, these very radars were purchased from the same manufacturer in 2003.’

There are areas in which the DRDO has been successful, like the missile programme. In the development of naval sonars, weapons avionics and torpedoes too, it is recognised to have done useful work. There is the counter-view that it is unfair to blame it for everything and that the DRDO has become a favourite punching bag. Wing Commander Ajay Lele, a weapons expert and Research Fellow with the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, says the gestation period in military technology is always long. The Lockheed Martin-developed F22 Raptor aircraft went to the drawing board in the Cold War era in the early 70s, but it formally entered the US air force in 2005. “Also, components for defence technology are not easy to come by. The DRDO cannot create everything on its own. It needs industrial back-up and our country lacks in that,” he says.

There is no clear accessible overview of the research DRDO does because there is no proper audit of it. A cloud called ‘Classified’ hangs over it. Prabhu Dandriyal, who worked in the DRDO from 1982 to 2003, is a whistleblower. After being forced into retirement when he started to expose corruption in the institution, he has been on a relentless mission. He says it has reached a stage where he is now called to assist the CBI and IB in corruption cases in DRDO labs because they don’t understand engineering concepts. He filed an RTI application asking how many technical papers DRDO scientists had published in international scientific journals between 1990 and 2010. He didn’t get it until the Chief Information Commissioner passed an order in his favour. “What is the surest way of showing that fundamental research is on? Publishing papers. The reply I finally got was ‘nil’. There had not been a single published paper. All these announcements they make, not one thing happens. All they do is talk,” he says.

Another criticism of the DRDO is that it expends time, money and focus on things that should not really be in its ambit. One journalist who went to a DRDO laboratory 15 years ago as a student was shown a banana that had been reduced to a tenth of its normal weight, the size reduced by 20 per cent. There are high altitude barfis for soldiers to partake of during festivals. There is a medicine for leucoderma. There are cockroach-killing tablets, instant idlis, betel leaf juice and chickenpav bhajis. A fungus found on a caterpillar has been cultured, which among other things is supposedly beneficial in the treatment of impotence. And so on goes the vast and bewildering list.

But, according to Ajay Lele, there is method to this madness. “The armed forces have set requirements. Until and unless the Government tells private industry ‘you provide us an alternative, this is the money, put it into R&D and give us the returns over a period of time’, the DRDO will have to make these things. Take the mosquito repellent. Anyone who is aware of conditions in the Northeast will tell you that the mosquitoes there are very different. Battle casualties are far lower than casualties from malaria. Good Knight [the repellent brand] is not going to develop such a mosquito repellent unless there’s some incentive for it,” he says.

The DRDO is now spinning these technologies commercially. Since 2008, it has a tie-up with Ficci to market products they think have demand. It goes by DRDO-FICCI Accelerated Technology Assessment and Commer- cialisation. Says Shyam Sunder, Deputy Director at Ficci’s Centre for Technology Commercialisation, “The DRDO has nominated more than 200 technologies to this programme. We shortlist them based on our assessment. We then contact Indian companies to introduce these technologies for manufacture or licensing. The response has been very good.”

Nearly everyone save the DRDO itself agrees that the institution has to be reinvented. A committee headed by P Rama Rao, former secretary, department of science and technology, made a number of recommendations. The main thrust of the recommendations was that the DRDO should focus on key areas like missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare and so on. Its laboratories should be restructured and those not central to the new mandate must be hived off to civilian scientific bodies. The report is yet to be implemented because of opposition from the DRDO.

Another way to reinvent the DRDO, say some, is to make it like DARPA in the US, which does no research but instead mediates between the armed forces and the private sector. Unless the DRDO is remodelled, there will inevitably be situations in which the kit for the soldier in Siachen has to be imported while the DRDO works on a robotic mule.

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DRDO gets it right when it works unlike DRDO

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Express Investigation: Delayed Research; Delayed Organisation – Part – Seven

DRDO gets it right when it works unlike DRDO

Amitav Ranjan
Posted: Sat Nov 18 2006, 00:00 hrs
NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 17:


For all its defences against non-performance, the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), ironically, has only to look within for ready templates of distinction. Programmes that have met targets are an isolated few but they worked well because their ethic symbolizes a fundamental breakaway from the tedium of the larger organisation’s default approach. Self-reliance, a term battered by DRDO’s track-record on showpiece programmes, shines beneath the hood in the Navy’s sonars, avionics and electronic warfare systems on IAF fighter aircraft and missiles developed under corporate foreign joint ventures.
The first two were developed on time because of the labs linking up with the armed forces right from the initial stages and, significantly, leadership that keeps young scientists on their toes. The latter, because international partnerships mandate a more professional approach to programme completion.
One of the most successful DRDO laboratories is also one of the least known, tucked away silently in the Trikkakara suburb of Kochi, fomenting applied research and technology to give the Navy real self-reliance in critical sensor systems.

