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Chinks in the Armour – What ail DRDO, India’s Premier Defence Organigation?

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Rediff.com – News-Special Part- V

‘Kalam has been promoting himself, not self-reliance’

George Iype

Avul Pakir Jainulabeen Abdul Kalam, who headed DRDO for years, is credited with drawing up the blueprint for India’s entry into the league of developed nations. He is the protagonist of the government’s grand plans to make indigenisation of defence products a reality.

If he could transform DRDO from a moribund, bureaucratic government organisation to an establishment that fights for self-reliance in defence production, will Kalam’s effort to build aircraft, war machines and missiles on the Indian soil bear fruit?

Many acknowledge that despite technology denials and control regimes enforced by the developed countries, Kalam imbibed a high-end research and development initiative in DRDO laboratories that the government, academic institutions and the industry now look at him in awe.

Thanks to Kalam, DRDO now has a leading role in generating technologies and secure systems in the field of information technology which could change the quality of life in defence forces. Under his stewardship, the organisation created the critical components and devices that will be the backbone of state-of-the-art electronic systems in defence.

Many claim Kalam’s discovery has been a turning point in India’s history and national security. But these days the boat owner’s son from Rameswaram in Tamil Nadu is setting sail on just one massive project — take India to self reliance in defence production at least 70 per cent by 2005.

It is because of Kalam that India can now boast of the ambitious indigenisation Plan 2005. Plan 2005 is not just about making weapons indigenously. It is the symbol of national pride.

Years after it professed the indigenisation mantra, the government sheepishly admitted last year that only 30 per cent of Indian weapons were of domestic origin. The realisation prompted it to turn to Kalam. It then immediately created a Self-Reliance Implementation Council headed by Kalam that will implement Plan 2005.

Is DRDO’s aim to achieve 70 per cent indigenisation in the defence system realistic in the wake of unaccomplished high profile projects like the Light Combat Aircraft, Arjun main battle tank, the missile and nuclear submarine programmes? But can Kalam deliver?

Not many believe that Kalam will accomplish 70 per cent self-reliance by 2005. The task us gigantic. More than one-third of the budget for the missile programme, the Arjun MBT and the LCA has gone into imports of critical components. More imports are to follow as DRDO’s indigenous engine programme, especially for the LCA, is on the verge of collapse.

“Indigenisation is a hoax. Kalam is spreading it boasting that he will attain self-reliance in defence equipment in five years time. Indigenisation should have been the DRDO motto when it was established in the 1950s, not in 2000,” says an army officer.

Many within the army, the air force and the navy, who have been waiting in vain for DRDO-developed defence equipment and electronic warfare systems, claim Kalam has been promoting himself, and not self-reliance.

“Both DRDO and Kalam have failed to win over the armed forces because many of their projects have become serious stumbling blocks for the forces’ modernisation,” the army officer adds.

The accusations against Kalam are three — that he did not create a good research and development culture in DRDO, that his relationship with the armed forces has been rocky and that he did not embark on any plan to stem the brain drain from DRDO.

Designing and developing defence weapons is perhaps the toughest engineering task. But experts claim DRDO suffers from a poor research and development culture thanks to Kalam.

“DRDO under Kalam has done more on public relations than on proper research and development. That is the reason why many of our projects like LCA are terribly lagging behind in schedules,” says Shankar Sen Chaudhury, an independent technical analyst based in Hyderabad.

“The structural environment in DRDO labs have to change if effective results in indigenisation is to take place,” he adds.

Another problem is the rocky relationship that Kalam has with the armed forces. He and his colleagues argue that the forces do not have any specialists who understand the design and development concepts of DRDO. “Therefore, the armed forces always interfere in our projects halfway through,” a DRDO scientist says.

Many say this messy relationship between DRDO, “the seller” and the three armed forces, “the buyers”, should be blamed on both sides. “Kalam was a marketing man. He wanted to hard-sell his half-baked DRDO products to us, like the Arjun tank,” says an army officer.

But DRDO asks: When the forces induct imported products without any trails, why can’t they rely on indigenous products? DRDO officials say the only reason for this is that the army does not have the experience to induct an indigenous weapon system.

DRDO has been mouthing the politically correct mantra of indigenisation because a number of disgruntled scientists in the organisation charge, “Dr Kalam is a politician.”

His critics say the problem is that India’s defence programmes is a one-man show. “Only Kalam is recognised and acknowledged. It is ridiculous that thousands of us are working there, and only one man is framed in a glass house. That is the precise reason for the high rate of brain drain from DRDO,” a disgruntled DRDO engineer said.

The rate at which scientists and engineers are leaving the laboratories is a cause for grave concern. According to a survey, more than 3 per cent of scientists and engineers leave the organisation every year in search of attractive salaries and perks.

“We have been demanding better salary packages and service conditions. But neither Kalam nor the government has listened,” says the engineer.

A section of DRDO scientists are now happy that the organisation is no longer under Kalam. Ever since the new chief, Dr Vasudev K Aatre, took over in December, things are looking up. One of the his first decisions was to initiate a university interactive programme for DRDO scientists. Now, professors of premier science institutes like the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore will spend time with DRDO scientists on specific research projects.

Dr Aatre is also taking a few radical decisions — he is on the verge of dropping some projects that the organisation has failed to execute in many years.