The Naval Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory (NPOL), the only DRDO lab to win both the Silicon Trophy and Titanium Trophy for excellence, has, in the last two decades, given the Navy an impressive 87 per cent self-reliance in acoustic sensors for warships and submarines. All Navy warships, including foreign ones, as a result, are fitted with DRDO sonars like the APSOH, HUMVAD and HUMSA, and the Navy does not need to import. Now, it is putting its finishing touches to the USHUS sonar for the Navy’s Kilo-class submarines and the Mihir dunking sonar for HAL’s Advanced Light Helicopter, all well within their projected timeframes.

Vice Admiral Madanjit Singh, formerly the Navy’s Southern Commander at Kochi, said, “The NPOL’s success is from user involvement right from the word go. The steering panel is headed by a serving Naval commander who sets the agenda, efforts between the DRDO and Navy are joint.”

VK Aatre, former NPOL director who went on to become DRDO chief, agrees. “When I was there, we could not distinguish between designers, Navy personnel and production engineers,” he said. “We shared an excellent rapport. The difference here was that the user was part of the design team.”

The lab’s current director V Chander, an IIT-IISc alumnus, has espoused applied research like no other DRDO establishment, working not for idealistic invention, but delivering quality, fool-proof sonar systems to the Navy. How?

First, he’s rechristened the HR cell as People, Academics, Research & Training. He’s made sure young scientists get to spend time with the Navy for extended periods of time rather than labour away only in their laboratories. Third, he’s made sure that the level of involvement with warships and the Navy is so high that projects are either completed or prudently foreclosed before despondence and lassitude can set in.

Vice Admiral Singh, as DG Defence Planning in 2000, recommended to the Task Force on the Reorganization of Higher Defence Planning, that the country’s R&D labs be rationalized on the lines of NPOL. What ensued, another story entirely, was a turf war that saw the idea quietly dissipate. Another area where DRDO has shone despite itself is avionics and electronic warfare systems for IAF fighter aircraft.

The IAF’s most advanced fighter, the Sukhoi-30 MKI, flies with avionics developed by the Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) in Bangalore, and has proved so good that the new British Hawk advanced jet trainers and the license-produced units of the upcoming contract for 126 foreign fighters, will be armed with DARE avionics and electronic warfare systems.

For now, in addition to the Sukhois, these arm IAF Jaguars and MiG-27s which, combined, have over 30 DARE electronic systems, including mission computers, electronic warfare suites, laser rangers and multifunction advanced cockpits.

A testimony to DARE’s work: in 2003, the Royal Malysian Air Force ordered radar computers worth Rs 21.15 crore (75 per cent of DRDO’s officially declared export value of Rs 27.93 crore) from DARE for its Sukhoi-30MM fighter fleet, and is interested in buying more.

Air Marshal JS Gujral, formerly IAF Central Air Commander and Deputy Chief in charge of acquisitions, feels DARE has done an excellent job in a world where such technology is simply too advanced to share. “DARE’s projects have succeeded also because of deep interfacing with the IAF. They have maintained a high mark in defence output and timeframes compared to DRDO’s other not-so-successful ventures. Across the board, the avionics and electronic warfare systems by DARE match up with the best in the world. The IAF has been very happy with what they have provided us,” Gujral said. DARE Director RP Ramalingam said, “DRDO has realized that if there is a WW III, the winner will be the side that can best control the electromagnetic spectrum, and has therefore placed India as a competent force in the world map of avionics.”

Foreign joint ventures, on the other hand, have compelled DRDO to put out more realistic predictions on time and cost. The BrahMos missile project, which began development in 1998 as a corporate joint venture with Russia and resulted in a world-class cruise missile that other countries now want to buy, was completed in just six years at a cost of Rs 667 crore – no time and cost overruns.

Similarly, the new generation Barak-II surface to air missile for the Navy, being developed by DRDO in a JV with Israel, is officially to cost Rs 2, 606.02 crore and be ready by May 2011, a far more realistic predictive frame than any other missile project under the indigenous IGMDP.

The defence sector does not have a policy for foreign direct investment, but DRDO open to joint ventures with foreign partners. No wonder then, that on June 7, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence said, “BrahMos model should be followed in other projects also. Private sector should be given more opportunities in defence production and user participation should be encouraged from R&D stage.”
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23 yrs and first fighter aircraft hasn’t taken off

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Express Investigation: Delayed Research; Delayed Organisation – Part – Four

23 yrs and first fighter aircraft hasn’t taken off

Amitav Ranjan , Siv Aroor
Tags :
Posted: Wed Nov 15 2006, 00:00 hrs
New Delhi, November 14:

At its last meeting in December 2005, the General Body of the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the society developing the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, recorded one fact: the Indian Air Force, despite official plans to ultimately buy 220 LCAs, would order only 20 aircraft.
And that the IAF had refused to push the order up until it’s convinced that the new 2010 deadline, the project’s third consecutive time over-run, would be met.

The IAF had more than a reason.

According to latest official figures that will shortly be tabled by the Standing Committee on Defence in a report for Parliament, available with The Indian Express, DRDO’s 23-year-old indigenous fighter aircraft programme, taken as a whole — including the radar, jet engine and Naval variant — would have wiped away a minimum of Rs 9444.5 crore by 2010. Aggregate cost over-run: Rs 4,094 crore. Delay: 12.5 years and counting.
By DRDO’s own testimony in June to the same committee, there are still “certain complexities,” although it claims it will produce the 20 LCAs on order from the IAF by December 2011. But that would still be understandable if the LCA was in any way ready.

Five months after the ADA meeting, Air chief S P Tyagi communicated in no uncertain terms to then Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee that his force could not depend on the programme in the short term. Shortly thereafter, he told The Indian Express: “We have to see if it is a suitably modern aircraft when it is complete. Right now we just cannot take any decisions. We can only wait for initial operational clearance (in 2008).”

The implication: the IAF is not sure if the LCA would have slipped down a few generations by the time it’s inducted. But the Standing Committee only had this to say: “The Committee are constrained to note that, keeping in view the ever-increasing delay in operational clearance of LCA, early induction of the same as IAF squadrons seems to be an unrealistic proposition.”

Just how unrealistic it is is something that has come to characterize the LCA programme ever since its inception in August 1983, and culminating now in a gravely unready fighter aircraft that the IAF could have no choice but to induct in large numbers from 2012.

Consider the following: Despite a battery of nine test pilots who have been embedded with the LCA programme, the IAF has refused to officially certify any technological aspect of the LCA apart from its structural strength, until initial operational clearance (IOC). Air Headquarters said so, in a written reply to this newspaper. The clearance should have been achieved by 2007 but its new schedule is 2008.

After a four-year wait following the rollout of the LCA technology demonstrator in 1997 for a first flight, former Air chief S Krishnaswamy made out an official case in 2003 for a “limited series induction” of the aircraft to give the IAF a chance to familiarize itself. He told The Indian Express, “The LCA is not full in any way, each prototype is different. I was a staunch supporter of indigenisation but am also very critical. How long can you keep on developing a product?”

The eight promised Limited Series Production fighters, envisaged as a part of the Rs 3,301.78 crore second phase of the programme, are nowhere in sight. The LCA, which should have undergone weapons trials by 2003, will now only undergo “dummy” trials in December 2007 according to DRDO chief M Natarajan, putting a big question mark on the possibility of IOC by 2008.

The real problem: the HAL-DRDO multi-mode radar, the very brain that will guide the LCA’s weapons, is not ready. After spending Rs 166.8 crore since 1997, HAL has decided to bring in a foreign technical partner to bail it out. The radar has been tested on an HS-748 Avro, but persistent problems with software and its signal processor have forced HAL and DRDO to admit their failure.

DRDO has justified the delays and their impact on the IAF’s preparedness by pointing to a revision of the development strategy because of a foreign exchange shortage in the 1990s, US sanctions, re-designing composite wings for weapon definition after January 2004 and extensive on-ground and independent evaluation.

After a cost and time overrun of Rs 2,456 crore and 13 years since 1996, DRDO admitted to the Standing Committee in June that it could complete the Kaveri engine only under a foreign joint venture. Problems that have crippled the Kaveri, according to the latest DRDO testimony, include critical glitches in aerodynamic, aero-mechanical, combustion and structural integrity.

Most significantly, DRDO has admitted to the Committee that to improve performance and safety issues, a JV could be attempted. Former DRDO chief V K Aatre said: “When I retired (in August 2004), there were some loose ends in the programme involving the radar and jet engine. But I am surprised they have still not been resolved.”

The DRDO was pulled up in January by the Standing Committee to explain how the LCA’s delays would impact the IAF’s modernization. Their reply: “IAF only can state the possible impact of delay on modernization exclusively due to LCA.”