TOMORROW: ‘DRDO is like the Indian cricket team’
“They have been pampered with money and praise that they cannot just deliver,” remarks Major General (retd) Ashok Mehta.

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Chinks in the Armour – What ail DRDO, India’s Premier Defence Organigation?

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Rediff.com – News-Special Part- II

‘The LCA won’t take off in the near future’

George Iype

The Light Combat Aircraft is perhaps the most ambitious of all DRDO projects. But 17 years and four postponements of its test flight later, the multi-role fighter meant to replace the MiG-21 is still a dream.

What has happened to the LCA, the most technologically complex challenge that DRDO had taken up? Air force officers, DRDO scientists and defence experts say it remains grounded because of “scores of technical problems.”

The delay has hurt the air force badly and dented the DRDO’s image. A country that has not designed a jet fighter in decades had been waiting long for one. India had designed and produced the HF-24 aircraft in the early 1960s, but its engine was British.

Such was the enthusiasm behind the LCA that in 1985 the then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi showcased it as a symbol of the new era of co-operation and friendship between India and the United States. Gandhi even overrode the claims of the French and Germans who had been collaborating with DRDO and the Bangalore-based Hindustan Aeronautical Limited for the LCA production.

The original deadline to fly the aircraft was 1993. The cost, Rs 5.6 billion. The DRDO and HAL did roll out an LCA in the presence of then prime minister P V Narasimha Rao on November 17, 1995. DRDO top brass then announced that the maiden flight would take place in early 1997. The dates were revised to June 1998 and then to February 1999.

Years passed by, but no test flight took place. Today the deadline for the LCA has become a joke in defence circles.

The most scathing criticism of the project came from the Comptroller and Auditor General of India who, in his 1999 report, said: ‘Even at the end of 1998, the LCA had not crossed the development stage. Its production and induction into the air force remains only a distant possibility.’

The CAG report went on to add that the airframe for LCA developed by the DRDO’s Bangalore laboratory, the Aeronautical Development Agency ‘is deficient in vital parameters of aerodynamic configuration, volume and most importantly, the weight.’

The first phase of the project consumed Rs 25 billion, overshooting the estimated Rs 5.6 billion. Worse, due to the delay, the air force was compelled to upgrade its MiG Bis aircraft at a cost of Rs 21.35 billion.

Scientists at DRDO, ADA and HAL concede one thing: the LCA has run into some serious technical problems. LCA is a meticulous fly-by-wire aircraft, which is critically dependent on software to fly.

“But over the years, we have not been successful in fully testing the software. Therefore, we face difficulties in integrating the system,” admits an engineer at HAL.

Since the aircraft depends on computers, no pilot wants to risk a flight test without thoroughly validating the system. Scientists say the trials intended to test the dynamic stability of the airframe and the LCA’s engine-flight control system has been successful. Though the engine and the electronics are in the advanced test mode, the aircraft’s ability to withstand low pressure and temperature at high altitudes is suspect.

“There is reason enough to worry that the LCA will not take off in the near future,” says Bangalore-based aviation expert P N Srivastava.

“I feel the delay is primarily due to the fact that it took years for a country like India to get the advanced technology for the project,” he says. “The idea for LCA was born without having any requisite technology on our side,” Srivastava points out.

DRDO officials put forward one reason for the project delay — sanctions from the United States after the Pokhran nuclear blasts. In a bid to force India to put the nuclear genie back into the bottle, the US has pulled out of the project soon after the tests.

Thus, just one week after the explosions in May 1998, many scientists working on different fields linked to the LCA at aerospace giant Lockheed Martin in Binghamton, New York, were asked to pack their bags for India by the United States. The Indian engineers were working to validate a computerised control law software for onboard computers which will ultimately fly the aircraft.

As it imposed sanctions, the US also denied key components like hydraulic actuators — that help manoeuvre the aircraft, gain altitude and determine the trajectory — and the ring-laser gyros to make inertial navigation systems.

“One of the main reasons for the delay is that technological sanctions from the US hit us badly. Had it not been for the nuclear blasts, our deadline to test fly the aircraft would have been successful in December 1998,” says a senior DRDO official.

Lockheed Martin refused to give the DRDO the flight control computer, which was in the US for testing, when sanctions were announced, he added.

Another major hurdle for DRDO is the LCA’s engine. As per its agreement with the US, India was allowed to purchase frontline 404 engines from General Electric. In fact, DRDO imported 11 such engines and fitted them on to the early versions of the aircraft, pending the development of the indigenous Kaveri engine being developed by Bangalore’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment.

But after the nuclear tests, GE withdrew its technical support personnel from India and DRDO was forced to depend only on Kaveri. Sources now say it will take at least two years to determine whether Kaveri engines can withstand the low pressure and temperature at high altitudes.

No one at DRDO, ADA and HAL believes that the LCA will fly before 2005.

Experts say the delay should be examined in the context of a country that has not designed and produced a jet fighter since the 1960s. Development of every vital component of the LCA — airframe, multimode radar, flight control system, Kaveri engine, digital electronic engine control – are said to be beset with problems.

Scientists at DRDO, for their part, hold the defence ministry partially responsible for the delay. Between 1990 and 1994, all work came to a virtual standstill as the defence ministry refused to release the much-needed foreign exchange because of economic stringency.

But the biggest worry for DRDO is not the bureaucratic delays and sanctions, but the Indian air force. Faced with diminishing number of its ageing fleet, the IAF holds DRDO responsible for promising to deliver the LCA before year 2,000, thereby considerably upsetting many of its aircraft acquisition plans.

Suspecting that DRDO will never deliver the LCA, the IAF has now embarked on an ambitious project to upgrade 100 MiG-21 aircraft.

Despite the heavy odds, DRDO still remains confident that it will roll out the country’s first indigenous aircraft before 2002.

“We will induct 200 LCAs into the Indian Air Force between 2003 and 2010,” Dr Abdul Kalam told a group of aeronautical scientists before he handed over DRDO’s charges to Dr Vasudev K Aatre.

But there aren’t many who believe that promise will be fulfilled.

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Chinks in the Armour – What ail DRDO, India’s Premier Defence Organigation?

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Rediff.com – News-Special Part- I

‘How long should we wait?’

George Iype

DRDO is responsible for indigenising and constantly upgrading the country’s weapons and equipment inventory and related supplies. But the dilemma has always been to determine the correct balance between make or buy.
The Kargil Review Committee Report
Make. Or buy?

That has been a longstanding issue between the DRDO and the Services. The former complains that the armed forces make impossible demands. The Forces say the DRDO has failed to develop the frontiers of defence technology. And that its claim to produce anything and everything has virtually strangulated critical defence exports.

Experts say it was in fact the collapse of the Soviet Union that drove home the urgency to reduce dependence on external suppliers and rely on indigenous defence production. “Thus over the years, the DRDO has been volunteering to produce virtually anything for the Indian forces. The result is that it has now accumulated nearly 1,000 projects. The DRDO does not have the capability to accomplish some of these,” says Rajendra Mohan, an independent defence analyst in Hyderabad.

According to Mohan, the DRDO promises to make anything for the Forces simply to keep many of its laboratories running. “Or else, some of the labs would have already been shut,” he points out.

Experts like Mohan argue that the very method of calculating the indigenisation content of defence development and production is a matter of debate. Over the years, the government has set up 10 committees under the Department of Defence Production to identify the scope of items such as aircraft, electronics warfare systems and armament. Based on their reports, the government had been claiming for more than a decade that the self-reliance and indigenisation content will be brought up to 70 per cent before 2000.

The core point as per this plan is minimising imports and inducting indigenously designed and manufactured systems. The stress was on increased research and development and the DRDO was the agency to implement it.

But last year, the government — after a thorough review of the DRDO — admitted that the indigenisation level still remained at only 30 per cent. It then quickly created a Self Reliance Implementation Council, chaired by then DRDO chief and now scientific advisor to the prime minister, Dr Abdul Kalam. The Council’s aim is to take indigenisation to 70 per cent by 2005. But many believe like all other DRDO targets, this deadline would also slip.

DRDO scientists claim they have made significant achievements on indigenisation and in their efforts to meet the requirements of the armed forces. They include flight simulators for aircraft, 68mm reusable rocket pod, brake parachute for fighter aircraft, mini remotely-piloted vehicle, light field gun, a new family of light weight small arms systems, charge line mine-clearing vehicle for safe passage of vehicles in the battlefield, and illuminated ammunitions for enhancing night fighting capabilities in their list of achievements.

The DRDO has also developed a cluster weapon system for fighter aircraft, naval mines, next generation bombs for high speed aircraft, low-level tracking radars Indra-I and II for the army and air force, light field artillery radar, battlefield surveillance radar, advanced ship sonar systems and torpedo launchers.

“Our biggest success and pioneering work has been the testing five nuclear devices during May 11-13, 1998 in the Pokhran range,” claims a DRDO scientist.

In collaboration with the Department of Atomic Energy, DRDO in fact designed, tested and produced advanced detonators, ruggedised high volt trigger systems, interface engineering, systems engineering and systems integration to military specifications for the nuclear blast.

“Like the nuclear bomb project, several high-technology projects are in various stages of design and development. Therefore, it is ridiculous to allege that we are a useless bunch of scientists for the armed forces,” the scientist adds.

Indeed, the problem is that for years DRDO has been enmeshed in several high-technology projects that no one really knows when the armed forces will be able to induct.

“DRDO has been acting like a dog in the manger. The agency has considerably torpedoed our efforts to import state of the art equipment because it has been boasting to make every available defence equipment that we demand,” an army officer says angrily.

For instance, he says, though the defence ministry sanctioned competence build-up projects for the multi-barrel rocket launcher Pinaka in the 1980s, DRDO is nowhere near accomplishing the target. The delay has forced the army to continue to depend upon their existing outdated system, whose range is much less compared to that envisaged for Pinaka.

Concerned about terrible delays in some of the vital projects, the army, the air force and the navy are these days asking just one question: “How long should we wait?”

For the Forces, these projects are lifelines. They include India’s indigenously built surface-to-air missiles Trishul and Akash which were to have replaced the Russian-supplied OSA-AK and Kvadrat systems in 1990. Then there is the most ambitious multi-role fighter, the light combat aircraft, the indigenous production of which DRDO has been grappling with in the last 17 years.

The main battle tank Arjun, incorporating state-of-art tank technologies with superior fire power, high mobility and excellent protection has been developed by DRDO. But the army is unhappy with its performance.