But at Air HQ, an unofficial and approximate damage analysis of the LCA’s delay, shared with The Indian Express, is to the tune of Rs 11,440 crore in forced upgrades (some variants of the MiG-21 that the LCA was to replace will be forced to serve till 2019-2021 at least) and stop-gap acquisitions.

This does not include the purchase of 126 fighters potentially worth Rs 30,000 crore that the IAF will shortly begin an acquisition process for. In an unusual move, the Naval LCA will use air data systems from Russia’s state-owned Rosobornexport, which will also create a shore-based test facility for the Rs 948.90 crore development. MiG Corporation will conduct a design review and be DRDO’s chief consultant.
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Armed Forces wait as showpiece missiles are unguided, way off mark

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Express Investigation: Delayed Research; Delayed Organisation – Part – Two

Armed Forces wait as showpiece missiles are unguided, way off mark

Amitav Ranjan                                                                                                                            Posted: Mon Nov 13 2006, 00:00 hrs                                                                            NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 12:

 

It is the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s most prestigious undertaking. Yet the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) remains a venture matchless for its repeated and expensive failures.

Of the five missile families that the DRDO announced at the IGMDP launch in July 1983, two ballistic missiles, the tactical Prithvi and long-range Agni, have been inducted into the Services. But investigation by The Indian Express reveals that even these are far from operational readiness. Among the other three missiles, the situation is worse.

DRDO claims its first success, Prithvi-I, is fully operational. However, the missiles were forced upon the Army even before crucial terminal accuracy trials were complete, according to a 2003 report by one of DRDO’s own top scientists. Even now, despite DRDO’s claims, the Army does not rely on the Prithvi as an effective deterrent and cannot do so unless serious technological issues affecting launch preparedness are resolved.

Former deputy director of the Prithvi project and now DRDO’s chief controller of missiles and strategic systems Dr V K Saraswat’s report RCI/PGT/PGM/1 admits: “Accuracy of missiles like Prithvi is acceptable in surface-to-surface theatre role, but precision strike without collateral damage is not possible with this system.”

Agni-I and Agni-II, the only strategic delivery systems in the Army’s arsenal, are considered risky. DRDO has told the Parliamentary panel, in testimonies available to The Indian Express, that the missiles have been successfully tested five times. What it conveniently leaves unsaid is the fact that this is out of at least 10 tests. Either way, the Army feels a handful of tests is not enough to prove a missile’s worth.

The Agni-III, which plunged into the sea after just five minutes of flight in July, will be tested again only towards mid-2007 as the teams at DRDL and the Integrated Test Range in Chandipur try to unravel the disaster.

As for the remaining three, anti-missile system Trishul is a closed chapter proving to be only a technology demonstrator, by former Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s own recent admission, after it was decided that persistent beam guidance glitches could not be put behind the project.

Even though the system’s radar is ready and functional, the Trishul team has never been able to correct the missile’s flawed trajectory — in all tests it has escaped out of its envelope. The project’s manpower has already been distributed among PSU Bharat Dynamics Ltd in Hyderabad, the Indo-Israeli Barak-II next generation missile project, the Project Nag and the submarine-launched missile, designated K-15.

A notional one-year extension granted to the project till December 2007, after hectic lobbying, is being seen as an outrage by the Army and Navy.

The Akash medium range surface-to-air missile, which DRDO publicly claims “is in the process of induction” will, according to the Ministry in testimony to a Parliamentary Standing Committee, only begin Phase-II user trials in December on a T-72 platform, a change that could pile up the massive time overrun further.

An exasperated IAF, which calls Phase-I user trials unsatisfactory, has decided to buy Israeli Spyder missile systems instead.

Realisation of the ramjet propulsion system has crippled the Akash programme, which continues to flounder when the missile is fired at its ceiling range of 25 to 27 km. The IAF, in fact, has certified the missile to a range of just 16-18-km, virtually declaring it a dud at maximum capacity. Officers in the IAF fear the Akash may go the Trishul way, but Natarajan claims: “The Akash missile defence system has been successful.”

The third missile, the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) Nag, which DRDO brags as an “imminent success,” has not been accepted by the Army. After 57 flight trials, it has encountered unforeseen problems with its Imaging Infrared (IIR) seeker, rendering it inaccurate until the seeker is properly miniaturized for use. User trials are slated for June-December 2007. Saraswat’s report calls for integrating Nag’s seeker with Prithvi to make the latter a precision-guided munition (PGM) but that hasn’t worked either, since the Nag’s seeker is far from ready.

The result: After over two decades of research in seeker technology and expenditure of upto an estimated Rs 800 crore, all Indian missiles, even the Indo-Russian BrahMos,fly with foreign seekers. This is especially troubling since the North Korean and Chinese missiles are known to fly with far superior terminal guidance technologies.