There are growing concerns among the Forces, and politicians and defence experts about the terrible delays of the DRDO and its ability to keep promises. For at stake is not just the concept of indigenisation, but a huge investment of more than Rs 150 billion that the government has made for the last two decades on various projects. Would the money be completely wasted?

“Weapon systems face obsolescence very fast. So the DRDO will have to either give up some projects or reorient its functioning,” says Mohan.

Yet, DRDO has been mouthing the political platitude of indigenisation by postponing the deadlines of LCA, Pinaka, Trishul, Akash, nuclear submarines and several types of electronics warfare systems for the army, air force and navy.

The Kargil conflict last year exposed the chinks in DRDO’s armour. None other than Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee echoed the Forces’s worries when he told DRDO directors on August 6, 1999: “Technology needed for mountain warfare is to be given the highest priority.”
But the biggest worry for DRDO is not the bureaucratic delays and sanctions, but the Indian air force. Faced with diminishing number of its ageing fleet, the IAF holds DRDO responsible for promising to deliver the LCA before year 2,000, thereby considerably upsetting many of its aircraft acquisition plans.

Suspecting that DRDO will never deliver the LCA, the IAF has now embarked on an ambitious project to upgrade 100 MiG-21 aircraft.

Despite the heavy odds, DRDO still remains confident that it will roll out the country’s first indigenous aircraft before 2002.

“We will induct 200 LCAs into the Indian Air Force between 2003 and 2010,” Dr Abdul Kalam told a group of aeronautical scientists before he handed over DRDO’s charges to Dr Vasudev K Aatre.

But there aren’t many who believe that promise will be fulfilled.

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Perform or perish: Antony tells DRDO

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Perform or perish: Antony tells DRDO

PTI | May 29, 2013, 08.08 PM IST – Times of India

Antony told the country's premier government-run organisation responsible for manufacturing defence equipment that it should adhere to the timelines and satisfy the user.
Antony told the country’s premier government-run organisation responsible for manufacturing defence equipment that it should adhere to the timelines and satisfy the user.

NEW DELHI: Reflecting frustration over long delays of strategic projects like Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), defence minister A K Antony came down hard on DRDO, saying there is a “limit to time slippages” and that it should “perform or perish”.

Antony told the country’s premier government-run organisation responsible for manufacturing defence equipment that it should adhere to the timelines and satisfy the user.

He specifically referred to the LCA project, which has not fructified even after nearly three decades of inception, and said, “I am waiting that the LCA should become a reality.”

The defence minister said in military development projects across the globe, it is a “herculean task” to meet timelines and there are time slippages. “But there is limit for slippages,” he said, clearly reflecting the frustration.

“In the times of cut-throat competition, the choice is very clear, perform or perish. In delivery of strategic systems, timelines must be adhered to and the satisfaction of the user is the litmus test,” Antony said at a DRDO awards function.

Asking the DRDO to focus on its core competence and “not fritter away its resources and energy”, he said, “Do not think that I am criticising you, I am with you in all times but as the minister of defence, it is my duty to say some things to you.”

On the LCA programme, he said he had been given a particular date by the DRDO. “I hope that it is the final date and the aircraft gets its Initial Operational Clearance II.”

The IOC-I of the LCA was held in January 2011 in Bangalore and its IOC-II was scheduled to be held in July but it has now been postponed to be held in November.

Antony asked the team of HAL, DRDO and the IAF to work together on the LCA project and ensure that it achieves the IOC-II and then the final operational clearance by the end of next year.

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Air Force audit says pact for LCA parts unauthorised

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Chethan Kumar, Bangalore, April 24, 2013, DHNS: – DECCAN HERALD

The Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE), one of the agencies working on light combat aircraft — Tejas had struck an agreement with BAE Systems Overseas Inc for supply of 15 ship sets of integrated flight control systems line replacement units costing US$3,06,00,000, without the approval of competent authority, states the audit of the Office of the Director of Air Force Audit.

BAE Systems Overseas Inc was to have delivered the units by March 2009. “Under the contract, ADE received 14 shipments. The consignment containing the 15th set consisting of actuators (total 15 numbers) valuing US$21,27,215 (Rs 10.63 crore) in one case weighing 206-kg was sent via shipper number 54151 dated December 17, 2008 by British Airways. However, the consignment was not received by ADE,” the report, completed in 2010 reveals.

Bringing this to the notice of Defence Minister A K Antony, Javed Abbas Technical Officer ‘B’, retired, in a letter said there are several other irregularities going on at ADE, a lab under Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), regarding appointments, promotions and transfers.

The audit report, annexed in to the letter, further states: “as per documents provided by BAE Systems, USA, the consignment was received by British Airways and the aircraft left the John F Kennedy International Airport (New York) for Heathrow Airport, London on December 12, 2008 by flight number BA 114.”

While 40 per cent of the value of these products had already been paid to BAE, payment for balance, amounting to 60 per cent of value was effected in October 2009, well after the deadline for delivering of the units was passed, and, the consignment had not reached ADE.

The auditors point out that as per para 7.2 of Purchase Management procedure, 2006, stores costing Rs 2.5 crore might be insured against loss or damage in transit and that insurance cover will invariably be obtained from the insurance agency before dispatching the consignment by the supplier.