The IGMDP should have wrapped up each of the projects by December 1995 using Rs 388.83 crore, but it got a 10-year extension from the then Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao after the then DRDO chief APJ Abdul Kalam managed to convince him that only a two-three year extension was not acceptable. Its revised funding: Rs 1771.43 crore, a budgetary overrun of Rs 1,382.6 crore. The time line has been further extended to December 2007 under the current chief M Natarajan.

“The Akash was to come at a certain time, and it didn’t. I had to change everything to make up for the delay.”

Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi

“It was a troubling scenario. On the one hand, DRDO assured us of Trishul’s success, and on the other our Western fleet was sitting completely vulnerable to a Pak missile attack.”

Admiral Sushil Kumar (retd)

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Antony asks DRDO to build credible missile defence system

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Antony asks DRDO to build credible missile defence system

Agencies – Indian Express

Posted: Fri Jun 03 2011, 15:01 hrs

New Delhi:

Defence Minister A K Antony today asked the DRDO to prioritise the development of 5,000-km range ballistic missile while building a credible missile defence system for the country.

He also congratulated the Defence Research Development Organisation for developing the interceptor missile allowing India to join an elite club of nations possessing such advance technology.

“DRDO must demonstrate the capability to develop missiles of the range of 5000 km at the earliest. This is a challenge for the DRDO and I hope they will successfully meet this challenge at the earliest,” he said here.

Antony was addressing a gathering of defence scientists who received the DRDO’s annual award for excelling in their respective areas.

“The interceptor missile defence program has taken India into the elite club of nations that possess the capability to demonstrate this technology. DRDO should now concentrate on developing a credible ballistic missile defence for the country,” he added.

He also asked DRDO scientists to focus on the development of Mark II version of the Main Battle Tank (MBT) Arjun for the Indian Army and Kaveri Engine.

“The development of MBT Arjun and Kaveri Engine has been hit by delays. Development of MBT Arjun is a major milestone. But Mark II is another area of challenge. That challenge you have to meet,” he told the gathering.

Antony also asked DRDO and Indian Air Force (IAF) to ensure on schedule the induction of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas into the force.

“After getting the Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) for the LCA Tejas, we are moving towards its Final Operational Clearance (FOC). I am sure DRDO and IAF will work together to deliver Tejas on schedule,” he said.

He added that the delays in the development of indigenous engine for the fighter jets had given more time for the induction of the LCA and the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) for the IAF.

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DRDO muddles through 439 projects

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DRDO muddles through 439 projects

Rajat Pandit, TNN Aug 16, 2006, 03.01am IST

NEW DELHI: From missiles, radars and electronic warfare programmes to even juices, mosquito repellents and titanium dental implants, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) does it all. And, by and large, flounders in them all, with technical glitches, time and cost overruns.

Amid growing demand by armed forces and experts that DRDO “concentrate” only on “a few core and critical areas” to bolster the country’s defence preparedness, latest statistics show the organisation has as many as 439 ongoing projects at a total cost of a whopping Rs 16,925 crore. “DRDO, with around 29,000 personnel in 50 laboratories and establishments under its umbrella, certainly needs to get its act together. Not even 10% of its total budget (DRDO got Rs 5,454 crore in 2006-07) is spent on fundamental research,” says a senior defence official.

Adds an Army officer, “What is the use of having such a huge defence R&D set-up if it cannot even come up with basics like good bullet-proof jackets, webbing and light-weight ballistic helmets. Even the systems they manage to deliver to us suffer from operational problems.”

The long-standing aim to take the country towards self-reliance in military capabilities, of course, remains a mere pipedream. If in 1991-92, 25% of India’s total defence expenditure was spent on imports, the case remains the same even now.

DRDO, of course, has to contend with inadequate funds, with its allocation hovering just around 6% of the total defence budget. Moreover, it’s not able to attract top scientific talent in the absence of good career prospects and other incentives.

But even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently told DRDO he was “concerned by the problems of cost and time-overruns, which have plagued our defence industry for decades now”.

Consequently, it’s no wonder that the armed forces prefer the import route because of DRDO’s long track-record of delivering too-little, too-late. Of the 439 projects, for instance, the really big ones number around 20. But the progress in them, more or less, has been shoddy.

The Arjun main-battle tank project, for one, was sanctioned way back in 1974. After spending a huge amount of money, the first five Arjun tanks are still being tested for battle-worthiness, with the Army not too keen to induct them.