“However, the consignment was not insured by DRDO in contravention of the regulation. On reasons for non-insurance, the ADE stated that the clearing agent Air Consolidation Agent — Balmer & Lawrie & Co did not advise the establishment to do so,” the report adds. Observing that the excuse is not tenable, the audit said, onus of deciding on whether the consignment should be insured or not rests with ADE and not the clearing agent.

“Thus, by not insuring the consignment by ADE, as provided in the regulation, the State had to bear loss of Rs 10.63 crore,” the report concluded.

DRDO sources said the consignment, eventually never reached the organisation, and it was lost in transit!

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The DRDO report card

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By Yatish Yadav and Nardeep Singh Dahiya 02nd September 2012 12:00 AM

CGDA secret audit blows the lid off several other projects

Nirbhay missile

Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE BANGALORE): In December 2010, a project for ‘additional development flight trials of Nirbhay’ was sanctioned costing Rs 18.1 crore . This was overlapping with an ongoing project codenamed Nirbhay sanctioned in 2004 at a cost of Rs 48 Crore.

“Old projects PDC has not been extended nor has it been successfully closed. The sanction of Rs 18.1 crore as a new project was inappropriate,” the audit said.
In one of its observation on the same project, the audit said “The case also raises questions on the way project proposals are put up for sanction. How original proposal to develop NIRBHAY exclude its trial? No research and development project can be sanctioned without inclusion of trial of the developed products.”
Arjun tank
Integrated Arjun tank program was sanctioned to CVRDE in November 2010 at a cost of Rs 69.90 crore. However, several small projects have been sanctioned under ‘buildup’. Audit reports reveal that it was done to avoid going through competent financial authority, which is contrary to financial regulations.
NAG missile
DRDO sanctioned another project at a cost of Rs 28.35 crore while cabinet committee on security approved programme to develop NAG missile is still going on.
UAV Aerostat project
It was sanctioned by DRDO at a cost of Rs 49.82 crore by reducing the cost proposed by the lab (Rs 70 crore) so as to bring it just under Rs 50 crore, which is its sanctioning power.
Facet
Facility for Electro-Optical System Testing (FACET) was sanctioned at a cost of Rs 35 crore by DG DRDO to create a facility, which is essentially required to meet the objectives of an already sanctioned project. However, the old project’s cost was not revised with the approval of appropriate CFA.
Flop show
Akash, NAG & Trishul missiles
The troika of integrated Guided Missile Development Plan (IGDMP) failed to fire after burning thousands of crore taxpayer’s money for almost 30 years. Akash which started in 1983 failed to meet requirements of army but after some hard bargaining Air force inducted it in its arsenal.
NAG, failed the 53rd test in August 2012. The project was started at an original cost of Rs 388.83 Crore in 1983, which was later revised to Rs 1,771.43 Crore. Indian army was forced to buy costly Javelin missile from USA in 2009 after DRDO failed to develop the project even after 29 years. After successive failures, Trishul was officially shelved in 2008. It is now reduced as a technology demonstrator by the DRDO.
AGNI
The AGNI project was launched in 1983. The DRDO borrowed ISRO’s PSLV rocket to enhance firepower after it failed the initial tests before 1994. AGNI series of Missiles AGNI I and AGNI II with a range of 700 km and 2,500 km were inducted in the armed forces after successful tests. AGNI III with a range of 3,500 km is expected to be inducted in the army soon.
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence in its report in March 2012 observed that the maximum range of the missiles that have been handed over to the army is 25 km only. Government in its reply to the committee had stated that the Indian army is currently in the process of procurement of advanced long range missile system and upgradation of certain existing weapon platform.
LCA
The LCA project, launched in 1983,is still waiting for final flight. The DRDO failed to develop promised indigenous engine even after spending over Rs 17,000 crore. It is expected to achieve the lasted deadline by December 2013.
Consider the three biggest projects: developing a Main Battle Tank (MBT), a nuclear-powered submarine, and an advanced Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). The MBT project was launched in 1974. But the tank has failed to meet service-requirement tests. It is reportedly too heavy and undependable to be used in combat. The Indian Army prefers Russian tanks and says it will use MBTs for training, not operations. The nuclear submarine project, launched 31 years ago, is not yet finished despite an estimated Rs 3,000 crore spent on it. The reactor is apparently ready, but not tested with the vessel’s hull.
Kaveri Engine
The CAG in its annual report 2010-11 noted that government had already spent Rs 1,892 crore on Kaveri Engine development programme launched in 1986 to power the Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas. In 2005, the GTRE had indicated that it would not be able to develop the Kaveri engine on its own. Defence Minister AK Antony has told Parliament that the DRDO still has no time-frame to fully develop its Kaveri engine. He also said that the engine will be used in UAVs and marine applications.

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DRDO revamp still in doldrums

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Rajat Pandit, TNN | Aug 13, 2012, 01.45AM IST

NEW DELHI: Like the unending developmental saga of Tejas light combat aircraft, now 30 years in the making, the much-touted revamp of the Defence Research and Development Organisation also seems to be progressing at a glacial pace.

Over four years after the Rama Rao Committee (RRC) submitted its report in February 2008, none of the major recommendations to make DRDO a better R&D organization capable of developing state-of-the-art weapon systems without time and cost overruns has been implemented.

Another committee led by the defence secretary subsequently watered down several steps suggested by the RRC to arrive at “a set of acceptable recommendations”. But even this “major DRDO restructuring plan”, grandiosely announced by the defence ministry in May 2010, is yet to see the light of day.

PM Manmohan Singh, last month, warned there was an urgent need to “change our current bureaucratic system” of administering scientific and technical departments.

“Organizationally too, DRDO should aim at becoming leaner and making the best use of its human, financial and technological resources,” he said.

With India still importing well over 60% of its military needs, experts feel it’s imperative to drastically overhaul the DRDO-defence PSU set-up as well as strongly push for private sector participation to build a strong domestic defence-industrial base.

But that seems a pipe dream. As part of the revamp of DRDO, which has an over Rs 10,500 crore annual budget, a new Defence Technology Commission (DTC) was to be established with defence minister A K Antony as its chairman. Quizzed about the delay, officials said “a note for the DTC has been initiated for the Union Cabinet’s approval”. DRDO, in turn, is pushing for an “empowered” DTC on the lines of the space and atomic energy commissions.

Writers’ Comments (1)

Rajat Pandit (New Delhi)

13 hrs ago

The recommendation for the creation of seven technology clusters (missile systems, aeronautics, armament & combat engineering, electronics & communication, material sciences, naval systems and life sciences), each headed by a director-general to ensure timely execution of major programmes, is also yet to take shape. Similarly, “notes for approval of the Cabinet” have so far only been “initiated” for the creation of a commercial arm of DRDO, which was to be created as a private limited company with Rs 2 crore as seed capital, and re-designation of the DRDO director-general as chairman

s_swamy (hyd) replies to rajatpandit

12 hrs ago

The IGMP of DRDO is one of the lone (partial)success story. Credit goes to Dr Kalam (for scientific & managerial inputs) and his successor Dr Saraswat et al for shear sweat. Elsewhere nothing much to brag about. LCA, Battle tank, artillery, torpedos… all are high priority where advanced countries may sell a few dozen, but India will end up a buyer for ever and cannot even find spares later. A very familiar story. DRDO’s effort? After 30 years of tardy development and a few thousand crores down the rat hole, wants to “tie-up” with a foreign know-how source. (Eg:GE for aeroengines, NPOE for Brahmos etc.).What next? No one appears to have any vision. Private companies are a huge let down. Some biggies have invested but Defence orders are far and few; they have shut shop or hiked the margins to keep alive. They have mostly tied-up with foreign suppliers and these items will be obsolete by the time they get first set of orders! They have no homegrown R&D back up, because they cannot find local talent or they don’t trust this. The picture is pathetic.

Raghubir Singh (pune) replies to rajatpandit

12 hrs ago

It is only good luck that RRC has been as slow as Tejas otherwise it would have created much chaos. All the successes we have been privy to in recent times from Agni to BMD’s- would perhaps have eluded us otherwise? Restructuring should be suggested by those who understand the basics of defence research & at least know how a gun fires and and what is the battle field environment. Best would be to have an internal review of the DRDO org structure by its senior CCR&D’s with some retired Directors and serving general rank officers & defence technologists and put up for review to the MoD.

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The Missile that Cannot Fire – Long delays, cost escalation damage DRDO’s reputation

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Amarnath K, Menon and  Gaurav C. Sawant – April 13, 2012 – India Today 

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was set up in 1958 with a vision to “provide our defence services a decisive edge by equipping them with internationally competitive systems and solutions”. The DRDO has clearly failed in its mission.

There is no bigger indictment of India‘s premier organisation for research and development in military hardware than the fact that 54 years after its establishment, India still imports 70 per cent of its equipment requirements. In 1997, India best known defence bureaucrat and the then scientific adviser to defence minister, APJ Abdul Kalam, had said that India should bring the hare of imports in defence equipment purchases down to 30 per cent by 2005. No progress has been made. The percentage is still 70-30 in favour of imports.

DRDO`s list of successes is short-primarily the Agni and Prithvi missiles. Its list of failures is much longer.The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project, which was commissioned in 2001, is running late by four years. The costs have gone up from an original estimate of around Rs 3,300 crore to over Rs 5,780 crore. The Kaveri Engine for LCA is running late by 16 years and the cost has escalated by around 800 per cent.
In 2011, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) put a serious question mark on drdo’s capabilities. “The organisation, which has a history of its projects suffering endemic time and cost overruns, needs to sanction projects and decide on a probable date of completion on the basis of a conservative assessment of technology available and a realistic costing system,” its report stated.

The CAG report also revealed that not all technologies developed by DRDO were suitable for use by the armed forces. The three services have rejected 70 per cent of the products developed at the Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE), Pune, in the last 15 years costing Rs 320 crore because the products did not meet their standard and requirement, The CAG report stated that in order to form a fair and balanced view of the success of the projects undertaken by drdo, 46 completed and nine ongoing projects worth Rs 387.35 crore were scrutinised in February 2011. Of the 46 completed and closed projects, only 13 closed projects, wrapped up at a cost of Rs 68 crore, underwent production. “Without close synergy between the users and the technology development agency, much of the development efforts would go in vain, as the success rate of projects in ARDE amply demonstrates,” the report said.

The army is not impressed by DRDO`s performance either. Says Major-General S.V. Thapliyal, a former deputy director-general for perspective planning at army headquarters in Delhi, “DRDO promises to manufacture. It nixes our plans to acquire from abroad; It does not meet the deadline. Worse, it does not maintain quality either. The soldier, the end user, is the worst sufferer.”