Similar is the story with Tejas Light Combat Aircraft, sanctioned in 1983 to replace the country’s ageing MiG fleet. Though its prototypes have completed over 530 flights, IAF is not fully convinced yet whether it will induct them by even 2012. This when government has already sanctioned Rs 5489.78 crore for Tejas till now.

The country’s integrated guided missile development programme, which kicked off in 1983, has only now shown some progress, with a few Prithvi and Agni missile variants being inducted into the armed forces.

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The case to support the indigenous LCA programme

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The case to support the indigenous LCA programme

Ashok Parthasarathi and Raman Puri

The facts with regard to perceived cost and time overruns and performance shortfalls in perspective

There have been several articles in the press critical of projects of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in general, and specifically the programme relating to the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), now named Tejas, and the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. Indeed, whenever a significant event that involves indigenous R&D, particularly defence-related, occurs, or a crucial decision is set to be taken, articles originating from within the defence “system,” or from vendors who see their business prospects threatened, appear. The real facts relating to the programme need to be put in context.

Performance shortfalls

The two issues on which the LCA project is criticised are cost and time overruns, and performance shortfalls. As regards the so-called time overruns, when the zero/go date for the project is taken as 1983, the critics fail to mention that what was sanctioned in 1983 was an ad hoc Rs.560 crore, pending full preparation of the Project Definition Document (PDD) — which is a fundamental step even to start the design and development process. The costs were to be finalised based on the PDD. This required the setting up of infrastructure in a hundred academic institutions and R&D laboratories and building up expertise to undertake the fundamental and application-oriented R&D required, and harnessing the design and engineering effort available largely in the public sector units for such a complex, state-of-the-art aircraft. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) discussed with Air Headquarters the Air Staff Requirement (ASR). Air Headquarters had requirements added to what was originally to be a replacement for the MiG-21. As a result, the ASR that was finalised was practically that for a Mirage 2000. But in the public perception the LCA remained as a replacement for MiG 21.

It look seven years, till 1990, to formulate the PDD. Based on this the ADA, in a report to the Ministry of Defence in 1990, gave a time-frame of seven years to develop the LCA and projected a financial requirement of Rs.4,000 crore. This included the building of four prototypes also. There had been a 25-year gap since the only fighter aircraft ever indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, namely the HF-24 Marut, had entered squadron service. So the period of seven years to set up a more advanced R&D infrastructure and build up even the core personnel needed to develop the technologies that the LCA’s ASR and PDD called for, was modest.

“Go-ahead”

After consideration, including by special committees, the Indian Air Force and the government gave the real operational go-ahead only in late-1993. Even that “go-ahead” covered the development of only two Technology Demonstrator Aircraft (TDA) without weaponisation. The funding approved was only of Rs.2,000 crore — half the amount requested for full-scale development. The first TDA flew in 2001, eight years from the real operational ‘go’ date, despite much additional R&D work that had to be undertaken due to the U.S. sanctions imposed in 1998.

Comments appeared in the media in 2001 quoting IAF sources to the effect that what the ADA had achieved was just a flying machine that was yet to be weaponised. Considering the nature and scope of the approval accorded in 1993, what else was to be expected? Using the money sanctioned for two TDAs, the ADA built four. Full-scale development, for which another Rs.2,000-plus crore was finally sanctioned, thus started only in late-2001. Some 1,200 hours of flight testing was to be undertaken to secure Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) from the IAF.

At that point, apart from the weaponisation requirements the project had to undergo extensive redesign to accommodate an air-to-air missile chosen by the IAF, which was considerably heavier and longer than what had been specified till 2000. The IAF had again changed its mind. This necessitated the complete redesign of the wing structure, using only composite materials in order to keep the weight within limits. The period of this redesign was also utilised to upgrade the avionics, to a completely open architecture.

Consequently, in “generational terms” the LCA is a fourth generation-plus aircraft with full networking capabilities. This made it more than comparable to anything the IAF had, and possibly would have, even after it acquires the 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) now on tender, with first deliveries due eight years hence.

On the engine

It is true that the Kaveri engine for the LCA that the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) of the DRDO has been developing for 12 years has not yet met its technical performance targets and requires redevelopment. So far the GE 404 engine from the U.S., which powers the F-16 fighter-bomber, has been used to power the LCA. The problems the GTRE has with the Kaveri are not unusual in a complex fighter aircraft engine project being undertaken for the first time. Moreover, the financial sanction of about Rs.320 crore given for engine development was possibly only to cover the Project Definition Phase and some high-risk technology development effort. We do not know of a first-of-type high-technology fighter aircraft engine being developed anywhere in less than a multi-billion dollar programme and a 20-year-plus development cycle. Even Snecma, the sole fighter aircraft engine manufacturer in France, despite decades of experience in developing and manufacturing engines for Mirage III, V and F-1, took about a decade and $2.2 billion to develop the M-88 engine for the Mirage 2000. The development of the Kaveri is unlikely to cross $1 billion.