General V.P. Malik, who was chief of army staff during the Kargil War, has an interesting incident to narrate in his book Kargil From Surprise to Victory. In 1997, the army finalized plans to acquire the AN/TPQ-37 Fire finder radars from the US. Prices were negotiated and just before purchase, drdo offered to manufacture them at half the price and within two years. The government shot down the army’s plans to buy these radars. In 1999, during the Kargil War, the radars were desperately needed. Neither had DRDO manufactured them nor could they be procured from the US (post-1998 Pokhran tests there was an arms embargo). Several lives were lost in Pakistani shelling. Wlien Indo-US relations improved, India did buy these radars in 2003, but at almost twice the initial price. “The problem with drdo is that it is big on promise and small on delivery. There is no accountability in the system,” says Malik.

DRDO continues to mislead. On April 4, it claimed it had achieved a major milestone on an “indigenous” programme to develop a sophisticated radar to monitor the Indian airspace. The aircraft on which the radar is mounted—a modified Embraer EMB 1451-is imported from Brazil. drdo had to resort to the Embraer aircraft because its own efforts at producing an indigenous carrier had ended in disaster. Project Guardian Airawat was stalled in 1999 when its HS-748 turboprop aircraft crashed, killing eight crew members-engineers, scientists and Indian Air Force (IAF) officers-on board.
Under a Rs 1,050 crore agreement, Brazil’s Embraer will now act as the pverall systems integrator for the “indigenous” project, supplying the three jets, mounting the radar and electronics onto the plane’s fuselage and ensuring that the altered jets retain acceptable flight performance.

According to its original 2004 timeline, this project was to be completed by 2011. Now the delivery of the remaining two modified Embraer aircraft is only expected by mid-2013. The project will not be complete until 2014. Even then there are serious flaws in the project. IAF has pointed out that the Embraer EMB 1451 cannot fly above 4 0,000 ft and therefore is only of limited use in surveillance. “DRDO has a history of claiming foreign designs as its own, like the Arjun tank which is a derivative of the German Leopard,” says a source in the agency. ~
The technology development agency is also largely responsible for the fact highlighted by General V.K. Singh that 97 per cent of the army’s air defence is obsolete. The CAG report lists seven requirements of the army for air defence guns and the project status report. CAG notes the end result: “Even though three R&D projects and one staff project were undertaken, the air defence gun system could not be developed by DRDO to satisfy the frequently revised requirement of the user.”

Army air defence sources say DRDO is tinkering with World War II equipment instead of working on cutting-edge technology. “The chief downplayed the state of affairs. It is in dire straits,” says a top-ranking air defence officer.

“The air defence is in a very-sorry condition,” says Air Marshal A.K. Singh, former air officer commanding-in-chief, Western Air Command. “DRDO is not able to service the equipment. Even if systems are acquired from abroad and DRDO or Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is meant to service it, it fails.This leaves critical gaps in national defence,” he says.

The Government had constituted a committee for the first-ever external review of the agency in February 2007. The committee chaired by P. Rama Rao, ex‘secreta1y, Department of Science and Technology and former director, Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory, Hyderabad, suggested that DRDO be restructured to make it a leaner organisation. It also recommended the setting up of a commercial arm of the organisation to make it a profitable entity, besides cutting back on delays in completing projects. “Delivery delayed is delivery denied,” said
Defence Minister A.K. Antony on delays in DRDO projects. But little progress has been made in the last five years on implementing the committee’s suggestions.

DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat is eager to put his house in order. He has called for the setting up of a Defence Technology DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat is eager to put his house in order. He has called for the setting up of a Defence Technology Commission as well as a bigger role for DRDO in picking production partners for products developed by the agency. Instead of the current practice of the Ministry of Defence arbitrarily nominating a defence public sector undertaking or an ordnance factory to build the product, usually when development is almost complete, DRDO would be able to select a capable partner company from the outset, from the private sector if necessary.

The defence organisation, which has an annual budget of over Rs 10,000 crore, now has no choice but to reinvent itself. The agency‘s research has drifted away from its core competence in recent times. It has been accused of “wasting time and precious resources” being engaged in research and development of technique for detection of pesticides in fruits, technology for dengue control, dental implants, foldable stretchers and berry juice.
The moribund agency is also suffering from employee attrition. Over the past five years, while the report of the Rama Rao Committee has languished, around 1,700 of its 7,900 engineers and scientists have left for better opportunities in private companies. The depletion of talent will be the last stage in what cynical insiders say is the process of converting DRDO into a dodo.

Drdo

Tatra trucks are fine, says DRDO Chief

Leave a comment

Surinder Jeet (USA)
01 Apr, 2012 02:03 AM
V K Saraswat has not answered the general’s allegations. The general has said that Tatra is too expensive. DRDO has not disputed it. That Tatra is delivering the service is like saying Bofors Guns are firing. They should. Can Tatra or similar truck be bought from other suupliers? Will they give more for the same money or will they cost less. DRDO would be wise not to drag itself into lime light. As it is it is in trouble for its own scandals and poor performance. My question now is,”why did they enter the fray?. What is their interest”?

jk (delhi)
01 Apr, 2012 01:48 AM
Everybody is trying to cover their as***, DRDO is a joke, even after many decades what indeginious product has come out of their stable?, even if there is one or two, are they being mass produced and are they world class that they are being exported?. This and other public sectors are a drain on the economy. I have a feeling DRDO’s palm has been greased and money exchanged to go for these trucks.

RAhul (Delhi)
01 Apr, 2012 01:35 AM
DRDO is scinetists are just feeding on tax payers money.If we need to procure defense equipment from pverseas suppliers…Why not close down DRDO.

subhash (h.pur)
01 Apr, 2012 01:23 AM
Mr. VK Sarasvat, The strength of the elephant is not under the clot but the cost.We are paying the price of 5 elephant to get only 3 . Kickback; corruption and nazrana ,whatever you call is the issue.

aks (USA)
31 Mar, 2012 11:43 PM
EXcept one or two divisions in DRDO all others are either doing nothing or are useless for nation, the so called scientists go to office to search internet play computer games and to gossip… I have tonnes of friends in DRDO and what I am saying here is there daily routine Most of the things made by DRDO is either obselete or useless for army and airforce… therefore we have to go for an MMRCA or BARHMOS as DRDO is incapable ….even the engine for LCA has still to come …DRDO is a political agency , where people know how to make comments like our incapable , despicable politicians

dkddn2 (delhi)
31 Mar, 2012 11:35 PM
Saraswat should be ashamed of heading of an organisation that cannot create anything but rebrand the foreign products. Is he not ashamed of the fact that DRDO had not been able to identify an Indian manufacturer for these missiles ? DRDO is infact a middleman now.

Abihshek (India) replies to dkddn2
01 Apr, 2012 12:29 AM
I don’t know about now but atleast in 2005, even to sit for an interview with DRDO/ISRO, the candidate had to be among the top 3 or 5 of his class. It was dream to work for them but I couldn’t even sit for the interview. And I’m sure everybody knows what kind of people are USUALLY among the top 3, especially in India. So a majority of people who work for these organizations are rote-learners who can memorize and score in exams but are not creative. I’m now working abroad in an Aerospace company who were happy to accept me. There would be thousands like me who would be dying to work for these organizations but can’t due their stupid recruitment policies.

Arif (India)
31 Mar, 2012 11:28 PM
That shows intelligence of DRDO chief. Either he is on drugs or does not understand issue. Issue is about :(1) Bribe (2) Middleman (violation of rule) (3) When Tata and Ashok Leland can produce better trucks then why Tatra?

 

Drdo

DRDO – Revenue and Build up

1 Comment

14th November 2011

To
The Defence Minister
Room No -104, South Block
New Delhi – 110011

Reference: a)  Your letter No 1409-VIP/RM/2011 dated 21st March 2011
                       b)  Your letter No 1409-VIP/RM/2236 dated 20th May 2011

Honorable Sir,

During UPA-I you assured the nation to fixing accountability on DRDO an organisation which has never been questioned since its inception in 1958.

Sir, until 1980 the cost of projects were few crores but due to the visionary thought of then Prime Minister late Smt. Indira Gandhi the projects/programs were planned for self reliance in south east Asia and in particular in the Indian sub continent. The neighbors Pakistan and China were supporting each other to keep their upper hand but nothing deterred Smt. Gandhi to take decisions which may culminate to self reliance in the defence sector.

Initially the projects were planned collecting inputs from the literature available elsewhere. The proposals worked out where the cost benefit ration never assessed.

The changing technology was constraint and therefore projects/ programs during 90’s were given extensions time repeatedly, in some cases without enhancing the cost, where the cost was enhanced with proper justification were made. The examples are LCA, MBT, SAMYUKTA (EW) etc.

Easy methods were worked out under the guys defence secret to persue the projects beyond sanctioned time, without financial implications. Today in the last ten years the projects/ programs for which PDC extended did not consume more than 7000 crores rupees an amount equal to the annual budget of DRDO.

What is the fall out?

The revenue and buildup money sanctioned for running the projects were diverted to meet the day to day expenses of the projects the projects/ programs, which were running on PDC extensions. The manpower, the infra structure, the electricity bills, the salary, the TA/DA expenses were more than the cost of build up.

This imbalance between revenue and buildup was supposed to be checked by finance ministry.

Without active project and constant engagement of manpower in dead project resulted in to growing incompetency of laboratories.

What to talk about the Scientist ‘G’, Scientist ‘B’ were started giving justifications for the failures and compared the annual expenditure of DRDO as the expenditure meet to counter the natural calamity like earth quake.

Then the top brass of DRDO says 100 crores projects is not a big amount for DRDO. Indian Air Force is losing every alternate day on a MIG-21.

Let SA to RM justify the extensions of services to his beloved/blue eyed boys.

Sir, there are hope of Indian people with you please fix accountability on DRDO.

At least the finance ministry should cross check the equal flow of money in revenue and build up.

Thanking you 

Regards     
Prabhu Dayal Dandriyal
21-Sunderwala, Raipur, Dehradun-248008
Phone – 2787750, Mobile- 9411114879,
E-mail id prabhudoon@gmail.com,  prabhu@dandriyal.com Website –  www.corruptionindrdo.com
 
Copy to
1.       Prime Minister, PMO, south Block, New Delhi – 110011
2.       Finance Minister, North Block, New Delhi – 110011
3.       Smt. Sonia Gandhi, Chairperson, United Progressive Alliance  Fax no.23018651