The LCA with a GE 404 engine has done 800-plus hours of flight-testing. Even with that engine the performance has been not only vastly superior to that of even the recently upgraded MiG 21 BIS (the IAF is operating almost 400 of the series), but it has shown itself to be comparable in many critical parameters to the Mirage 2000. Modifications to the aircraft structure are under way to reduce weight and improve engine performance. When the GTRE’s joint venture with a leading foreign engine manufacturer for further development is completed in the next four years, the Kaveri will be brought up to a performance level, superior to the GE 404. Fitted with it, the LCA will be truly comparable to the Mirage 2000 and in many respects even superior. And all this in an aircraft much lighter than the Mirage 2000.

Superior

As for network-centric capability, which intrinsically needs indigenous systems for secrecy, security and inter-operability, it is superior in the LCA compared to any aircraft in the IAF’s inventory.

So it is a fallacy to think that we can continue the importing spree and still have such network-centric capability.

As recently as in 2005, the IAF’s requirement for 126 new aircraft was only for an upgraded Mirage 2000. At Rs.120 crore to Rs.140 crore a plane, compared to at least double that amount for any of the aircraft types now bidding for the 126 MRCA, is not the LCA a highly cost-effective fighter for volume induction into the IAF?

As for development costs, the LCA has remained well within the sanctioned $1.2 billion — which is about the lowest anywhere. Time overrun in the strict sense is only by a year or two, despite the sanctions. A first-of-type aircraft of this degree of complexity has not been developed anywhere in the West or in Russia in less than two to three decades.

The F16 series that was inducted into the U.S. Air Force in 1975 is today at Mark 60. That is how aircraft of this level of complexity are improved after induction. That this imperative applies even more to the LCA has to be recognised.

It is for the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister to ensure that this effort is not belittled or scuttled, and that the LCA programme is given all-out support — as successive Prime Ministers have ensured for our atomic energy and space programmes.

(Ashok Parthasarathi was Science Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Vice- Admiral (retired) Raman Puri was Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Committee of Service Chiefs, remaining closely involved with the inter-service weapons acquisition process from October 2003 to February 2006).

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Sanctioned in ’83, LCA Tejas is yet to take off

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Sanctioned in ’83, LCA Tejas is yet to take off

Rajat Pandit, TNN Feb 12, 2008, 01.55am IST

NEW DELHI: When defence minister A K Antony witnesses a flight demonstration of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in Bangalore on Tuesday, he should take a close look at the fighter which typifies all that is wrong with defence projects in India.

The LCA project was sanctioned way back in 1983 at a cost of Rs 560 crore to replace the rapidly aging MiG fighters.

A quarter of a century later, with project costs already pegged at Rs 5,489.78 crore, the LCA is still at least four years away from becoming fully operational.

And when IAF finally inducts an LCA squadron, around 2012 or so, it will fly with American GE-404 engines and radars developed with Israel’s help, apart from several other ‘foreign’ parts in what is touted to be an ‘indigenous’ project.

Yes, developing a supersonic fly-by-wire fighter jet from scratch, with international sanctions in place for several years, is an extremely complex task. “But taking almost three decades is criminal,” said a senior official.

“All the agencies involved in it like the Aeronautical Development Agency, Defence Research and Development Organization, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd and even the IAF, which has frequently changed requirements of weapons and electronic warfare midway, have to share the blame,” he added.

For the record, the two LCA technology demonstrators and three prototype vehicles have clocked over 800 flights till now, accumulating 425 hours and covering a flight envelope of 1.4 Mach and 15-km altitude.

Last year, the LCA even test-fired its first air-to-air missile, prompting the defence ministry to proclaim it as “a historic event” marking the beginning of the “weaponization” of Tejas. But the fact remains that the deadlines for the IOC (initial operational clearance) and FOC (final operational clearance) of Tejas have been revised time and again. As things stand now, IOC is projected by 2010 and FOC by 2012.

IAF, on its part, has ordered only 20 LCAs so far, despite pressure from the defence R&D establishment, unsure as it is of the delivery date and whether the LCA will be a top-notch fighter once it is ready. Incidentally, IAF and Navy had earlier projected a requirement of as many as 220 LCAs.

The less said about the indigenous Kaveri engine, which was meant to power the LCA, the better. The repeated failures of Kaveri – its development cost has jumped to Rs 2,839 crore from the initial Rs 382 crore – has meant the first 40 LCAs will have the American GE-404 engines.

With no solution in sight, DRDO has invited proposals for foreign collaboration for the co-development of Kaveri now. Keeping all this in mind, the overall development cost of LCA will zoom well over Rs 12,000 crore before it becomes a reality.

 

Readers’ opinions (33)

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vivian fernandes (bombay)
12 Feb, 2008 09:21 AM
I have recently started working for the aviation industry and i have come to learn that although building a plane sounds easy there are so many parts that have to fit together that it is a mind boggling process.. However like many of the readers have mentioned,it should not take us 24 years to make a plane fly .. I do agree that the indian scientists are underpaid and i think it is high time we start bringing in private contractors like most of the western countries do.. so i think the only solution to this problem is to bring in people who know what they are doing and not leave projects in the hands of un educated,3rd rate politicians who might as well sold the parts for the plane on the black market to line their pockets..

Kotresh Tambrallimath (Bangalore)
12 Feb, 2008 09:00 AM
Indian Scientist salary is 5 to 10 times less than normal software Engineer salary. Because of this transition rates are high, so project is getting delay. Regarding cost of project, all are talking about 5000 cr. but how many billions of dollars US has invested to come to this position ??? Developing our own technology and building LCA is far far far better than Buying Black box(F16). I am very much thankful to all our scientists who are working in ADA and DRDO for there effort and dedication.

Krishna (Pennsylvania, PA)
12 Feb, 2008 08:31 AM
Well…I have worked on the LCA’s cockpit software programs in the early 90s. I know very well that we tried imitating F16’s fly by wire technology. We even followed USA DoD standard for software documentation. But I don’t understand why there is so much delay in taking off. I think we could not even copy something properly.

Prasad (Atlanta, USA)
12 Feb, 2008 08:24 AM
Even if we consider 12K Crore to develop an aircaraft from scratch (and belive, me there are many more things to an aircraft apart from the engine), I think it is not a bad price. Considering India has 12 lakh crores in its coffers as foreigh exchange and its income has multiplied manifold in past few years, 12 K crores for this project is not at all astronomical. We have to be cognizent of the fact that the project was executed by a government agency in complete isolation until recently without any private participation. India has learned a good lesson from it and is now encouraging privte participation in these kind of projects. I think we need to look at it much more positively. Every project is a learning curve and we have learned our share from this one too. I find such reports a bit too harsh towards all the good work which has gone into it. As a responsible mouthpiece of Indian media your esteemed publication should refrain from publishing such articles, which show our research establishments in bad light.

Rishi (Bangalore)
12 Feb, 2008 08:21 AM
Its time for the government to come out of the politics and took hard decision and recruiting from top premier colleges by offering them competetive pay.India have enough talent to build anything the only thing is that there should be strong will power behind it.

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Indian Mig 21 nominated for Nobel Peace Prize

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Gursimran Khamba , Hindustan Times
October 10, 2011
First Published: 17:07 IST(10/10/2011)
Last Updated: 17:31 IST(10/10/2011 

The Indian Air Force came in for a surprise today as the Nobel Foundation in Sweden nominated the Mig 21 for the Peace Prize in 2012, shortly after announcing Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Leymah Gbowee and Tawakkul Karman as winners for 2011. In a press release, the Nobel Foundation states “We would like

to appreciate the role of the IAF Mig-21 which is the most prominent aircraft to reject the notion of war by deciding to crash in entirety before any conflict arises, thus saving thousands of innocent lives. Unlike Barack Obama who was given the prize despite being at war with two countries, the Mig 21 is only at war with its inability to survive a flight.”

Indian defence analysts however were not amused. “This seems like an attempt by the Scandinavians to mock the equipment levels of the Indian Air Force. They are probably still peeved that the SAAB Gripen got rejected by the IAF for the 126 MMRCA fighter contract, and they’re using the Nobel Foundation as a front to publicly humiliate us. If they really had to award an Indian institution why not the DRDO which till date hasn’t made a defence product that works? Or why not Narendra Modi, whose fans would have you believe that the recently concluded Sadbhavna yatra is the biggest thing since the Dandi March?”

Left wing groups have called the announcement an imperialist conspiracy to destabalise India. Rita Menon, a prominent social activist who issues a lot of press releases that media houses throw in the trashcan without even looking said, “This is nothing but a technique for Scandinavians to penetrate the burgeoning Indian market like the white people who wanted to organize Miss World in 2006. India hasn’t given a shit about the Peace Prize ever since Gandhi didn’t get one. Mark my words, in five years they will get desperate and nominate Aamir Khan for building inter-faith peace and harmony”.